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vRÉSUMÉ
Une mémoire cache est le lien entre le processeur et la mémoire principale. Elle permet de
réduire considérablement les temps d’accès aux blocs de mémoire dans un système embarqué
temps-réel et critique (CRTES), ce qui influence énormément son comportement temporel.
Des caches à accès aléatoire—caches avec une politique de remplacement aléatoire—ont été
proposées dans le but d’améliorer les estimations du comportement temporel des CRTES,
et cela en diminuant les cas pathologiques. Les Measurement Based Probabilistic Timing
Analysis (MBPTA) et Static Probabilistic Timing Analysis (SPTA) sont deux méthodes
qui ciblent à estimer le pire temps d’exécution (Worst Case Execution Time probabiliste -
pWCET) d’une façon probabiliste et sécuritaire pour les caches aléatoires. À travers cette
dissertation, on présente des travaux de recherche concernant l’estimation temporelle basée
sur la méthode SPTA. L’état de l’art sur les méthodologies SPTA fournissent des estimations
sécuritaires et strictes. En revanche, au vu de la réduction d’échelle des technologies des semi-
conducteurs utilisés pour la mise en oeuvre des composants faisant partie des CRETS, les
caches sur puce sont de plus en plus prédisposés aux pannes. Par conséquent, nous avons
développé des méthodologies SPTA pour l’estimation des pWCETs en présence de pannes.
Nous avons effectué également des évaluations de l’impact de ces fautes sur les comportements
temporels.
Afin d’examiner les pannes, nous avons modélisé dans un premier temps les pannes transi-
toires et permanentes. Une panne transitoire représente un changement d’état temporaire. Le
système peut ainsi être restauré en utilisant des techniques de détection et de correction des
pannes. D’un autre côté, une panne permanente introduit un changement permanent. Elle
persiste après son apparition et affecte en conséquence le comportement général du système.
Nous avons alors proposé une méthode basée sur les chaînes de Markov afin de modéliser
les états de disposition de la mémoire. Pour chaque accès à un bloc de mémoire, le change-
ment de l’état est calculé en utilisant une matrice de transition, tout en tenant compte des
impacts des fautes transitoires. Nous avons également utilisé différents types de modèles de
la chaîne de Markov pour représenter le système ayant subi un nombres différent de pannes
permanentes. Les expériences montrent que notre méthode SPTA assure des résultats précis
en présence des pannes transitoires et permanentes.
Par la suite, nous avons étudié différents mécanismes de détection en ligne des pannes per-
manentes. Ce type de pannes joue un rôle important dans l’estimation temporelle, vu qu’elles
continuent d’exister dans le système après leur production, ce qui affecte les accès en mémoire
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qui suivent. Nous avons appliqué deux techniques de détection de pannes ; une technique de
détection basée sur des règles, et une seconde technique basée sur le modèle Dynamic Hidden
Markov Model (D-HMM). La détection basée sur les règles consiste à calculer le nombre de
pannes pour chaque bloc de cache : si le nombre dépasse un certain seuil, le bloc de cache est
considéré définitivement défectueux. La détection basée sur la D-HMM calcule la probabilité
d’une panne permanente. Si cette probabilité dépasse un certain seuil, le bloc de cache est
alors définitivement défectueux. Une fois que le bloc de cache est détecté comme définiti-
vement défectueux, il n’est plus disponible pour les futurs accès. Nous avons découvert que
les mécanismes de détection des fautes permanentes ont permis de changer considérablement
les pWCETs d’un système. En effet, la détection basée sur la methode D-HMM a contribué
énormément à l’amélioration du pWCET, comparé aux techniques de détection basée sur des
règles.
Nous avons ensuite élargi le champ de nos travaux de recherche en ce qui concerne l’état de
l’art sur la SPTA. Les travaux sur la SPTA sans doute peuvent être décomposés en deux
parties : les méthodes basées sur l’énumération d’état et celles basées sur la contention.
La première méthode est relativement similaire à notre méthode basée sur la chaîne de
Markov, puisque les deux méthodes dépendent de l’incorporation des états dans le calcul du
pWCET. Par conséquent, nous avons adapté notre méthode basée sur l’espace des états aux
pannes avec la méthode basée sur l’énumération. Ensuite, nous avons renforcé la méthode
basée sur la contention pour inclure l’impact causé par les pannes. Nous avons pris comme
référence un mécanisme de détection des pannes dit parfait, ayant la capacité de détecter une
panne permanente immédiatement après sa production. Finalement, nous avons comparé les
pWCETs obtenus en utilisant la méthode de détection basée sur des règles et D-HMM avec
ceux obtenus en utilisant la méthode de détection parfaite. Les mesures ont démontré qu’en
moyenne, la D-HMM est plus susceptible à produire des pWCETs proches de l’idéal.
Dans le but d’analyser l’implémentation d’une détection des pannes permanentes, nous avons
adopté une méthode de détection basée sur des règles avec un scrubbing périodique. Deux
modes de commutation périodiques ont été choisis pour cet objectif : un mode auquel la
détection de panne est active et un autre où celle-ci est ignorée. Pour chacun des deux modes,
nous avons développé les formules correspondantes à la méthode basée sur l’énumération
d’état et à la méthode basée sur la contention. Des évaluations expérimentales ont montré que
notre méthode SPTA fournit un pWCET sécuritaire même dans le cas où le système contient
un nombre limité de blocs de mémoire analysés avec la méthode basée sur l’énumération
d’états. Ces évaluations démontrent également une amélioration de la précision qui va de
pair avec l’augmentation du nombre de blocs de mémoire.
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Finalement, nous avons comparé notre propre méthode basée sur la chaîne de Markov avec
l’état de l’art sur la SPTA. Nous avons formellement présenté le cadre de travail du modèle de
la chaîne de Markov et nous avons montré le niveau de sécurité des changements adaptatifs
introduits dans le modèle de la chaîne de Markov. Les résultats expérimentaux indiquent que
les deux méthodes sont caractérisées par des temps de calculs similaires, alors que le modèle
basé sur les chaînes de Markov produit, en moyenne, des pWCETs plus précis. Les caches
LRU (Least Recently Used) ont également été comparés aux caches aléatoires. Celles-ci ont
montré que quand il s’agit d’un nombre limité de blocs de mémoire, les systèmes avec des
caches LRU prennent moins de temps pour compléter l’exécution. Plus le nombre de blocs
de mémoire s’accroit, plus les systèmes avec des caches aléatoires deviennent susceptibles à
terminer plus tôt que ceux avec les caches LRU.
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ABSTRACT
A cache is typically the bridge between a processor and its main memory. It significantly
reduces the access latencies to memory blocks and its timing behavior. Random caches—
caches with a random replacement policy—have been proposed to improve timing behavior
estimates in critical real-time embedded systems (CRTESs) by reducing pathological cases
due to systematic cache misses. Measurement Based Probabilistic Timing Analysis (MBPTA)
and Static Probabilistic Timing Analysis (SPTA) aim at providing safe probabilistic Worst
Case Execution Time (pWCET) estimates for random caches. In this dissertation, we present
research work on timing estimation based on SPTA. State-of-the-art SPTA methodologies
produce safe and tight pWCET estimates. However, as semiconductor technology scales
down, CRTES components—especially their on-chip caches—become prone to faults. Con-
sequently, we developed SPTA methodologies to estimate pWCETs in the presence of faults,
and evaluated the impacts of faults on timing behaviors.
To investigate faults, we first defined transient and permanent fault models. A transient fault
represents a temporary change of state. The system with transient faults can be recovered
using fault detection and correction techniques. A permanent fault represents a permanent
change of state. It persists after its occurrence and affects the system’s behavior afterwards.
Additionally, we proposed a Markov chain method to model memory layout states. For
each memory block access, the state changes are calculated using a transition matrix. The
transient fault impacts were integrated into the transition matrix computation, and we used
different groups of Markov chain models to represent the system with different number of
permanent faults. Experiments showed that our SPTA method provided accurate results in
the presence of both transient and permanent faults.
Next, we studied different online fault detection mechanisms for permanent faults. Permanent
faults play an important role in the timing estimates, because they exist in the system
after their occurrences, and all following accesses are affected. We applied two permanent
fault detection techniques, i.e., rule-based detection and Dynamic Hidden Markov Model
(D-HMM) based detection. Rule-based detection counts the number of faults for each cache
blocks: if the number exceeded a threshold, the cache block is regarded as permanently faulty.
D-HMM based detection predicts the probability of a permanent fault. When the prediction
is larger than a threshold, the cache block is classified as permanently faulty. Once a cache
block is detected as permanently faulty, it is disabled for future accesses. We found that
permanent fault detection mechanisms drastically changed the pWCETs of a system, and
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D-HMM based detection produced an improved pWCET compared to rule-based detection.
We then extended the scope of our research towards state-of-the-art SPTA. The state-of-the-
art, non-fault aware SPTAs consist of two parts: a state enumeration-based method and a
contention-based method. The state enumeration-based method resembles our Markov chain
based method, in that both methods adopt states for pWCET calculations. Consequently,
we adapted our state-space based method with faults within the state enumeration-based
method. Then, we extended the contention-based method to account for fault impacts.
As a reference, we adopted a perfect permanent fault detection mechanism that detects
a permanent fault immediately after it happens. We compared pWCETs obtained using
rule-based and D-HMM based detection to those obtained while using a perfect detection.
Measurements demonstrated that, on average, D-HMM could produce pWCETs that were
closer to the ideal.
For the analysis of the effects of the implementation of permanent fault detection, we adopted
rule-based detection with periodic scrubbing. We used two periodic switching modes: a
mode in which fault detection is active and one in which it is ignored. For each of the two
modes, we developed the corresponding formulae for the state enumeration-based method
and the contention-based method, respectively. Experimental evaluations showed that our
SPTA method provided a safe pWCET result even with few memory blocks and its accuracy
improved when the number of memory blocks increased.
Finally, we compared our own Markov chain based method to this state-of-the-art SPTA
approach. We formally presented the Markov chain model framework and explained the
safety of the adaptive changes in the Markov chain model. Experimental results indicated
that both methods had similar calculation time, while the Markov chain model produced, on
average, more accurate pWCETs. Least Recently Used (LRU) caches were also compared to
random caches, which showed that when few memory blocks were used, systems with LRU
caches took less time to complete their execution. As more memory blocks are used, systems
with random caches might terminate earlier than those with LRU caches.
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1CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed an unprecedented growth in the number of critical real-time
embedded systems (CRTESs). Airplanes, self-driving cars, and spacecraft are examples of
such systems, in which the timing of a computation is as important as its result, and in which
a failure could result in loss of equipment or life; Imagine an aircraft’s response time to a
pilot input, or the activation of a collision avoidance system in an autonomous vehicle. With
the continued trend in automation, the demand for CRTES is expected to continue growing
in the future.
Since timing is such an crucial aspect of these systems, many techniques have been developed
to verify this critical non-functional property. Among these, timing analysis is one of the
most used technique to ensure the safe operation of CRTES [116, 73, 74].
Timing analysis strives to provide guarantees for the maximum time needed to perform a
given computation, providing its safe Worst Case Execution Time (WCET). However, one of
the main obstacles to accurate timing analysis is the unpredictable timing behavior of modern
computer architectures; with multi-stage pipelines and multi-level memory hierarchies, it is
extremely difficult to accurately predict the execution time of a given program. This is
made almost impossible with parallel architectures (such as multi-core systems), due to the
presence of shared resources. Being conservative and over-estimating does not solve the
problem, because of the extremely wide gap between the worst and average cases [18].
In this context, a probabilistic analysis approach can be beneficial [18]: by enabling true
randomized behavior in all the components of a computer, one can define probabilistic metrics
to the timing behavior of a system. Successful implementation of such systems will have
tremendous impact on the way critical systems are designed. The potential benefits in terms
of cost of integration, verification, and certification of real-time software are enormous. For
that matter, consider the development of the on-board computer of a satellite. This is an
excellent example of a CRTES: if commands or alarms are not treated in the appropriate time
frame, the entire satellite could be lost. A traditional approach would take a flight-proven
processor (e.g. the LEON3) equipped with a real-time operating system (e.g. RTEMS [35])
and statically schedule all software tasks to guarantee that the control software will always
respond to events within a safe time frame. This requires detailed knowledge of the hardware
and expensive software analysis. The behavior of multiple interacting tasks can lead to rare
corner cases1 that can lead to catastrophic effects. The largest part of the cost of software
1A corner case is a problem or situation that occurs only outside of normal operating parameters
2qualification is to identify and deal with these situations. The base idea with probabilistic
systems is that instead of struggling to eradicate corner cases, one can tweak the system
parameters to reduce their probability of occurrence to negligible values.
As a result, Probabilistic Timing Analysis (PTA) methods have been proposed to provide the
upper bound of randomized systems. Unlike a single WCET value derived from a determin-
istic system, the timing distribution of a random system behavior is a probabilistic WCET
(pWCET), i.e. the probabilities of execution times exceeding given values. Three types of
PTA methods were proposed in the literature: Measurement Based Probabilistic Timing
Analysis (MBPTA) [37], Static Probabilistic Timing Analysis (SPTA) [118, 27, 39, 9] and a
hybrid of both MBPTA and SPTA [18]. The trustworthiness of these three approaches is in-
vestigated in [6], which concludes that PTA methods have promising pWCET distributions,
but more industrial support is needed to promote their use in real-world products.
That being said, most of the existing PTA methods are typically not fault aware. A few years
back, this would have been acceptable. However, as technology advances, the continuous
shrinking of feature sizes has made reliability a challenge that cannot be overlooked [12].
The system needs to meet real-time requirements while dealing with reliability issues. The
presence of faults, for instance, may degrade system performance and cause catastrophic
consequences. As a matter of fact, faults account for 80 percent of unmanned aerial vehicles
failures reported in a reliability study of the US Office of the Secretary of Defense [95].
Aerospace systems especially navigate in particularly harsh environment in which high-energy
particles interfere with the systems and cause different types of faults. This renders it one of
the most challenging problems for space applications.
Researchers have performed numerous studies on faults of semiconductor devices to help
understand their impacts. Parameter and dynamic variations and their impact on circuit
failures, caches in particular, have been studied [24, 25]. Nassif et al. [82] demonstrate
that SRAM—an element often used in caches—will be affected significantly by technology
scaling. Hardy and Puaut [56] report that caches will be a potential source of performance
degradation in future designs. Consequently, we can see that faults affect system performance
drastically, making it vital to develop PTA methods that take into account fault impacts, an
issue that will be principally addressed in this dissertation.
On that same note, to improve the timing behaviors of CRTES and reduce the cost of
timing analysis, different architectures and analysis methodologies have been proposed in
the literature. One key architecture component is the cache of a processor. A cache is a fast
and expensive memory that is physically close to the processor, which provides instructions
and data at a rate comparable to the computing speed of a processor. Hence the memory
3access time can be significantly reduced if the required information is stored in the cache.
When timing analysis is of concern and in the case of a cache miss, the number of cycles
to execute an instruction is much larger than that in the case of a cache hit. Therefore,
there may be significant timing variations for the execution of the same instruction when
performing timing analysis, depending on the context. To obtain safe results, a conservative
timing analysis is performed. One needs to find the pathological cases—those that lead to
systematic cache misses—of all possibilities, which requires time and effort. Pathological cases
may be much worse than the average case due to systematic cache misses by a particular
pattern, and it is extremely difficult to trigger since many factors may produce it, such
as memory layout, interaction with other programs, etc. In this dissertation, we study a
random cache architecture with a random replacement policy. It reduces the dependence
on a program’s execution history by randomly evicting cache blocks, thus minimizing the
impact of pathological cases and easing the timing analysis [90].
Timing analysis for random caches, however, is now facing new challenges. In this disserta-
tion, we develop new SPTA methodologies for random caches, with the ability to take faults
and their corresponding detection and correction techniques into consideration. Using our
methodologies, we consider fault impact on the system design phase to manage faults effec-
tively, which is critical for CRTES, especially for aerospace systems that experience harsh
low pressure and high radiation environments[81].
1.1 Basic Concepts and Definitions
Pathological Cases
Caches play a fundamental role in determining the execution time of software. A cache
hit provides a much faster access to data and instructions compared to accessing the main
memory. The cache hit and miss pattern is affected by the size of a program’s code and data,
memory addresses, access history, interrupts and preemptions [19]. Pathological cases refer
to the design patterns that cause significant cache misses and make Worst Case Execution
Time (WCET) very pessimistic.
As shown in [19], a good memory layout produces all cache hits after the code is stored in
the cache. However, a bad memory layout may induce a pathological case in which a 100% of
cache misses happen, which dramatically increases the execution time and is very difficult to
predict or test. However, using a random cache, the probability of a pathological case can be
extremely low compared to traditional deterministic caches [90], which drastically improves
the worst-case performance of the system.
4Random Replacement
Fully-associative or set-associative caches have several cache blocks in each cache set. When
a cache set is fully occupied, the replacement policy determines which cache block to evict
and replace. For example, a Least Recently Used (LRU) replacement policy finds the least
recently used cache block and replaces it with the new cache block. Intuitively, a random
replacement chooses a cache block randomly whenever it is needed.
Two random replacement policies exist: evict-on-miss replacement [27] and evict-on-access
replacement [39]. The evict-on-miss replacement policy evicts a cache block randomly when
a cache miss happens, and puts the incoming cache block into the evicted cache block. The
evict-on-access replacement policy evicts a cache block randomly when a cache is accessed
by the processor, whether it is a cache hit or a cache miss. If a cache miss happens, the new
cache block replaces the evicted one.
In this dissertation, we study SPTA using the evict-on-miss replacement policy since it has
been reported to provide a better performance compared to an evict-on-access replacement
policy [39]. Thus, evict-on-miss replacement policy is hereinafter referred to as simply a
random replacement policy unless stated otherwise.
Execution Time Profile
An Execution Time Profile (ETP) is often used in timing analysis (PTA) [18, 20, 37, 27] in
which it represents the frequencies of the possible execution times of software. It consists
of two parts: the execution times (in terms of cycles or number of cache misses) and their
corresponding probabilities.
An ETP can be represented as ETP = {T, P}, where T denotes execution times, i.e., T =
[t0, t1, t2, ...], and P indicates the corresponding occurrence probabilities for each execution
time, i.e., P = [p0, p1, p2, ...], with pi being the occurrence probability of execution time ti.
Probabilistic WCET
For traditional deterministic systems, deterministic timing analysis techniques produce a
single WCET estimate, which upper-bounds the system execution time, and numerous tech-
niques have been developed to improve the tightness of the WCET. For random systems,
PTA techniques are used to compute multiple WCET estimates with corresponding proba-
bilities, instead of a single upper bound estimate. The final result is denoted as a probabilistic
WCET (pWCET).
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Figure 1.1 An example of pWCET.
Figure 1.1 shows an example of a pWCET. The x-axis denotes the execution time, and the
y-axis indicates the exceedance probability, i.e. the probability to exceed a given execution
time. The exceedance probability is the inverse Cumulative Distribution Function (1-CDF),
i.e. the complementary CDF.
The CDF can be calculated by integrating an ETP and the sum of CDF and 1-CDF is
always 1. Therefore, the pWCET can be represented using two variables T and P1−cdf .
T = [t0, t1, t2, ...] is the timing vector from the ETP and P1−cdf = [p01−cdf , p11−cdf , p21−cdf , ...] is
the corresponding exceedance probability vector. Thus, we have pi1−cdf =
∑
∀j,tj>ti pj, where
pj is from the probability vector P in ETP. With the help of pWCET, we can observe if the
probability of the timing failure of the system meets the safety or operational requirements,
e.g., 10−9 per hour.
Measurement Based Probabilistic Timing Analysis
MBPTA is based on Extreme Value Theory (EVT) [37, 28], and collects measurements from
the target hardware to obtain trustworthy pWCET estimates. EVT aims at estimating the
probabilities of events that seldom occur (or even never occurred before), and is used to
predict rare events in many different fields, such as financial crisis, flood levels, catastrophic
6weather conditions, etc. The estimation procedures can be performed using two approaches:
Block Maxima (BM) and Peaks Over Threshold (POT). The BM approach breaks the data
into n groups, and uses the maximum data from each group. The POT approach exploits a
threshold and all data that exceed the threshold are used for estimation.
Due to the presence of random caches, MBPTA uses execution time measurements that vary
under the same condition as the data. With the help of EVT, MBPTA can compute pWCETs
of any PTA-compliant platform, such as [59, 69, 87, 15], using the procedure described in the
following. The measurements can be represented as independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) variables. Then, they are grouped using the BM or POT approach. The distribution
which fits the data is estimated, and the pWCET is calculated using the parameters of the
distribution.
MBPTA has been used extensively in real-world applications [68, 94] and especially in critical
real-time systems [111, 112]. It has proven to be a sound approach for estimating pWCET
using measurements [37, 104].
Static Probabilistic Timing Analysis
SPTA requires detailed knowledge of a program and the target system for its timing analysis.
An SPTA approach uses the memory traces or the compiled executable binary and calculates
pWCET exploiting the additional provided information, such as cache associativity, reuse
distances of memory blocks, etc. The computational complexity of an SPTA approach that
aims at performing a complete analysis of the program increases exponentially with the num-
ber of memory blocks used. Therefore, some information may be discarded in the calculation
process to reduce the computation complexity, while maintaining a good accuracy at the
same time, as is described in [27, 9].
Various SPTA approaches have been tested using benchmarks. They can typically produce
results with good accuracy and, as more information is used, the result quality can be im-
proved at the cost of calculation speed.
Reuse Distance
The reuse distance is a metric often used in SPTA. It defines the number of memory block
accesses between accesses to the same memory block. When the memory block appears for
the first time, its reuse distance is defined as ∞. For example, assume to have a memory
trace a, b, c, a, c, b, we can see that the reuse distances are∞,∞,∞, 3, 2, 4 respectively. With
knowledge of the reuse distance and cache associativity, simplified SPTA methods have been
7developed which provide safe pWCET estimates [27, 39].
Transient Faults
As technology scales down, the probability of fault occurrences increase so dramatically that
we cannot afford to ignore them any longer. In this dissertation, we consider Single Event
Upsets (SEUs) as our main source of transient faults. These are caused by high energy
particles, especially in high-radiation environment of avionics [105]. The internal state of the
circuit is changed by the particles, and a restorable fault occurs as a result. However, SEUs
do not damage the circuit permanently. Numerous error detection and correction techniques
have been proposed, such as parity bit detection, turbo code correction, etc. Once the fault
is detected and corrected, the fault can be removed from the circuit.
Permanent Faults
Technology scaling also makes the circuit less reliable and permanent faults may consequently
occur as well. There are two types of permanent faults: faults due to variations in manu-
facturing process, and those that are caused by component wear-out effects, aging, etc. The
former type of permanent faults is static, i.e. they remain the same after the manufacturing
of the component and the number of faults do not change. The latter is dynamic, and ad-
ditional permanent faults may occur after some time due to aging, etc. In this dissertation,
our focus is on dynamic permanent faults. Once permanent faults happen, the circuit with
such faults is permanently damaged and cannot be recovered.
1.2 Dissertation Objectives
The main objective of our research work is to develop SPTA methodologies for random caches
in the presence of transient and dynamic permanent faults, taking existing fault detection
and correction techniques into consideration. The main objective includes the following sub-
objectives:
• Develop an SPTA methodology for random caches without faults. The SPTA method-
ology is used to provide safe and tight pWCET in absence of faults. We developed a
Markov chain based SPTA method for instruction caches [31] and then extended it to
write-back data caches [33]. Since prior SPTA methods exist, we compared our SPTA
method to the state-of-the-art SPTA methods to make sure that our SPTA produces
results with good accuracy at a reasonable computation cost [33].
8• Develop an SPTA methodology for random caches, while taking transient and perma-
nent faults into account. The presence of faults changes the timing behavior of the
system. Transient and permanent faults affect the system differently and, for them,
specific fault models are established. Fault detection and correction techniques are
assumed to be already in place and their implementation details omitted. Starting
from these fault models and the SPTA method without faults, we developed an SPTA
methodology capable of accounting for fault impacts [31].
• Investigate the impact of permanent fault detection mechanism on timing behaviors.
There are numerous ways in which permanent fault detection can classify a fault as
permanent. Since a permanent fault cannot be recovered for future operations, its
occurrence and detection has a big impact on timing analysis. We compared two
different online permanent fault detection mechanisms and studied their impact on
the timing behavior of the instruction cache of a system [30]. Write-through data
caches, those that avoid data inconsistency issues due to faults, were applied for full
performance analysis of detection techniques [32].
• Develop an SPTA methodology that deals with the implementation details of perma-
nent fault detection mechanisms. In reality, a permanent fault detection mechanism
cannot classify a fault as permanent immediately after its occurrence. We assume that
a permanent fault detection is implemented using period scrubbing. We extended our
SPTA method into two operating modes that affect each other, studying the mode with
and without periodic detection separately [34].
1.3 Dissertation Organization
This dissertation is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 reviews related work on timing analysis for random caches in three main
areas: randomization implementation of a system; PTA methodologies for random
caches; and fault occurrences due to technology scaling and external environment.
• Chapter 3 establishes transient and permanent fault models for random caches. A
detection mechanism is used to detect a transient fault whenever it occurs in a cache
block, and the content in this block is set as invalid. For the permanent fault, a perfect
detection mechanism that detects and disables the cache block immediately after it
occurs is used. We developed a state space based Markov chain model for SPTA, and
9extended it to account for fault impacts, by calculating state changes at each memory
block access.
• Chapter 4 studies two online permanent fault detection mechanisms, i.e., rule-based
and Dynamic Hidden Markov Model (D-HMM) based detection. We assessed how
different detection mechanisms affect pWECTs, and compared the effectiveness of both
mechanisms.
• In Chapter 5, we applied our state space method to state-of-the-art SPTA, which is
composed of a state enumeration method and a contention based method. We also
integrated impact of faults into the contention based method for a simplified and fast
SPTA. Furthermore, two detection mechanisms—rule-based and D-HMM based detec-
tion mechanisms—are compared to a perfect detection mechanism for the statistical
analysis of fault detection impacts.
• The implementation of permanent fault detection is investigated in Chapter 6. We use
a periodic scrubbing technique for fault detection. When a permanent fault is detected,
the corresponding cache block is disabled for future use. We tackled the implementation
impact by developing two SPTA formulae in two modes, and switching between them
periodically.
• Chapter 7 introduces our framework for Markov chain based SPTA. We compared
Markov chain based SPTA to state-of-the-art SPTA. Additionally, we evaluated per-
formance of random caches and Least Recently Used (LRU) caches, respectively.
• Chapter 8 provides a general discussion on the proposed SPTA methodologies and the
impact of faults and their detection techniques.
• We then conclude the dissertation and discuss future work in Chapter 9.
• Finally, we present two co-authored articles in the APPENDICES, which demonstrate
the issues of a random cache implementation on a Field Programmable Gate Array
(FPGA) and the impact of a random cache on scheduling policies for multicore systems,
respectively.
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW
In the verification of a critical real-time embedded system (CRTES), the WCET plays an
important role. The components on a CRTES can be classified into two categories: de-
terministic and stochastic. Deterministic components are adopted for traditional computer
architectures, in which WCETs are computed to ensure that all tasks meet deadlines. Three
types of timing analysis methods are developed [116] accordingly to provide trustworthy
WCETs, i.e. static timing analysis [80, 106, 47, 110, 84, 115, 103, 91, 89, 54, 57, 29, 76],
measurement-based timing analysis [88, 113, 114, 42] and hybrid timing analysis [18, 22, 43].
Aside from deterministic components, numerous stochastic components have been proposed
to randomize the system, thus improving the system performance [100, 101, 90, 66]. Conse-
quently, PTA methodologies are proposed to calculate pWCETs, i.e. execution times with
respect to exceedance probabilities. In this chapter, we review the work on random systems
in three orthogonal areas, i.e. randomization approaches, PTA methodologies for randomized
systems, and the impact of faults on systems studied through PTA. Table 2.1 summarizes
the work and their contributions at the end of the chapter.
2.1 Randomization
2.1.1 Cache Randomization
Many techniques have been proposed to modify caches so that they behave randomly. Schlansker
et al. [96] present a design of set-associative data caches with a randomized placement policy.
When the data is placed into the cache, a pseudo-random hash function randomly selects
a cache set. A matrix multiplication program evaluation showed that a random placement
policy can distribute data uniformly across different cache sets, hence avoiding the sharply
peaked distribution of a modulo placement policy. Thus, data caches with a random place-
ment policies provide a lower cache miss ratio even at a higher fill fraction.
Topham and Gonzalez [107] demonstrate how to modify the cache indexing function to reduce
the cache conflict misses. They propose a polynomial modulus function for cache indexing.
Using the SPEC95 benchmarks, they find that the cache miss ratio standard deviation is
reduced from 18.49 to 5.16, thus increasing the predictability of the system.
Instead of modifying the placement policy, Quinones et al. [90] propose to modify the replace-
ment policy for single-level instruction caches. When a cache block has to be evicted, is is
randomly selected, instead of using a deterministic pattern (e.g., LRU). The authors validate
11
their replacement policy in standard and skew-associate caches, showing that it increases the
average execution time but avoids pathological cases of systematic misses. The worst-case
execution times are 33% and 25% faster for standard and skewed caches, respectively.
In addition to a random replacement policy, Kosmidis et al. [66] develop a parametric random
placement, such that PTA can be applied to set associative as well as direct-mapped caches.
The parametric hash function uses a seed to generate random indexes that are deterministic
throughout the program execution. For different executions, the seed is modified so that the
execution times can be represented as i.i.d. variables. Evaluations show that the hardware
complexity and energy consumption for parametric random placement is low, and the average
performance is comparable to that of deterministic caches. Another Pseudo-Random Number
Generator (PRNG) is proposed in [7]. This meets the safety requirements of IEC-61508 SIL
3 [1] and can be used to provide randomization for multicore platforms.
Hernandez et al. [60] propose a randommodulo cache design that uses randomized-permutations
of memory address index bits. This makes the memory mapping and the layout independent,
while taking advantage of spatial locality. Thus, pWCET is improved when compared to the
random placement cache design in [66].
Reineke [92] state that it is harmful to use random caches in hard real-time systems, because
timing analysis techniques for deterministic LRU caches are preferable to SPTA and MBPTA
techniques. However, Mezzetti et al. [78] point out that MBPTA techniques can produce
trustworthy pWCET estimates for random caches. New, improved SPTA techniques are still
being developed. For example, in loops where the number of memory blocks exceeds the
cache associativity, random caches outperform LRU caches that incur only in cache misses.
Using state-of-the-art SPTA techniques [11], pWCET can be computed.
2.1.2 Bus Randomization
Besides caches, another hardware component that can be randomized is the bus. Jalle et al.
[61] describe buses whose arbitration policies make execution times fulfill PTA requirements
for multicore processors. They study a lottery arbitration bus and propose a randomized-
permutation arbitration bus. On each arbitration round, the lottery arbitration bus randomly
grants access to cores [70]. However, in this case, one core may take many rounds to access the
bus. Therefore a randomized-permutation arbitration bus produces a random permutation
for all cores, which sets an upper bound to the wait time for requesting cores. In fact, there is
no need to develop extra timing analysis techniques, for the PTA techniques used for random
caches with a single core processor can be directly applied to estimate pWCET of random
buses.
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2.1.3 Software Randomization
Some software techniques can be used to enforce randomness in a system as well. Berger
et al. [16] introduce a memory manager—DieHard—to achieve probabilistic memory safety.
DieHard is a runtime system that aims at probabilistically avoiding all memory errors. It
approximates a heap of infinite size, in which it allocates objects randomly. To further
enhance security, the object can be replicated and all replicas can run simultaneously, which
helps to avoid errors from illegal reads. Evaluations over the full SPECint2000 suite [102]
show that DieHard effectively reduces memory errors.
A runtime system and compilers are used to randomize program executions with traditional
deterministic caches to fulfills PTA requirements [67]. Memory objects are randomly placed
by the compiler and the runtime system during each execution, which effectively makes deter-
ministic caches behave randomly. The randomization results are evaluated using Stabilizer
[38]. Experiments show that the proposed technique generates execution times with i.i.d.
property, which makes MBPTA suitable for pWCET estimates.
Kosmidis et al. [64] present a static software randomization approach, which randomly places
functions, global variables and stack frames at compile time. An extra padding is created to
help determine stack frame locations. Evaluations show that this approach provides afford-
able functional verification cost to fulfill safety requirements and is easy to implement at the
cost some extra storage overhead.
2.2 Probabilistic Timing Analysis
In this dissertation, we focus on random caches for system randomization. As mentioned in
previous sections, there are three types of PTA for random caches: MBPTA, SPTA and the
hybrid methods jointly using MBPTA and SPTA. In this section, we separately review each
one of the PTA methods.
2.2.1 Measurement Based Probabilistic Timing Analysis
MBPTA collects timing measurements on a target system, and derives pWCET using sta-
tistical approaches. Cucu-Grosjean et al. [37] propose an EVT based MBPTA approach
for multi-path programs with given input vectors for systems with random caches. They
first collect execution time measurements and then group the measurements using the BM
approach that selects the maximum value in each group for processing. The Gumbel dis-
tribution parameters are estimated for fitting and the pWCET distribution is derived from
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these parameters. Benedicte et al. [14] present a method that gives suggestions as to the
choice of a sufficient number of measurements for MBPTA.
To extend MBPTA to any input vector, Kosmidis et al. [62] propose the Path Upper-
Bounding (PUB) method, which probabilistically upper-bounds the execution time of any
path. It upper-bounds core latency and cache latency, and performs code alignment to ob-
tain a safe pWCET estimate. Ziccardi et al. [119] present a technique which modifies the
time measurements to represent the characteristics of all paths and to make them proba-
bilistically path independent. Path independent execution times are combined as synthetic
measurements to account for unobserved paths.
2.2.2 Static Probabilistic Timing Analysis
Unlike MBPTA, SPTA statically analyzes the program to discover its timing behavior. Zhou
[118] presents a cache hit probability calculation formula that provides the lower bound value
using the reuse distance. However, Cazorla et al. and Altmeyer et al. [27, 9] find the pWCET
calculation with this formula to be unsound, because the pWCET distribution is calculated
using convolutions where all lower bound hit probabilities are considered independent. With
limited cache associativity, this is not the case and therefore the pWCET result may be
wrong.
To provide a safe pWCET estimate, Davis et al. [39] develop an independent cache hit
probability formula which uses both the reuse distance and the cache associativity. When
the reuse distance is larger than the cache associativity, the hit probability is 0. From
this, the lower bound probabilities are computed for all memory blocks. An Execution Time
Profile (ETP) can be derived using the cache hit probability of a memory block, and the final
pWCET distribution is computed by convolutions of all ETPs, since they are independent.
Kosmidis et al. [66] propose another cache hit probability formula which replaces the reuse
distance with the expected number of misses between two memory blocks as the exponent.
Davis [40] has refuted the formula, and provided a case showing that it may be optimistic to
derive pWCET using it.
To estimate pWCETmore precisely, Altmeyer et al. [9] use a state enumeration method which
considers all the possible states in a program’s execution. For each memory access, the entire
state information is calculated to produce an accurate result, however, the number of states
increases exponentially with the number of memory blocks. To cope with this problem,
a cache contention based method is developed to derive less precise pWCET results with
faster calculation. By combining both the state enumeration and the cache contention based
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methods, pWCET estimation becomes tractable and the result is a compromise between
calculation accuracy and speed. Altmeyer et al. [11] extend their work by developing another
heuristic to decide how to select the memory blocks for the state enumeration and the cache
contention based method, respectively. Furthermore, they add an approach to calculate lower
bound hit probabilities using the stack distance (an alternative formula for reuse distance).
Griffin et al. [49] explain a state space based approach, and reduce the state sizes using
lossy compression techniques. May and Must analysis [80] are performed respectively, where
the May analysis finds the memory accesses that are guaranteed to be cache misses and
the Must analysis finds those that are guaranteed to be cache hits. With lossy compression,
some memory blocks are replaced by unknown memory blocks, and the states and their timing
history are replaced by bounding information, which results in two compression methods: hit
probability and forward reuse distance. Benchmark evaluations indicate that both methods
are tractable and derive precise pWCETs when using appropriate parameters.
Lesage et al. [71] analyze the Control Flow Graph (CFG) of a multi-path program to find the
worst-case execution path using a joint function to explore cache states and path inclusions.
They apply the state-of-the-art SPTA in [9] to the worst-case path, and derive the pWCET
distribution. This multi-path pWCET estimation technique produces a more accurate result
when compared to a previous work on multi-path pWCET derivation using simple path
merging techniques [39].
2.2.3 Hybrid Probabilistic Timing Analysis
Bernat et al. [18] aim at reducing the overestimation of execution times and propose a
hybrid method using both measurement and static approaches for their timing analysis. The
program is represented as a syntax tree, and the ETPs of blocks are computed respectively.
Taking block interactions into consideration, the final execution time is obtained using joint
operators for ETPs. A pWCET calculation tool framework is developed in [20]. It generates
instrumentation and traces, and traverses the syntax tree to perform a hybrid analysis.
2.3 Fault Impact
Due to technology scaling, fault rates have increased noticeably. As a result, PTA methods in
the presence of faults have been investigated to study how faults affect the timing behaviors
of randomized systems. For random caches, Slijepcevic et al. [98] propose the Degraded Test
Mode (DTM) to derive safe pWCET distributions. DTM specifies requirements on fault-
tolerant hardware that is compliant with PTA. Together with MBPTA, DTM provides safe
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and tight pWCETs, and graceful degradation of the average and worst-case performance in
the presence of permanent faults.
To further the study of fault scenarios, Slijepcevic et al. [99] considered both transient and
permanent faults, in addition to error Detection, Correction, Diagnosis, and Reconfiguration
(DCDR) techniques. Different fault rates are applied to a system with random caches.
pWCET distributions from MBPTA indicate that—due to the presence of DCDR—pWCETs
are negligibly affected. However, permanent faults affect the pWCET estimates significantly
in some cases.
Besides fault-aware MBPTA, SPTA techniques have also been adapted to consider fault im-
pact. Hardy and Puaut [56] propose an SPTA method to deal with fault impact in LRU
instruction caches. The permanent faults that are caused by process variations in the man-
ufacturing phase are taken into account. They first compute the fault-free timing behavior
of the system, and then they generate a Fault Miss Map (FMM) using an Integer Linear
Programming (ILP) solver with faulty blocks. By combining the fault-free timing behavior
and the FMM, they obtain pWCET distributions in the presence of the permanent faults
introduced by the manufacturing process.
Hardy et al. [55] introduce two reliability mechanisms—Reliable Way (RW) and Shared
Reliable Buffer (SRB)—to mitigate the impact of permanent faults. RW adds one extra
fault-free cache block to each cache set, while SRB adds a shared fault-free cache block that
can be used by all cache sets, in addition to an extra look-up mechanism for this shared block
in a cache. pWCETs are computed using SPTA techniques [56], and the results show that,
with these reliability mechanisms, the pWCETs can be improved dramatically.
Trilla et al. [109] propose a new random modulo cache design with the typical features of a
random modulo cache but also improved reliability. With the help of MBPTA, they assess the
random modulo robustness against Hot Carrier Injection (HCI) aging, which shows that—
compared to the random modulo cache in [60]—the lifetime of the new design increases by
3.9 times and 8.8 times for instruction cache and data cache, respectively. The critical path
is not affected by the new design.
16
Table 2.1 Summary of related research work in the literature.
Feature Reference Contribution
Cache Randomization [96, 107,
66, 60]
Random placement policies for caches using
different strategies.
[90] Cache random replacement policy.
Bus Randomization [61] Bus random arbitration policy.
Software Randomization [16, 67] A compiler or a runtime environment that
randomly allocates objects into the memory.
[64] Static approach to randomly place objects at
compile time.
MBPTA [37, 14] EVT based approach to predict pWCET for
given input.
[62, 119] Representation of all paths as the input to
EVT based approach.
SPTA [118, 27,
40, 39, 66]
Independent cache hit probability for each
memory request.
[9, 11, 49] State space based approach for precise esti-
mates.
[39, 71] Multi-path program analysis.
Hybrid PTA [18, 20] Hybrid analysis using syntax trees.
Fault Impact [98, 99] MBPTA in the presence of faults.
[56, 55] SPTA for LRU caches with manufacturing
permanent faults.
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CHAPTER 3 ARTICLE 1: STATIC PROBABILISTIC TIMING ANALYSIS
IN PRESENCE OF FAULTS
3.1 Preface
Random caches are starting to be more commonly used in commercial processors to improve
the system performance. Reliability is also becoming a serious challenge for semiconductor
devices. Smaller feature sizes, lower power voltages and higher frequencies have increased
the probabilities of faults in cache memories which adopt the smallest features allowed. In
this article, we propose a model for transient faults—i.e., fault that affect cache blocks
temporarily and does not hinder successive data storage operations—and one for permanent
faults—i.e., faults that permanently damage cache blocks—for random caches. On top of
that, we develop an SPTA technique that describes the states of the cache for each memory
request and uses them to derive pWCET distributions, while taking the impact of faults into
consideration. This is our first attempt to develop SPTA methodologies and to study fault
impacts. Experiments prove that it is possible to deal with faults using SPTA techniques
and the pWCET estimates could be as precise as those from simulations provided that we
use sufficient memory blocks for the analysis.
Full Citation: C. Chen, L. Santinelli, J. Hugues, and G. Beltrame, “Static probabilistic
timing analysis in presence of faults,” in 2016 11th IEEE Symposium on Industrial Embedded
Systems (SIES), May 2016, pp. 1–10.
3.2 Abstract
Accurate timing prediction for software execution is becoming a problem due to the increas-
ing complexity of computer architecture, and the presence of mixed-criticality workloads.
Probabilistic caches were proposed to set bounds to Worst Case Execution Time (WCET)
estimates and help designers improve system resource usage. However, as technology scales
down, system fault rates increase and timing behavior is affected. In this paper, we pro-
pose a Static Probabilistic Timing Analysis (SPTA) approach for caches with evict-on-miss
random replacement policy using a state space modeling technique, with consideration of
fault impacts on both timing analysis and task WCET. Different scenarios of transient and
permanent faults are investigated. Results show that our proposed approach provides tight
probabilistic WCET (pWCET) estimates and as fault rate increases, the timing behavior of
the system can be affected significantly.
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3.3 Introduction
A time-critical computing system, such as a satellite on-board computer, requires accurate
timing prediction of software execution. If events are not managed within a certain time
frame, the result may be catastrophic. A conservative estimation on execution time for
traditional deterministic architecture will place the Worst Case Execution Time (WCET) far
away from the actual maximum time used by the application [18].
To help predicting timing behavior, probabilistic real-time systems were introduced and such
systems have very few pathological cases [90]. One method to realize probabilistic system is
to modify the behavior of the cache – a bridge between processor and main memory – and
make it random [90], which provides overall tighter bounds due to the lack of pathological
cases. Two timing analysis techniques are proposed for systems with random caches: the
Measurement Based Probabilistic Timing Analysis (MBPTA) and the Static Probabilistic
Timing Analysis (SPTA). While MBPTA is based on repeated testing of an application for
estimating its timing probability distribution, the SPTA uses detailed knowledge of software
and hardware for obtaining a precise timing analysis with safe timing bounds.
As transistor size decreases, circuits become more sensitive to transient faults [36] which
affect system timing behavior. Transient faults might be caused by high local temperatures
or radiation effects, such as package alpha decay or galactic cosmic rays impacts, even at the
ground level [85]. Furthermore, wear-out effects can introduce permanent faults throughout
the lifetime of a device. Such effects are also exacerbated by technology scaling [50]. As a
result, reliability to permanent and transient faults has to be considered for timing analysis.
In this paper, we present an SPTA methodology for instruction caches with random re-
placement policy, that takes both transient and permanent faults into consideration. Our
methodology takes single-path program memory traces as inputs and computes probabilistic
WCET (pWCET), i.e. exceedance probabilities with respect to execution time (the num-
ber of processor cycles in our simulations). The calculation is performed using state space
techniques, and it is based on a non-homogeneous Markov chain model [97]. At every step,
the current status of the system can be represented as a vector containing the probability
of each state. The status of next step is computed using a transition matrix. To perform
timing analysis, timing distribution vectors – which are used for timing representation and
analysis – are assigned to each state. Transient and permanent fault effects are addressed as
probabilistic models using fault injection. We employ an online fault detection mechanism
for both faults and modify the system state at each step for accounting of faults. Our results
show that by our approach, we can obtain tight pWCET estimates. In addition, different
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scenarios of faults are studied. We can see that permanent faults have a significant impact
on performance degradation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: related work is discussed in Section 7.4; Sec-
tion 6.5 introduces system model based on Markov chain; the methodology using the model
is explained in Section 5.6; fault models and their impacts on the system are demonstrated
in Section 5.5; real-world benchmarks are evaluated in Section 6.7; and finally Section 7.10
draws some concluding remarks.
3.4 Related Work
Several works on SPTA have been proposed for caches with random replacement policy.
Zhou [118] proposes a cache hit formula using reuse distance – the number of memory ad-
dresses accessed between two consecutive references to the same memory address – which
simplifies computational complexity significantly. The probabilities for each cache access are
made independent, and the final result is the convolution of all cache accesses. However,
Cazorla et al. [27] and Altmeyer et al. [9] have found his methodology unsound. Quinones et
al. [90] and Kosmidis et al. [66] give other formulae for random caches, while Cucu-Grosjean
et al. [37] and Cazorla et al. [27] perform probabilistic timing analysis using these formulae.
However, the formulae in [66] may overestimate the cache hit ratio [40].
Davis et al. [39] develop a formula using reuse distance only for evict-on-miss caches, and
Altmeyer et al. [9] prove it to be optimal when only reuse distance is known. Multi-path
programs are also analyzed by assuming that they are bounded. Besides, maximum preemp-
tion effects during program execution are taken into account for timing analysis. Altmeyer et
al. [9] propose an exhaustive analysis approach. To reduce its computational complexity, this
exhaustive approach can be combined with simplified formulae [11], resulting in an improved
algorithm for SPTA. Griffin et al. [49] propose a methodology from the field of Lossy Com-
pression and compare it with the method in [9]: by using May and Must Analysis, the result
is more accurate with appropriate parameters. Lesage et al. [71] propose an SPTA for multi-
math programs by using a conservative approach: cache states upper-bounds are calculated
and paths are reduced according to worst-case execution path expansion. To demonstrate
the impact of random caches, Abella et al. [4], Altmeyer et al. [11] and Lesage et al. [71]
have done comparisons between caches using LRU and random replacement policy.
There are few studies on Probabilistic Timing Analysis (PTA) in the presence of faults.
Slijepcevic et al. [98] study fault-tolerant systems, and combine it with PTA. Degraded Test
Mode is proposed for random caches, which specifies requirements for hardware design and
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test. By using Degraded Test Mode, real time systems can be analyzed with probabilities,
and the pWCET is performed using MBPTA. Slijepcevic et al. extend the work in [99].
They propose an approach taking account of timing impacts of error detection, correction,
diagnosis, and reconfiguration (DCDR) and degraded performance due to faults. They verify
the timing behavior with different fault scenarios on critical real-time embedded systems and
their work is based on MBPTA. Hardy and Puaut [56] present an SPTA-based methodology
to calculate pWCET for instruction caches that contains only manufacturing permanent
faults with LRU replacement policy. Permanent faults are detected by tests and cache blocks
with permanent faults are disabled. A fault-free pWCET and miss probability distribution
due to faults are initially computed separately. Then they are combined to form the pWCET
with permanent faults. This method does not consider permanent faults that occur during
program executions.
Our approach is the first method that calculates the timing behavior of caches with random
replacement policy in presence of both transient and permanent faults. We consider perma-
nent faults that happen during execution and are caused by device wear-out effects. This
approach is based on SPTA and provides safe and tight pWCET estimates.
3.5 System Model
In this section, we present our SPTA model for random caches based on Markov chains. Our
model is applied to a fully associative cache and it can be generalized to a set associative
cache in which the analysis of each cache set can be performed separately as a fully associative
cache. The model uses a memory trace as the input, and obtains a pWCET as the output.
It is based on system states, which is similar to other accurate SPTA approaches [9, 49]
for random caches. Different heuristics are applied for these approaches, and we apply an
adaptive heuristic in the proposed approach.
A Markov chain is a mathematical framework that describes how a system moves from one
state to another. If the future state of a system depends uniquely on the current state, such
a system forms a Markov chain. The current state describes the status of the system, and
the transition matrix explains how the system transits into the next state.
For a cache with evict-on-miss random replacement policy, every time a cache miss happens,
a cache block is randomly selected and replaced with the new data (the term data is used
to refer to the content of a memory address). As a result, there may be different data in
the cache at different times, i.e. the memory layout of the cache changes with time. To
describe the status of the system, si is defined as the memory layout of the cache and |si| is
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the number of elements in this state. Example 3.5.1 shows how to construct states from a
trace of memory access by a task.
Example 3.5.1 Suppose there is a task τ and a 2-way cache. The memory accesses from τ
are a, b, c, a, b. Then we can define the state space as s0 = ∅, s1 = {a}, s2 = {b}, s3 = {c},
s4 = {a, b}, s5 = {a, c}, s6 = {b, c}. We can see that all memory layouts are included in the
states, and |s0| = 0, |si| = 1 : i = 1, 2, 3, |si| = 2 : i = 4, 5, 6.
Each program step can be seen as an access to a new memory address. Every time a memory
address is accessed, the system advances by 1 time step and the system state may change.
Each possible state of the system, i.e. memory layout, at a given step is associated with a
probability.
The state occurrence probability vector S is defined as:
S = [Pr(s0), P r(s1), · · · ], (3.1)
where Pr(si) is the probability of the state si. With m being the number of different memory
addresses in the program, and l being minimal value between cache associativity and m, the
number of states can be calculated as:
l∑
k=0
 m
k
 . (3.2)
In addition to S, we introduce the transition matrix P , which describes how one state varies
from the current step to the next. It is represented as:
P =

p0→0, p0→1, · · ·
p1→0, p1→1, · · ·
... ... . . .
 , (3.3)
where pi→j is the probability for the system to go from state si to state sj. In our model, pi→j
varies constantly, because it depends on the current system state and the memory accesses.
At each step, the system may access different memory addresses and its state may change.
Consequently, the transition probability pi→j may change and this is a non-homogeneous
Markov chain model.
Assuming Sk and P k are the state probability vector and the transition matrix at step k,
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respectively, then we have
Sk+1 = SkP k. (3.4)
We can see that the state of the system for next step only depends on current state and the
transition matrix.
3.6 Methodology
In this section, we demonstrate how to perform SPTA using the proposed system model
based on Markov chains.
3.6.1 Transition Matrix Calculation
In our Markov chain model, Equation (3.4) is used to describe the system behavior. Given
an initial state, we can calculate the transition matrix at each step and obtain the system
state.
Algorithm 2 takes two inputs: the state occurrence probability vector S and the incoming
memory address, and produces one output: the transition matrix P . The algorithm checks
all states and generates the transition matrix elements accordingly:
Line 4: All transition probabilities for state si are first initialized to 0. They may be modified
later depending on current state and incoming address.
Line 6: Pr(si) = 0 means that state si is an impossible state at the current step. Therefore
we have ∀m, pi→m = 0, i.e. one cannot exit from an impossible state.
Line 9: If si corresponds to an empty cache, a cache miss is inevitable, and there is only
one possible transition from the empty cache state to the cache state with the incoming
memory address.
Line 2: If the requested memory address is in the cache, there is a cache hit. In this case,
the cache will not change its state with probability 1, i.e. pi→i = 1.
Line 5: If the requested memory address is not in the cache, there is a cache miss and the
transition matrix is computed. This is the most complex case: the new memory ad-
dress may replace an existing cache block, or it may be put into a new cache block and
probabilities have to be computed accordingly. In our target cache, the probability of
replacing an existing cache block is 1/N (see Line 8), where N is the cache associativ-
ity. This is because we consider an evict-on-miss random cache, and a cache block is
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ALGORITHM 1: Transition matrix calculation
Data: State prob. vector S, memory address a
Result: Transition matrix P
1 n← |S|; //number of states in S;
2 for i← 0 to n-1 do
3 for j ← 0 to n-1 do
4 pi→j ← 0; //initialize transition matrix
5 end
6 if Pr(si) = 0 then
7 go to next i; //state si does not exist
8 end
9 if si = ∅ then
10 pi→m ← 1; //sm = {a}, cache miss for si
11 go to next i;
12 end
13 if a ∈ si then
14 pi→i ←1; //cache hit
15 go to next i;
16 end
17 ind0← ∅; //indexes of transitions by replacement
18 ind1← ∅; //indexes of transitions by new cache block
19 q ← |si|; //number of addresses for state si
20 for j ← 0 to n-1 do
21 p← |sj |; //number of addresses for state sj
22 if p-q=0 then
23 l← |si − sj |; //number of different addresses
24 if l=1 and a ∈ sj then
25 Add j to ind0; //replaces existing address
26 end
27 end
28 if p-q=1 then
29 if si ⊂ sj and a ∈ sj then
30 Add j to ind1; //add new address
31 end
32 end
33 end
34 N ← cache associativity;
35 for x ∈ ind0 do
36 pi→x = 1/N ; //replacement prob.
37 end
38 for x ∈ ind1 do
39 pi→x = (N − q)/N ; //new address prob.
40 end
41 end
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randomly selected for replacement with probability 1/N . The probability for a memory
address to be placed in an empty cache block is (N − q)/N (see Line 12), where q is
the number of blocks in use for the current state si. This is due to the fact that if the
new memory address does not cause a replacement, it can only be put into an empty
cache block. The number of empty cache blocks is N − q, and they are chosen from N
ways. Therefore the probability is (N − q)/N .
Example 3.6.1 shows how to obtain the state at a given step for Example 3.5.1 using the
transition matrix using Equation (3.4) and Algorithm 2 .
Example 3.6.1 Let pi→j = 0 at the beginning of each step, and assuming the cache is
initially empty at the beginning of step 1, then we have S1 = [1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0].
At step 1: For P 1, all elements are 0 except p0→1 = 1. S2 = S1 · P 1 = [0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0].
At step 2: p1→2 = 1/2, p1→4 = 1/2, S3 = S2 · P 2 = [0, 0, 1/2, 0, 1/2, 0, 0].
At step 3: p2→3 = 1/2, p2→6 = 1/2, p4→5 = 1/2, p4→6 = 1/2,
S4 = S3 · P 3 = [0, 0, 0, 1/4, 0, 1/4, 1/2].
At step 4: p3→1 = 1/2, p3→5 = 1/2, p5→5 = 1, p6→4 = 1/2, p6→5 = 1/2, S5 = S4 · P 4 =
[0, 1/8, 0, 0, 1/4, 5/8, 0].
At step 5: p1→2 = 1/2, p1→4 = 1/2, p4→4 = 1, p5→4 = 1/2, p5→6 = 1/2, S6 = S5 · P 5 =
[0, 0, 1/16, 0, 5/8, 0, 5/16].
3.6.2 Timing Analysis
With Algorithm 2, Equation (3.4) can be used to describe the system state transitions.
Nonetheless, the duration of a task execution is different from the step used in the Markov
chain. At each step, one memory address is accessed and different number of cycles may be
applied to the timing analysis according to the system state. Without loss of generality, we
assume 1 cycle for a cache hit and 100 cycles for a cache miss (any timing behavior would
work). With different number of cycles executing the program and their corresponding
occurrence probabilities, we have timing distributions for programs. The resulting timing
distributions are discrete-time distributions as each memory access takes n ∈ N number of
cycles.
Two vectors are introduced for defining timing distributions and modeling timing behaviors
with respect to probabilities. A cycle vector C can be used to denote the timing distribution
in terms of number of cycles, and a probability vector M can represent the probability of
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occurrence for C. Then we have C = [c0, c1, · · · ] and M = [m0,m1, · · · ], where ci ∈ N
represents the program duration in cycles and mi = Pr(ci),mi ∈ R denotes the occurrence
probability for ci. A scalar addition of C and a scalar multiplication of M are defined as
C + n = {c+ n|n ∈ N, c ∈ C},
M · p = {m× p|p ∈ R,m ∈M}.
With the cycle vector C and its probability vector M , we define the timing distribution for
state si as Ti =< Ci,M i >. Ti collects the number of cycles to execute the program and
corresponding probabilities for each cycle. The timing distribution changes during program
execution; the initial values is Ti =< [0], [1] >, and each memory access adds additional
cycles and probabilities to the timing distribution.
Timing distributions T need to be combined during state transitions, since different states
can transit to the same state after the memory access. Therefore the merge operation between
timing distributions ⊎ is defined such that the resulting distribution Tk is
Tk = Ti
⊎ Tj =< Ck,Mk >, (3.5)
where Ck = Ci ∪ Cj, and Mk = {mp +mq|mp ∈ M i,mq ∈ M j, cp ∈ Ci, cq ∈ Cj, cp = cq}.
The merge operation puts all number of cycles into one vector, and the probabilities with
the same number of cycle are added together.
With the transition matrix P , the timing distribution for state sj is:
Tj =
 < ∅, ∅ > if ∀i, pi→j = 0⊎
i < Ci + na,M i · pi→j > otherwise,
(3.6)
where
na =
 nh if j = inm if j 6= i, (3.7)
nh is the number of cycles for a cache hit, and nm is the number of cycles for a cache miss,
e.g. the previously chosen values of 1 and the 100.
By merging timing distribution vectors of all states, using Equation (3.6), we could compute
the timing distribution of the whole program as T =< C,M >.
Having the timing distribution, for each state and for the whole program, we can compute
both the Cumulative Distribution Function and the inverse Cumulative Distribution Function
(1-CDF) [39]. The inverse cumulative is an exceedance function showing the probability of
exceeding a certain program duration in cycles. The 1-CDF probabilities are denoted as
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Q = [q0, q1, · · · ], with
qi =
∑
mj∈M,ci,cj∈C,cj>ci
mj. (3.8)
The inverse timing distribution is defined as I =< C,Q > and can be related to the state
si, i.e. Ii, or the whole program, i.e. I.
Example 3.6.2 In this example we demonstrate how to do timing analysis for the parameters
listed in Example 3.5.1.
At each step, we use Equation (3.6) to compute Ti. Let nh = 1, nm = 100
At step 1: T1 =< [100], [1] >.
At step 2: T2 =< [200], [1/2] >, T4 =< [200], [1/2] >.
At step 3: T3 =< [300], [1/4] >, T5 =< [300], [1/4] >, T6 =< [300], [1/2].
At step 4: T1 =< [400], [1/8] >, T4 =< [400], [1/4], T5 =< [301, 400], [1/4, 3/8] >.
At step 5: T2 =< [500], [1/16] >, T4 =< [401, 500], [3/8, 1/4], T5 =< [401, 500], [1/8, 3/16] >.
By Equation (3.6), we have T =< [401, 500], [1/2, 1/2] >.
From Equation (3.8), the inverse timing distribution is I =< [401, 500], [1/2, 0] >, i.e. there
is the probability of 1/2 to exceed 401 cycles, and the probability to exceed 500 cycles is 0,
since the maximum execution time is 500 cycles.
It is worth noting that for a set associative cache, the Markov chain model applies to each
cache set CSk. As a result, there are both the timing distribution TCSk and the inverse timing
distribution ICSk specific of the cache set. Assuming a deterministic placement policy (e.g.
modulo placement) is applied, let akm be an address assigned to cache set CSk. This address
can assigned to only one cache set. The timing distribution TCSk is a function of the addresses
assigned to it, i.e. TCSk = f(ak0, ak1, ...). For another cache set timing distribution, we have
TCSl = f(al0, al1, ...) and akm 6= aln : k 6= l. We can see that cache set timing distributions
are functions of different addresses and are thus statistically independent of each other, i.e.
TCSk ⊥ TCSl : k 6= l.
To obtain the timing distribution T of different cache sets, we apply the convolution operator
⊗ between different cache set timing distributions:
TCS = TCSk ⊗ TCSl =< C,M >,
where C = {cp + cq|cp ∈ CCSk , cq ∈ CCSl}, and mi ∈M calculated as mi =
∑
mp∈MCSk
mq∈MCSl
cp+cq=ci
mpmq.
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3.6.3 Adaptive Method
The result of our Markov model is an accurate timing analysis, because it takes all states
into account and computes how they change over time. The Markov model overcomes the
pessimism introduced by formulae in [39]. The resulting timing distribution T is the pWCET
obtained accounting for all the cache configurations while the program executes.
However, from Equation (3.2) we can see that the number of states increases polynomially
with a high exponent value as more memory addresses are accessed. The method proposed
could become intractable. We use then an adaptive method to limit the number of states and
to produce a result with reasonable accuracy, which scales with the size of memory accesses.
Suppose there are n different memory addresses, in order to reduce computational complexity,
we would like to use only m (m < n) memory addresses for the states so that the number
of states is limited and we can enumerate all states. This is realized with two parts: the i)
state modification and the ii) state and timing distribution merge.
i) State modification: for the first m different addresses a0, a1, ...am−1, where ai 6= aj for
i 6= j. We construct the state space {s0, s1, ...} using the proposed Markov chain method.
We have ∀A ⊆ {a0, a1, ...am−1}, ∃i : A ⊆ si. The number of states is from Equation (3.2).
When another new memory address am comes, we modify states in the state space, instead
of increasing the number of states.
In order to modify states, we find a memory address a ∈ {a0, a1, ...am−1}. The state si
containing a is changed to state sj in which am replaces a. There are different heuristics
to select a. We assume that a least recently used address a has a low probability to be
used again in recent memory accesses, and a is to be replaced as follows: ∀i : a ∈ si, sj =
si\{a}∪{am}. The probability and the timing distribution for sj are respectively Pr(sj) = 0
and Tj =< ∅, ∅ >. This way, the number of states remains the same, but different addresses
can be used in the state space. The method works in an adaptive way by modifying the
states with the least recently used addresses. Note that the least recently used address is
used to change states, and it is not a cache replacement policy.
ii) State and timing distribution fusion: When states are changed, we need to take timing
analysis into account as well, because each state is assigned different timing distributions.
To obtain the safe bound to the pWCET, we use a conservative method dealing with the S
and T variables for the timing analysis. S is the state occurrence vector and T is the timing
distribution.
Suppose si : a ∈ si is the state before state modification, and sp is the state containing all
memory addresses in si except the address a that is to be replaced, i.e. sp = si \ {a}. In
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state modification, we have seen that whenever a new address is accessed, we may change
the state si. Therefore the state vector which represents its occurrence probability must be
modified accordingly. In the new state vector S, we use
Pr(sp) = Pr(si) + Pr(sp) (3.9)
The occurrence probability Pr(sp) can be accumulated to account for the occurrence prob-
ability Pr(si), because if sp ⊆ si, for any new memory address, state si has the same or a
higher cache hit probability compared to that from state sp. Equation (3.9) adds pessimism
to timing analysis, but it provides a safety bound. In addition to state modification, we need
to merge the timing distribution Ti to Tp using Equation (3.5).
After the state modification and state and timing distribution fusion, the Markov chain model
uses the same methodology developed in Section 5.6 for new memory accesses. By using the
state space constructed by m addresses, the adaptive method is tractable. To trade off for
tractability, the accuracy is compromised, because only some of addresses are used to build
the state space. Therefore timing behaviors from the addresses that are discarded are not
considered. Nevertheless, the pWCET estimate from this method is safe and it becomes
tighter as more addresses are applied.
3.7 Fault Impacts
In this section, both transient and permanent fault models are introduced to the system
that is equipped with an online fault detection mechanism. We consider faults that only
occur in the storage elements of the cache and apply probabilistic models for faults. Faults
in combinational circuits are not considered in this paper. We use the fault occurrence
probability of each memory access step for analysis. Since a cache miss takes longer than a
hit, to simplify the analysis and obtain a safe bound, we assume that each memory access
step is a cache miss, i.e. it takes nm cycles and this value is used for fault rate calculation in
following sections.
For set associative caches, different cache sets may be accessed. Let ni and ni+1 be consecutive
steps to access the same cache set, and ns be the step difference. We have
ns = ni+1 − ni. (3.10)
For fully associative caches, ns = 1. We assume a constant fault rate f is applied to both
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transient and permanent faults. The probability to have a fault for one cache block is
1− (1− f)ns , (3.11)
and the probability without a fault is (1− f)ns .
3.7.1 Transient Fault Impact
A Single Event Upset (SEU) is a change of state caused by a high-energy particle. We regard
an SEU as a transient fault, since it does not cause permanent damage and the system
can be recovered. SEUs are known to be independent, and we assume they are uniformly
distributed in space and time, i.e. each cache block has the same fault rate throughout the
program execution. After the fault occurs, the cache block remains faulty unless this fault
is detected. This is because the transient fault happens to the storage element. Once the
storage state changes, it can not recover automatically. As a result, transient fault effect
lasts. After the fault is detected, this block is seen as invalid, but it does not affect following
data storage in it.
To deal with transient fault, many techniques have been proposed. For example, Reed-
Solomon codes have been used extensively for space applications to detect and correct tran-
sient fault errors. In this paper, we employ a simple parity check fault detection mechanism
– where parity bits are are added to the data – to first level (L1) cache, which has less area
and speed penalties for L1 caches compared to commonly used single error correction-double
error detection (SEC-DED) techniques [79].
When a cache block is accessed, the parity bits stored are examined to see if any transient
fault has occurred. Due to low probability of fault, we assume that all faults can be detected.
If any fault is detected, the corresponding data is regarded as invalid and will be fetched
from the main memory again.
We note that with parity check mechanism, the impact of a transient fault is equivalent to a
cache eviction, i.e. once the transient fault occurs, the data is not valid any more and it is a
cache miss. Let ft be the transient fault probability at each step and si be the state before
transient fault detection. After fault detection, si becomes sp. With Equation (3.10) and
(4.4), we have sp ⊆ si and
Pr(sp) = Pr(si)((1− ft)ns)|sp|(1− (1− ft)ns)|si|−|sp|. (3.12)
Transient fault detection produces new states, which may be the same as existing ones. If
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∃sm : sm = sp, we change timing distributions by multiplying the state change probability,
and then merge state probabilities and timing distributions using Equation (3.9) and Equa-
tion (3.5). Example 3.7.1 demonstrates how a state changes because of transient fault after
one step.
Example 3.7.1 Suppose we have a state s = {a, b}, Pr(s) = 0.5 and the transient fault
probability is ft = 0.1 at each step. After one step, from Equation (3.12) we know that new
states are produced and we have
Pr(s = {a, b}) = 0.5× (1− 0.1)2 = 0.405
Pr(s = {a}) = 0.5× 0.1× (1− 0.1) = 0.045
Pr(s = {b}) = 0.5× 0.1× (1− 0.1) = 0.045
Pr(s = ∅) = 0.5× 0.12 = 0.005
3.7.2 Permanent Fault Impact
Permanent Fault Model
Permanent faults are faults whose effects are assumed to last from the moment they appear
to the end of the program execution. When a permanent fault occurs to a cache block, it
cannot be used any more.
To model permanent faults we start by defining the probability fp(t, T ) of a permanent fault
occurring. It is the probability of fault in a system component by time t, failure ≤ t,
given that the component was still functional at the end of the previous interval t − T ,
failure > t − T . T is the scrubbing period, i.e. the time interval between two consecutive
fault detection to avoid error accumulation. In this paper it is the time for one memory
access. This probability can be computed using the Kolmogorov definition from the formula
in [86], as:
fp(t, T ) = Pr(failure ≤ t|failure > t− T )
= Pr(failure ≤ t ∧ failure > t− T )
Pr(failure > t− T )
= cdffailure(t)− cdffailure(t− T )1− cdffailure(t− T ) , (3.13)
with cdffailure the cumulative density function of the random variable failure describing the
time at which the failure happens.
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In literature, several probability distributions are used to model failure times [86]. One of the
most frequently used is the exponential distribution; however, the exponential distribution
representation is somewhat imprecise because it lacks the ability to capture the increasing
failure probability due to accumulated wear in the component. A common alternative used
to overcome this limitation is a log-normal failure distribution:
fp(t, T ) =
cdfnorm ln(t)−µσ − cdfnorm( ln(t−T )−µσ )
1− cdfnorm( ln(t−T )−µσ )
, (3.14)
where cdfnorm the cumulative density function of the normal distribution. The mean and
standard deviation parameters of such distribution can be computed from the Mean Time
To Failure (MTTF) such that
µ = ln( MTTF
2
√
varMTTF +MTTF 2
)
σ =
√
ln(1 + varMTTF
MTTF 2
). (3.15)
Note that in Equation 3.14, fp(t, T ) depends on the actual time t and the scrubbing period
T . The non-memoryless distribution function describe the occurrence of a recent failure with
larger probability than a memory-less distribution like the exponential one.
Figure 3.1(a) summarizes the comparison of the log-normally distributed failure times with
different MTTFs. The plot is discretized in years. We can see that as MTTF increases,
the permanent fault rate fp for each memory access decreases, because a smaller fault rate
can lead to a longer lifetime. In addition, fp is an increasing function of time. As system
operation time increases, fp increases continuously. In this paper, however, we assume that
fp is constant, because execution times of our benchmarks are short and fp rises extremely
slowly.
Figure 3.1(b) depicts the comparison of the log-normally distributed failure times with differ-
ent operating frequencies. The desired MTTF is arbitrarily set at 5 years. At the beginning,
the fault rate is extremely low, e.g. with KHz frequency, the permanent rate is 4.4 × 10−18
at year 2. The MHz and GHz fault rates are 10−3 and 10−6 smaller respectively.
Permanent Fault Detection
To deal with permanent fault in the SPTA, we establish different Markov chain models with
different numbers of faults. For N -way set associative caches, we implement N + 1 Markov
chain models, where the ith model contains i− 1 permanent faults and there are N − (i− 1)
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Figure 3.1 Failure probability fp the MTTF and the platform frequency
available cache blocks. The model with N faults is the worst case where all cache blocks are
faulty. Its timing analysis is easy to calculate since there are always cache misses.
When the memory is accessed, fault detection is applied using parity check. To identify if
the fault is permanent, we adopt the method proposed by [2]. It is simple to implement and
tracks the number of fault occurrences. If a threshold value is exceeded, the fault is classified
as permanent. To improve following timing behaviors, we assume that each cache block can
be controlled separately. Once a cache block is classified to have a permanent fault, it will
be disabled and will not be used any more.
Figure 3.2 shows how to apply different Markov chain models to N -way caches, with each
node representing a Markov chain model state space. There are N + 1 rows for N -way
caches, i.e. N + 1 Markov chain models. Memory addresses are accessed at step 1, 2, 3, ....
The analysis is completed in two phases to account for fault events.
Phase 1: Fault detection. This is denoted by dotted lines. Node Smn denotes the state
occurrence probability vector of the system with m faults at step n. Let fp be the probability
of permanent fault at each step. With Equation (3.10) and (4.4), for each node, the state
smi ∈ Smn is changed as follows.
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caches. Dotted lines indicate state changes due to fault detection, and solid lines denote
state transitions due to memory accesses.
• No permanent faults occur.
Pr(smi ) = Pr(smi )((1− fp)ns)N−m. (3.16)
The probability of this state changes due to potential permanent fault occurrences, and
timing distribution are changed by multiplying the state change probability.
• Permanent faults occur. Let l be the number of added permanent faults on current
model and sm+lp ∈ Sm+ln be the state after permanent fault detection. We assume
that permanent faults can be detected immediately after they appear. Then we have
sm+lp ⊆ smi and
Pr(sm+lp ) = Pr(smi )((1− fp)ns)N−m−l(1− (1− fp)ns)l. (3.17)
For state sm+lm : sm+lm = sm+lp , we change timing distributions by multiplying the state
change probability, and then merge state probabilities and timing distributions using
Equation (3.9) and Equation (3.5).
Phase 2: State transition. This is denoted by solid lines. After the fault detection, states
in different Markov chain models are updated, since new addresses are accessed. Together
with the transition matrix Pmn (the transition matrix with m faults at step n), the timing
analysis methodology from Section 5.6 is applied to each model.
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3.8 Experimental Results
3.8.1 Experimental Setup
In our experiments, we used the SoCLib open platform1 to generate memory traces for
benchmarks. The platform is equipped with one MIPS 32-bit processor with L1 instruction
cache. In order to evaluate our approach, we adopt Mälardalen benchmarks [52], a popular
benchmark suite used for WCET evaluation and analysis. Due to limited space, we only
present results of two benchmarks (fdct and crc). By injecting faults into instruction cache
with different fault rates, we investigate their impacts on the system. The cache size is 512
bytes, with 2-way associativity and 4-byte cache block. We assume that for each cache miss,
the duration is 100 cycles; for each cache hit, the duration is 1 cycle. To account for fault
detection delays, we add additional 10 cycles. A cache with bigger size can also be adopted,
in which more cache sets are used and thus there are fewer addresses for each set. The timing
distribution calculations for each set perform faster due to address reductions.
In our adaptive Markov chain model, we adopt 4 memory addresses for adaptive state mod-
ification. Since execution times of benchmarks are short, we create synthetic benchmarks
which repeat the same benchmark 10 times. This way, we can study as execution time in-
creases, how the system is affected by the faults and we can see if repeated benchmarks
produce similar pWCET estimates to the original benchmarks. We perform 1,000 simula-
tions for each benchmark as the base line and this can be used to verify the accuracy of the
method at around exceedance probability of 10−3. A brief comparison can be done using
such an exceedance probability between simulations and our approach. If a lower exceedance
probability is required, more simulations can be performed. 2
Figure 3.3 – Figure 3.6 show timing analyses of benchmarks fdct and crc respectively. fdct
is fast discrete cosine transform using a lot of calculations based on integer arrays and crc
is cyclic redundancy check computation using complex loops with lots of decision. On each
figure, the x-axis shows the number of cycles and y-axis represents the exceedance proba-
bility (i.e. 1-CDF) for corresponding cycles. The exceedance probability is set as 10−15,
for the failure rate requirement at the highest level for commercial airborne is translated
into the region of around 10−13. To show simulation results in detail, a zoomed figure of
each benchmark which limits the exceedance probability to 10−3 is displayed. Different fault
scenarios are applied. The transient fault rate that we applied is at each step, there is
a probability of 10−20 for fault occurrence. Different permanent fault rates are applied to
1http://www.soclib.fr
2The replication package of our method script is available on demand.
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show account for wear-out effects at different times. Since for a MHz with 5-year MTTF,
the permanent fault probability is around 10−20, we applied permanent fault probabilities
of 10−20, 10−15, 10−10, 10−7, 10−6, 10−5 respectively to study how the system is affected when
permanent fault rate increases.
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Figure 3.4 synthetic fdct and the zoomed figure
3.8.2 Discussion
To verify the accuracy of our SPTA approach, simulations are performed with transient
fault rate at 10−20 per memory access, and two permanent fault rates at 10−20 and 10−5
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Figure 3.6 synthetic crc and the zoomed figure
per memory access are applied. From zoomed figures (Figure 3.3(b), 3.5(b), 3.6(b)), we can
see that for all fault scenarios, at any exceedance probability the simulation execution time
matches our result, which means that our approach provides tight pWCET estimates. Note
that simulations results may show an error at low probabilities as the number of datapoints
are insufficient to accurately estimate the exceedance function.
In Figure 3.4, we can see that there is a slight difference between simulations and the result
from our approach, because our adaptive method uses only some of states for analysis. As
a consequence, the accuracy may be compromised. Although the synthetic benchmark is a
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repetition of an original benchmark, its timing behavior may be different. At an exceedance
probability, the number of cycles for the synthetic benchmark is not the original value multi-
plied by the number of repetitions, because after the first completion of the benchmark, some
code may exist in the cache, which can help reduce execution time for following executions.
For transient fault, its fault rate is extremely low. In addition, when the cache block with
transient fault is accessed, the transient fault will be detected if it has occurred. The new data
to be put into this cache block will not be affected, since transient fault does not accumulate.
As a result, the impact of transient fault is not significant.
The fact that permanent faults can accumulate has a significant impact on the behavior of
the system, especially since device aging can increase their rate. In our experiments, we have
applied different permanent fault rates to the system. We can see that when the permanent
fault rate is extremely low, the system is not affected during benchmark execution. However,
as fault rate increases, the system takes more time to finish the benchmark.
The size of benchmarks has different impacts on transient and permanent faults. For transient
faults, since they can be recovered, the benchmark size does not have a big influence. How-
ever, since permanent faults accumulate, as benchmark size increases, the execution times
may become longer. For example, at the exceedance probability of 10−15, for original fdct
with permanent fault rate of 10−5, it takes around 80,000 cycles. Its synthetic benchmark
takes around 1000,000 cycles. Even if it may contain some existing code for repetitions, the
synthetic benchmark takes more than 10 times in terms of cycles due to permanent fault
effects.
We note that for some permanent fault rates, there may be a sudden drop in exceedance
probability, especially in Figure 3.5, where the exceedance decrease drops at similar execution
time. This is because permanent faults may have significant impacts on some cache sets
depending on benchmark characteristics. In Figure 3.7, two cache set exceedance probabilities
are convolved, where x-axis is execution time and y-axis indicates exceedance probability. It
shows that one cache set exceedance probability changes gradually while the other one is
affected badly by permanent faults. As a result, the convolution result may have drastic
drop around some execution time.
From the experiments, we can see that our approach can work with different fault rates.
Depending on characteristics of benchmarks, their pWCET estimates are affected in different
ways. For example, the fdct benchmark pWCET varies gradually as higher-level permanent
fault rates are applied, while crc benchmark exhibits pWCET by a dramatic change at some
exceedance probabilities. One potential use of our approach is to estimate fault impacts on
program timing behaviors with random replacement caches, so that we can make sure that
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safety requirement is met under different fault scenarios.
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Figure 3.7 Convolution of two different exceedance probabilities. One exceedance probability
decreases gradually, and the other decreases dramatically due to fault impacts.
3.9 Conclusion
In this paper, we have demonstrated an adaptive Markov chain based Static Probabilistic
Timing Analysis (SPTA) methodology in presence of faults; our methodology is based on
a non-homogeneous Markov chain model. Both transient and permanent faults are then
introduced into the system. The states are modified accordingly for including fault impacts
and the pWCET obtained embeds faults effects. The experimental results show how faults
affect execution time.
In order to reduce computational complexity, the state space can be limited to the specified
level. The state space is modified in an adaptive way, such that existing addresses can be
replaced by new incoming addresses in the state space. This guarantees good accuracy and
scalability of our SPTA analysis.
As future work, we intend to address aspects such as benchmark and platform fault tolerance.
Furthermore, we will enhance our SPTA Markov chain methodology to apply preemptions
and multi-processor embedded system platforms.
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CHAPTER 4 ARTICLE 2: EFFECTS OF ONLINE FAULT DETECTION
MECHANISMS ON PROBABILISTIC TIMING ANALYSIS
4.1 Preface
In our previous research [31], we have studied the transient and permanent faults that may
occur in random caches. To preserve performance, it is necessary to detect transient faults
and correct them. On the other hand, when a permanent fault occurs in a cache block, the
block cannot be used to store data any more. Hence, we must detect such blocks and disable
them to avoid recurring errors. A traditional rule-based online fault detection technique
periodically counts the number of faults to classify a fault as transient or permanent. In this
article, we introduce a permanent fault detection technique using Dynamic Hidden Markov
Model (D-HMM) that predicts whether a cache block is permanently faulty or not using the
detected faults and a “belief” threshold. The results of our experiments indicate that the
D-HMM based detection technique dramatically improves system performance compared to
the traditional rule-based detection technique.
Full Citation: C. Chen, J. Panerati, and G. Beltrame, “Effects of online fault detection
mechanisms on probabilistic timing analysis,” in 2016 IEEE International Symposium on
Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems (DFT), Sept 2016, pp.
41–46.
4.2 Abstract
In real time systems, random caches have been proposed as a way to simplify software tim-
ing analysis, by avoiding corner cases usually found in deterministic systems. Using this
random approach, one can obtain an application’s probabilistic Worst Case Execution Time
(pWCET) to be used for timing analysis. As with deterministic systems, technology scaling
in cache memories is making transient and permanent faults more likely, which in turn affects
the system’s timing behavior. To mitigate these effects, one can introduce a detection mecha-
nism that classifies a fault as transient or permanent, with the goal of disabling permanently
faulty cache blocks to avoid future accesses. In this paper, we compare the effects of two
online detection mechanisms for permanent faults, namely rule-based detection and Dynamic
Hidden Markov Model (D-HMM) based detection, for the generation of safe pWCET esti-
mates. Experimental results show that different mechanisms can greatly affect safe pWCET
margins, and that by using D-HMM the pWCET of the system can be improved compared
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to rule-based detection.
4.3 Introduction
In safety-critical systems (e.g., the on-board computers of airplanes and spacecrafts), timing
behaviors must be analyzed to ensure that the systems meet the safety requirements. Nu-
merous methods have been proposed to compute the Worst Case Execution Time (WCET).
However, as technology advances, the WCET computation becomes more complex and it can
be extremely pessimistic [18].
To help better predict and improve WCET estimates, we can leverage probabilistic systems.
The policy of the cache—the bridge between the processor and the main memory to improve
data access latency—has been modified, so that a random replacement policy replaces a
deterministic replacement policy, such as Least-Recently-Used (LRU). The use of random
replacement policy reduces occurrences of pathological cases [90] and thus the extreme cases
are upper bounded with very low probabilities. Such extremely low probabilities ensure that
the system execution time matches the safety requirements (e.g. 10−9 failure rate per hour).
Probabilistic WCETs (pWCETs) are often used as timing estimates of probabilistic systems,
in which the execution time is associated with an exceedance probability. Using pWCET,
one can obtain the probability for an application to exceed a certain execution time. A
number of pWCET estimation techniques for random caches have been developed, and most
of them have ignored the presence of faults. However, technology scaling is making both
transient and permanent faults more likely [36, 50, 82]. As caches are prone to faults, they
can have a significant impact on system timing behavior. Therefore, we need to take faults
into consideration when computing timing estimates.
In a previous study [31], we have introduced a Static Probabilistic Timing Analysis (SPTA)
method to compute pWCETs for random caches in the presence of faults. The SPTA method
is based on the Markov chain model. We define cache memory layouts (i.e., combinations
of main memory addresses in the cache) as system states. Each state contains a timing
information vector. For each memory access, the system state and timing information is
updated using a transition function. By injecting faults, a simple detection mechanism is
adopted to classify the fault as transient or permanent. Experimental results show that the
SPTA method can provide an accurate pWCET in presence of faults. We observe that when
permanent fault rate increases, the pWCET estimates degrade greatly. To reduce permanent
fault impacts on performance degradation, we can detect the permanent faults using the
detection mechanism and disable the corresponding faulty block.
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In this paper, we introduce transient and permanent faults to instruction caches and ap-
ply two different permanent fault detection mechanisms—rule-based detection and Dynamic
Hidden Markov Model (D-HMM) detection—in different fault scenarios simulating the en-
vironmental conditions of specific aerospace applications. The choice of the two detection
mechanisms aims at showing how, leveraging probabilistic models, can improve performance
w.r.t purely deterministic decision making. Experimental results show that, when fault rates
are high, fault detection mechanisms significantly affect the system’s pWCET estimates. The
rule-based detection is simpler to implement, but it provides a pWCET with more perfor-
mance degradation in the high fault rate scenario. On average, rule-based detection degrades
41% for pWCET compared to the D-HMM detection mechanism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.4 presents our fault model and the
SPTA method for pWCET estimates in presence of faults. The two fault detection mech-
anisms are explained in Section 4.5. Benchmarks are evaluated in Section 6.7. Section 7.4
presents related work. Finally concluding remarks are given in Section 4.8.
4.4 Background
In this section, we summarize the SPTA method in presence of faults [31]. We first introduce
the system model and the SPTA method for random caches. Then we describe probabilistic
models for both the transient and permanent faults. Finally, the SPTA method for pWCET
estimation in presence of faults is presented.
4.4.1 System Model
Without loss of generality, we use a fully associative cache to demonstrate the system model.
The random cache we adopt has an evict-on-miss random replacement policy. When a cache
miss happens, a cache block is randomly evicted and used to store the incoming data. Since
the future state of the cache depends uniquely on current state, we can represent the system
using a Markov chain model. The state si represents the memory layout of the cache. The
state occurrence probability vector S and transition matrix P are defined as:
S = [Pr(s0), P r(s1), · · · ], (4.1)
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P =

p0→0, p0→1, · · ·
p1→0, p1→1, · · ·
... ... . . .
 , (4.2)
where Pr(si) denotes the probability of state si and pi→j describes the probability of going
from state si to state sj.
The state occurrence probability vector Sk and transition matrix P k are used to describe the
system transition at step k, and we have
Sk+1 = SkP k. (4.3)
To account for timing information, a timing distribution variable Ti is assigned to each state
si. At each step, the element pi→j of P k is computed and the timing distribution variables
for all states are updated.
In our Markov chain model, the number of states increases dramatically with the number of
distinct memory addresses. To reduce the computational complexity, only a fraction of the
memory addresses are used to represent the states. The state addresses are changed in an
adaptive way: when a memory address am is accessed, if it is not already included in the
states, we need to select an address a according to selection rule and replace it with am. Thus
we have sj = si \ {a} ∪ {am}. The probability and timing distribution for sj are initialized
to 0 and empty vector respectively. In addition, the probability and timing distribution for
si are added to a pessimistic state sp = si \ {a}.
4.4.2 Fault Model
In this paper, we consider only cache storage element faults. To obtain a safe bound, we
regard each memory access as a cache miss, since the latency of a cache miss is longer than
the latency of a cache hit and thus it has a higher fault occurrence probability.
For set associative caches, let ns be the number of memory accesses between two consecutive
access to the same cache set, and f be the fault probability of one cache block for one memory
access, then the probability to have a fault for this cache set is computed as
1− (1− f)ns . (4.4)
The transient faults we focus on are Single Event Upsets (SEUs) which are caused by high-
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energy particles. SEUs are known to be independent events and we assume that their fault
rate ft is constant throughout the program execution and each cache block has the same
fault rate.
With regard to permanent fault, we consider dynamic permanent faults, i.e. the faults caused
by wear-out effects of the device. The permanent fault rate is defined as fp(t, T ), where t is
operation time and T is the scrubbing period, i.e. the time interval between two consecutive
fault detection to avoid error accumulation. A log-normal distribution is proposed in [86] to
account for cumulative wear-out effect:
fp(t, T ) =
cdfnorm ln(t)−µσ − cdfnorm( ln(t−T )−µσ )
1− cdfnorm( ln(t−T )−µσ )
, (4.5)
where cdfnorm the cumulative density function of the normal distribution. The mean and
standard deviation parameters of such distribution can be computed from the Mean Time
To Failure (MTTF) as:
µ = ln( MTTF
2
√
varMTTF +MTTF 2
)
σ =
√
ln(1 + varMTTF
MTTF 2
). (4.6)
Using Equation 4.5, we can compute the permanent fault rate for a given operation time t
and scrubbing period T . Note that cumulative wear-out effects are accounted for, and thus
as t increases, f(t, T ) increases as well.
4.4.3 SPTA with Faults
When faults are injected, the states in the Markov chain model are modified accordingly. We
assume that a parity check mechanism is applied so that all faults can be detected and the
system can run safely.
Transient faults can be regarded as cache evictions, because if a transient fault occurs in a
cache block, the data becomes invalid. When this block is accessed, the fault can be detected,
and data will be fetched from the main memory. At the beginning of each memory access,
new states sp are generated from si due to transient faults, and they are subsets of the state
si. The probability is calculated as sp ⊆ si,
Pr(sp) = Pr(si)((1− ft)ns)|sp|(1− (1− ft)ns)|si|−|sp| (4.7)
where (1 − (1 − ft)ns)|si|−|sp| represents the probability of cache block evictions caused by
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faults and ((1− ft)ns)|sp| denotes the probability without evictions.
Permanent faults are different from transient faults, since the block affected by a permanent
fault cannot be used for future access. To take permanent fault impacts into consideration,
N + 1 Markov chain models are created for an N -way cache. We assume that permanent
faults can be detected immediately once they occur. At the beginning of each memory access,
we change the states in all Markov chain models. Let smi be the state with m faults, and l
be the number of added permanent faults, then we have
Pr(sm+lp ) = Pr(smi )((1− fp)ns)N−m−l(1− (1− fp)ns)l (4.8)
Using Equation (4.7) and (4.8), we can compute state transitions due to transient and per-
manent faults. The probabilities and timing distributions of the generated states are added
to the existing states that have the same memory layouts. Then, the system transits in the
same way as in Section 7.5.
4.5 Permanent Fault Detection Mechanisms
The SPTA method from Section 6.6 assumes that the permanent fault is detected immedi-
ately after it occurs. This can be regarded as a perfect detection. However, depending on
the permanent fault detection mechanisms, the permanent fault may not be detected per-
fectly, i.e. there might be some delay between the classification as a permanent fault and its
occurrence. As disabling the faulty block depends on its detection, this delay can affect the
execution times.
Figure 4.1 is an example on how different detection mechanisms affect the system’s timing
behaviors. In Figure 4.1(a), the permanent fault is not detected. In Figure 4.1(b), the
permanent fault is detected and the faulty block is disabled. The memory address a is
accessed twice. For the second access, the hit probabilities are different: in Figure 4.1(a), it
is 0.1539 + 0.6561 = 0.81; in Figure 4.1(b), it is 0.2349 + 0.6561 = 0.891.
We investigate two fault detection mechanisms: rule-based and Dynamic Hidden Markov
Model (D-HMM) based fault detection. We assume that there is a periodic cache scrubbing,
which checks the data in the cache. If any fault is detected in a cache block, the block is
set as invalid. Given the fault detection mechanism, we can classify if the detected fault is
transient or permanent.
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Figure 4.1 Impacts of different permanent fault detection mechanisms on a 2-way random
cache with a permanent fault probability of 0.1 per memory access. Each block represents a
state and the value at the bottom shows the probability of the state. The dotted lines denote
fault occurrences and the solid lines indicate cache memory accesses. When a permanent
fault occurs in a cache block, it is marked with an X.
4.5.1 Rule-based Detection
The rule-based fault detection is a simple mechanism to classify a fault as permanent. We
adopt the approach in [99, 3]. We use a counter to record the number of faults of a block
within a reset period. Every time a fault is detected, the counter value increases by 1. At
the beginning of each reset period, the counter value is reset to 0. We can define a threshold
value, such that when the counter value exceeds the threshold value, we classify the fault as
permanent; otherwise the fault is regarded as transient.
4.5.2 D-HMM based Detection
To better classify permanent faults, D-HMM based detection is proposed in [86]. An HMM
is defined as follows
• P (S0): an initial probability distribution of states.
• Tij = P (St = j|St−1 = i): the probability of a transition from step t− 1 to step t.
• Eij = P (Ot = j|St = i): the sensor model which shows the probability of observation
given a state.
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St
P (Ot)
Fault No Fault
Available 0 1
SEU 1 0
Failure 1 0
Table 4.1 Sensor Model
St−1
P (St)
Available SEU Failure
Available 1− P (SEU ∨ Failure) PSEU Pfailure(t)
SEU 1− P (SEU ∨ Failure) PSEU Pfailure(t)
Failure 0 0 1
Table 4.2 D-HMM Transition Model
Using HMMs, we can predict the state of the system:
Pt(S = j|O1:t−1) =
∑
i
Pt−1(S = i|O1:t−1)Tij (4.9)
Given a new observation, the prediction can be refined as:
Pt(S = j|Ot = j, O1:t−1) = αPt(S = i|O1:t−1)Eij (4.10)
where α is a normalization parameter.
The sensor model and D-HMM transition model are displayed in Table 5.3 and 5.4 respec-
tively, where PSEU is the probability of observing SEUs and Pfailure(t) is the probability of
permanent fault occurrences.
We construct a D-HMM model for each cache block. At the beginning of a scrubbing phase,
we update the system model using Equation (4.9). After the scrubbing phase, we apply the
results to Equation 4.10. Then, we use Equation 4.9 for prediction. A threshold value is
defined such that, if the predicted value exceeds the threshold value, we classify the fault as
permanent.
4.6 Experimental Results
In this section, we compare different online fault detection effects on permanent faults.
Mälardalen benchmarks [52] are used for evaluation. The gem5 instruction set simulator [23]
is used to generate instruction traces for an ARM processor for the benchmarks. A statically
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linked library and an Floating Point Unit (FPU) are adopted for the code compilation with-
out system calls. Single-path program memory traces are generated using example inputs
for all benchmarks.
We assume that the latencies for a cache hit, a cache miss and a parity check are constant,
and they are set as 1 cycle, 100 cycles and 10 cycles respectively. The system is equipped
with an L1 instruction cache with a size of 1024 bytes, 2-way associativity and 16-byte cache
block. We consider only faults in instruction caches, but our method applies to data caches
as well.
In the context of aerospace applications, the system may be exposed to different radiation
environment. We consider two fault scenarios for experiments:
• Low fault rate: permanent fault with a probability of 10−20 per memory access, tran-
sient fault with a probability of 10−10 per memory access.
• High fault rate: 10−4 permanent fault rate, 10−2 transient fault rate.
We apply two random number generators for transient and permanent faults respectively and
both faults are generated during simulations. Consequently, for two simulations in the same
fault scenario, there may be different results due to randomness.
With regard to transient faults, we assume that in the low fault rate scenario, the system is
protected against high-energy particles. The probability 10−10 is adopted, which is equivalent
to ∼ 10−6 SEU bit−1s−1. This is the long term SEU rate for a SPENVIS device with a 4mm
shield thickness on highly elliptical orbits (HEO) [108].
In the high fault rate scenario, we assume that faults happen with a probability of 10−2
per block, per memory access. This assumption is extremely severe and, in fact, pertaining
to environmental conditions harsher than those we would find in most practical aerospace
applications. It is comparable, for example, to the SEU rates that are caused by solar events
in Mercury’s orbit [46]. However, this “stress” test allows us to discover how the performance
impacts of the rule-based and the D-HMM detection mechanisms set apart from one another
in extreme conditions (despite the very short run-time of our benchmark applications).
Using Equation (4.5), we compute that for a MHz processor with 5-year MTTF, the perma-
nent fault probability is around 10−20. This is used in the low fault rate scenario. To study
fault impacts in the high fault rate scenario, we increase the permanent fault rate to 10−4.
In each scenario, the simulation results with the rule-based and the D-HMM based permanent
fault detection mechanisms are compared. We perform 1,000 simulations for each detection
mechanism. For the rule-based method, the threshold is set to 4 and the reset period is
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set to the execution time of of each benchmark. If 4 faults are detected, the corresponding
cache block is considered to have a permanent fault and will be disabled. For D-HMM based
detection, the threshold is set to 0.9. If the prediction value exceeds 0.9, the cache block will
be disabled. In addition, the Markov chain based SPTA method result is displayed to show
the result with perfect fault detection. Note that other thresholds produce similar results,
which are not shown hereby due to limited space.
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(a) fdct with low fault rate.
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(b) fdct with high fault rate.
Figure 4.2 fdct pWCETs in low and high fault rate scenarios.
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(b) cover with high fault rate.
Figure 4.3 cover pWCETs in low and high fault rate scenarios.
Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 show results for benchmark fdct and cover respectively. The x-
axis represents the number of execution cycles and y-axis the exceedance probability. In
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the low fault rate scenario (Figure 4.2(a), Figure 4.3(a)), both detection mechanisms exhibit
similar pWCETs, which match the result of perfect detection. In the high fault rate scenario
(Figure 4.2(b), Figure 4.3(b)), for a given exceedance probability, the system execution time
with rule-based permanent fault detection is much longer than that with D-HMM based
permanent fault detection mechanism.
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0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Figure 4.4 Normalized rule-based detection and D-HMM based detection execution times at
the exceedance probability of 10−3 for all benchmarks.
The statistical results of all benchmarks in the high fault rate scenario are displayed in
Figure 4.4 using box plots. The rule-based detection execution time and the D-HMM based
detection execution time are normalized as
X˜ = X −Xmin
Xmax −Xmin (4.11)
where Xmin is the minimum execution time with perfect detection, rule-based detection and
D-HMM based detection, Xmax is the maximum execution time with all detection mecha-
nisms, X is the execution time using rule-based or D-HMM based detection, and X˜ is the
normalized value.
We observe that for rule-based detection, most execution times are normalized to 1 (only a
few data points lie outsize the line-shaped box in Figure 4.4), because its execution time is
usually the longest among all detection mechanisms. Using D-HMM based detection, we can
improve the execution time performance. As a result, a large number of execution times are
below 1 with normalization
In the low fault rate scenario, there is not much difference between pWCETs using different
50
permanent fault detection mechanisms, because the execution times of the benchmarks are
short, and with extremely low fault rates, permanent fault rarely occurs, which limits the
effect of detection mechanisms.
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Figure 4.5 Ratio distribution in the high fault rate scenario for all benchmarks.
To show the effects of detection mechanisms in the high fault rate scenario, the detailed ratio
distribution of all the benchmarks is shown in Figure 4.5. The x-axis represents different
benchmarks and y-axis shows the ratio of rule-based detection execution time to D-HMM
based detection execution time for each benchmark. The geometric mean is 1.41, which
means on average, the rule-based detection execution time is 41% more than that using the
D-HMM based detection mechanism.
4.7 Related Work
For the timing analysis of random caches, three methodologies are most commonly found in
the literature: Measured Based Probabilistic Timing Analysis (MBPTA), Static Probabilistic
Timing Analysis (SPTA) and the hybrid method which combines both. In this paper, we used
an SPTA method which adopts a perfect fault detection mechanism. The SPTA formulae
which provide fast results for single-path programs have been proposed in [118, 27, 66, 39],
but their results are not as accurate as those presented here. Accurate SPTA methods are
proposed in [9, 10, 49], in which cache states are used for timing analysis and the result is
accurately refined at the expense of a greater computation time. [71] extends the single-path
programs to multi-path programs by calculating cache state upper-bounds and execution
path reductions. Previous studies have investigated the effects of fault-injection in real-time
systems. [98] studies fault-tolerant systems for random caches, and estimate pWCETs using
MBPTA techniques. They extend the work in [99] and study the impact of error detection,
correction, diagnosis, and reconfiguration (DCDR) in different fault scenarios. [56] introduces
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an SPTA method for the pWCET estimations of instruction caches. The cache under scrutiny
uses an LRU replacement policy and permanent faults due to process variations are also taken
into account. A fault-free pWCET and miss probability distribution are combined to obtain
the pWCET with permanent faults. [55] applies reliability mechanisms to faulty instruction
caches and analyze their effects, showing an improvement in pWCET estimates.
Our study focuses on transient faults and dynamic permanent faults caused by wear-out
effects. In this context, we are interested in computing pWCET estimates for random re-
placement caches. To classify fault types, we adopt two very different online fault detection
mechanisms: a deterministic, rule-based one and one based on probabilistic graphical models.
This is the first study of different online permanent fault detection effects on pWCET estima-
tions. We implement the D-HMM detection mechanism for instruction caches with faults and
the results reveal that it improves pWCET estimates significantly compared to the simple
rule-based detection mechanism. This can help the system meet the safety requirement.
4.8 Conclusions
In this paper, we studied the problem of classifying transient and permanent faults affecting
instruction caches of real-time systems. We focus on two online permanent fault detection
mechanisms —rule-based and D-HMM based detection—for random caches and we compare
their effects on a system’s timing analysis by analyzing traces of single-path programs. We
discover that fault detection mechanisms play an important role in timing behaviors and
that D-HMM detection improves pWCET estimates significantly compared to rule-based
detection. In our future work, we plan to study the effects of more fault tolerant techniques.
We also plan on extending the level of detail of our model to take into account the computation
overhead of rule-based and D-HMM based detection to obtain even more accurate results for
low exceedance probabilities.
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CHAPTER 5 ARTICLE 3: PROBABILISTIC TIMING ANALYSIS OF
RANDOM CACHES WITH FAULT DETECTION MECHANISMS
5.1 Preface
This article is the synthesis and extension of the work we presented in Chapter 3 [31]—a
state space based technique to estimate timing behaviors using Markov Chains—and the
research in Chapter 4 [30]—a comparison of rule-based detection to D-HMM based detection
for random caches affected by permanent faults. This article significantly extends those
contributions in the following aspects: (i) we added write-through data caches to the SPTA
and permanent fault detection evaluation; (ii) we introduced the fault impact analysis into
a cache contention based approach, which provides a faster yet safe probabilistic WCET
(pWCET) estimate than previous approaches; (iii) we integrated the cache contention based
approach with the state space approach to create a state-of-the-art SPTA method that takes
faults into consideration; and (iv), in the experimental section, we added an analysis of the
cache configuration impact on the pWCETs.
Authors: Chao Chen, Jacopo Panerati, and Giovanni Beltrame
Submitted to: High Dependability Systems, IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in
Computing, Special Issue/Section, Third Issue of 2017 [32].
5.2 Abstract
In the real-time systems domain, random caches have been proposed as a way to simplify
software timing analysis, i.e., the process of estimating the probabilistic Worst Case Execution
Time (pWCET) of an application. However, in probabilistic—as well as in deterministic—
systems, the technology-scaling of the cache memory manufacturing process is rendering
transient and permanent faults more and more likely. These faults, in turn, affect a system’s
timing behavior and the complexity of its analysis. In this article, we propose a Static
Probabilistic Timing Analysis (SPTA) approach for random caches that is able to account
for the presence of faults—and their detection mechanisms—using a state-space modelling
technique. Our experiments show that our methodology is capable of providing tight pWCET
estimates. In our analysis, we compare the effects on the estimation of safe pWCET bounds
of two online mechanisms for the detection and classification of faults—i.e., a rule-based
system and Dynamic Hidden Markov Models (D-HMMs). The experimental results show
that different mechanisms can greatly affect safe pWCET margins and that, by using D-
53
HMMs, the pWCET of the system can be improved with respect to rule-based detection.
5.3 Introduction
Time-critical computing systems—such as the on-board computer of a satellite—require ac-
curate timing estimations of their software execution. If hazardous events are not handled
within specific, fixed delays, the results can be catastrophic. Traditionally, designers have
used extremely conservative estimations of the execution times extracted from deterministic
architectural models. The major shortcoming of these approaches is the fact that they can
place the Worst Case Execution Time (WCET) very far away from the actual maximum time
used by the application [18].
Better, i.e., tighter, WCET estimates can greatly improve performance. To achieve this goal,
one can leverage the properties of probabilistic systems. In the system under test in this
work, we modified the policy of the cache—the bridge used between the processor and the
main memory to improve data-access latency—so that a random replacement policy is used
instead of a deterministic replacement policy such as Least-Recently-Used (LRU). Random
and pseudo-random caches can now be found even in commercial processors. For example,
ARM’s Cortex-A731 and Gaisler’s LEON42 both use random replacement policies. The use of
a random cache reduces the occurrences of pathological cases—when compared to caches with
a deterministic policies—-and associates extreme cases to very low probabilities, allowing for
better system performance [100, 101, 90, 66]. The extremely low probabilities, in fact, ensure
that the execution time matches the safety requirements (e.g., 10−9 failures per hour) even
with tighter WCETs.
Probabilistic WCETs (pWCETs) are typically used as the timing estimates of probabilistic
systems. Probabilistic WCETs associate exceedance probabilities to execution times. Thus,
from a pWCET, one can also extract the probability for an application to exceed a given exe-
cution time. Several pWCET estimation techniques for random caches have been developed,
however, most of them ignore or disregard the presence of faults. This is starting to appear
as an oversimplifying assumption as technology scaling is making the occurrence of transient
and permanent faults more and more common [36, 50, 82]. As modern caches become more
prone to faults, errors can have a significant impact on a system’s timing behavior. Therefore,
it is crucial to take faults—and their detection/mitigation mechanisms—into consideration
when computing timing estimates.
The literature accounts for a multitude of techniques that can be used to cope with transient
1http://infocenter.arm.com/help/index.jsp
2http://www.gaisler.com/index.php/products/processors/leon4
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faults. For example, Reed-Solomon codes have been used extensively in space applications
to detect and correct transient fault errors. In this article, we consider cache blocks that
are equipped with error detection mechanisms and assume that all errors can be detected.
However, differentiate transient faults from permanent failures is as non-trivial as imperative
to determine the proper course of action—e.g., to fetch a memory block once a transient fault
occurs.
As fault rates increase, pWCET estimates greatly degrade. When dealing with permanent
faults in particular, space redundancy techniques, such as Error Correcting Codes (ECC) are
not scalable because of their high cost [3]. To reduce the negative impact on performance of
permanent faults, one must detect the permanently faulty cache blocks and reconfigure them
so that they are not used again. The detection and classification of a fault as permanent can
be outsourced to a number of ad-hoc mechanisms. Our work experiments with different fault
detection mechanisms to study how they impact the pWCET estimates.
In this article, we present a Static Probabilistic Timing Analysis (SPTA) methodology for
caches with a random replacement policy, that takes into consideration both transient and
permanent faults. Our methodology starts from single-path program memory traces to com-
pute probabilistic WCETs (pWCETs), i.e., exceedance probabilities associated to execution
times (measured in the number of cache misses in our simulations). The approach is derived
from state-space techniques [11] and it is extended in our work to consider the impact of
faults. Transient and permanent fault effects are modelled as probabilistic events and imple-
mented into the system under test through fault injection. At every memory access, faults
(if they happened) are injected and the state of the system is computed. Experimental re-
sults show that our SPTA method can provide accurate pWCET estimates in the presence of
faults. Moreover, we experiment with two different permanent fault detection mechanisms—
rule-based detection and Dynamic Hidden Markov Model (D-HMM) based detection—in
different fault scenarios that replicate the environmental conditions of actual aerospace ap-
plications. The choice of the two detection mechanisms aims at showing that, leveraging
probabilistic models, one can further improve performance—with respect to deterministic
decision making. Experimental results show that, when fault rates are high, the presence
of fault detection mechanisms significantly affect the system’s pWCET estimates. The rule-
based detection is simpler to implement, but it results in greater performance degradation in
the high fault rate scenario. On average, rule-based detection yields a 21% larger degradation
of the pWCET compared to the D-HMM detection mechanism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the related work is summarized in Section 6.4;
the fault models and their impact on the system performance are presented in Section 5.5; in
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Section 5.6, we describe the proposed SPTA methodology and how it handles the presence
of faults; Section 5.7 details the fault detection mechanisms; experimental results on a set of
real-world benchmarks are presented and discussed in Section 6.7; and finally Section 7.10
draws the concluding remarks.
5.4 Related Work
Most of the methodologies for the timing analysis of random caches that can be found in
the literature fall into three main categories: (i) Measurement-based Probabilistic Timing
Analysis (MBPTA); (ii) Static Probabilistic Timing Analysis (SPTA); and (iii) hybrid meth-
ods which combine the two. In this article, we propose an SPTA approach that accounts for
faults and fault detection mechanisms. SPTA formulae capable of providing fast results for
single-path programs have been proposed in [118, 27, 66, 39]. These methods compute the
lower bound of the cache hit probability of each memory access from the cache associativity
and the reuse distance (i.e., the number of memory blocks between two consecutive references
to the same memory block). All hit probabilities are considered to be independent. Time
Profiles (TPs) can be constructed using the miss/hit probabilities and the corresponding
miss/hit latencies. Then, the pWCET can be obtained by convolving the TPs.
It is worth noting that the results obtained under the assumption of independence of all
memory accesses are not as accurate as those we present here or in other works. The timing
analysis methods proposed in [9, 11] exploit knowledge of the cache state and their results are
typically more accurate (at the expense of a longer computational time). The ability to enu-
merate cache states, in particular, entails more precise pWCET estimates. The contention-
based method proposed in [9] improves the pWCET results of methods that are based on the
reuse distance. Selected memory block accesses are fed to a cache state enumeration-based
method to obtain accurate pWCETs, while others are used in a contention-based approach
to allow for a fast calculation with reasonable accuracy. The two results are then convolved
to obtain an overall estimate that provides an accurate result while avoiding state explosion.
Griffin et al. [49] proposed a different state space-based approach, which, instead, exploits
lossy compression techniques to avoid the state explosion pitfall. Lesage et al. [71] extended
the conversation from single-path programs to multi-path programs by calculating cache state
upper-bounds and execution path reductions.
Previous studies have also investigated the effects of fault-injection in real-time systems. Sli-
jepcevic et al. [98] studied fault-tolerant systems with random caches and estimated pWCETs
using a MBPTA technique. The authors show that DTM can identify the average and worst-
case performance degradation due to faults. They extend their work in [99] with a study of
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the impact of error detection, correction, diagnosis, and reconfiguration (DCDR) in different
fault scenarios, i.e., low-, medium- and high-error scenarios for both transient and permanent
faults. Their results show that, in most cases, pWCET estimates are negligibly affected by
the presence of faults. In some cases, programs are more sensitive to the number of available
cache blocks, which exacerbates the negative effect of permanent faults.
Hardy and Puaut [56] present an SPTA method for the pWCET estimation of instruction
caches. The research work is focused on caches using an LRU replacement policy and it
takes into account those permanent faults that are due to process variations. The fault-free
pWCET and the probability distribution of cache misses are combined to obtain the pWCET
with permanent faults. Hardy et al. [55] also investigated the introduction of reliability
mechanisms into instruction caches with permanent faults. Two mechanisms are evaluated—
one extra fixed way per set and a shared buffer. By using the SPTA techniques from [56], it
is shown that simple reliability mechanisms can mitigate the impact of faulty cache blocks
and considerably improve pWCETs.
The uniqueness of our study resides in how it considers both transient faults and dynamic
permanent faults caused by wear-out effects. In this particular context, we are interested in
computing the pWCET estimates of caches with random replacement policies. The SPTA
method we propose can provide tight pWCET estimates while taking into account the oc-
currence of faults. To classify faults (as transient or permanent), we adopt two different
online fault detection mechanisms: a deterministic, rule-based approach and a mechanism
based on probabilistic graphical models (D-HMMs). This is the first study of the effects of
different online permanent fault detection mechanisms on pWCET estimations dealing with
both instruction and data caches. Having implemented the D-HMM detection mechanism in
a random replacement cache injected with faults, we discover that it significantly improves
the pWCET estimates when compared to the static rule-based detection mechanism. This,
in turn, offers a fundamental advantage in helping the system to meet its safety requirements.
5.5 The Impact of Faults
This section is dedicated to the description of both the transient and permanent fault models
on which this work is based. These models are then used for the injection of faults into
the system under test. In our model, we only consider those faults that occur in the storage
elements of the cache. Faults happening in the combinational circuit entail a range of different
behaviours (e.g., transient faults have no impact on future operations) and they can be
detected using additional mechanisms that may increase the time to access cache, but their
study is beyond of the scope of this work. In our analysis, we compute fault occurrence
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probabilities for each memory access. Since a cache miss takes longer than a hit, to simplify
the analysis and obtain a safe bound, in following sections, we use the latency of a cache miss
for the fault probability calculations of each memory access.
5.5.1 Transient Faults
A Single Event Upset (SEU) is a change of state in a memory element, usually caused by
the impact of a high-energy particle. SEUs induce transient faults since they do not cause
permanent damage: the memory elements they affected can still be correctly used after the
successive write operation. SEUs due to space radiation are known to be independent, and
we assume they are uniformly distributed in space, i.e., each cache block has the same fault
probability throughout the program execution. We thus define the transient fault probability
for each memory access as ft.
When a transient fault occurs, a cache block remains faulty until the fault is detected (and
corrected). This is because transient faults happen in storage elements that do not recover
autonomously. As a result, transient faults can have lasting effects. After the fault is detected,
the content of the block is labelled as invalid. However, this does not affect the following
data storage operations on the same block.
To cope with transient faults, many techniques have been proposed. For example, Reed-
Solomon codes have been used extensively in space applications to detect and correct transient
fault errors. In our work, we employ a classic parity check fault detection mechanism—
where parity bits are are added to the data—to the first level (L1) cache. Our choice is
motivated by the smaller area requirements and lower delay penalties of parity checking when
compared to other commonly used single error correction-double error detection (SEC-DED)
techniques [79].
When a cache block is accessed, the stored parity bits are examined to discover whether a
transient fault has occurred. At relatively low fault rates, we assume that almost all faults
can be detected. If a fault is detected from the result of parity checking, the corresponding
block data is labelled as invalid and fetched from the main memory again. If no fault is
detected and the access is a cache hit, the data in the cache is used as is.
5.5.2 Permanent Faults
Permanent faults are those faults whose effects last from the moment they appear until the
end of the system’s life cylce. When a permanent fault occurs, the affected cache block
cannot be re-used. In this work, we only deal with the dynamically arising permanent faults
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induced by the wear-out of components. These faults can occur at any moment during the
execution of a program.
To model permanent faults we start by defining the probability fp(t, T ) of a permanent fault
to occur. This is the probability of a fault in a system component by time t, i.e., failure ≤ t,
given that the component was still functional at the end of the previous interval t− T , i.e.,
failure > t − T . T is the scrubbing period, i.e., the time interval between two consecutive
fault detection operations. Scrubbing happens periodically to avoid the accumulation of error.
This probability can be computed from the formula in [86] using Kolmogorov’s definition as:
fp(t, T ) = Pr(failure ≤ t|failure > t− T )
= Pr(failure ≤ t ∧ failure > t− T )
Pr(failure > t− T )
= cdffailure(t)− cdffailure(t− T )1− cdffailure(t− T ) , (5.1)
with cdffailure being the cumulative density function of the random variable failure describing
the time at which the failure occurs.
In the literature on reliability, several probability distributions are used to model failure
times [86]. A recurring one is the exponential distribution; however, the exponential rep-
resentation is somewhat imprecise as it lacks the ability to capture the increasing failure
probability due to the accumulated wear of a component. A good alternative capable of
overcoming this limitation is the log-normal failure distribution:
fp(t, T ) =
cdfnorm
(
ln(t)−µ
σ
)
− cdfnorm
(
ln(t−T )−µ
σ
)
1− cdfnorm
(
ln(t−T )−µ
σ
) , (5.2)
where cdfnorm is the cumulative density function of the normal distribution. The mean and
standard deviation parameters of this distribution can be computed from a device’s Mean
Time To Failure (MTTF) as:
µ = ln
(
MTTF 2√
varMTTF +MTTF 2
)
σ =
√
ln
(
1 + varMTTF
MTTF 2
)
. (5.3)
Note that, in Equation 5.2, fp(t, T ) depends on the actual time t as well as the scrubbing
period T . A non-memoryless distribution function, in fact, can describe the occurrence
of a failures with detail that cannot be grasped by a memory-less distribution (e.g., the
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exponential distribution) [45].
Figure 5.1(a) summarizes the comparison of the log-normally distributed failure times with
different MTTFs. The plot is discretized in years. We can see that, as the MTTF increases,
the permanent fault probability fp for each memory access decreases, because a smaller fault
probability is induced by the longer lifetime. In addition, fp is a monotonic function of time.
As the system’s operation time increases, fp increases continuously. In this we, however, we
consider a constant fp, because the benchmarks we employ for the WCET evaluations tend
to be relatively short [52]. From Equation (5.2), we can see that when the execution times
of our benchmarks are sufficiently short, fp’s growth is negligible.
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(a) Increasing the MTTF (in years) the probabil-
ity of a failure by any given time decreases con-
sistently.
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(b) Varying the system frequency, the probability
of failure for ∼MHz and ∼GHz operations are,
respectively, 10−3 and 10−6 smaller than those
for ∼KHz.
Figure 5.1 Failure probability fp plotted as a function of the MTTF and the platform fre-
quency.
Figure 5.1(b) presents the comparison of the log-normally distributed failure times at different
operating frequencies. The MTTF is assumed to be 5 years. At first, the fault probability per
memory access is always extremely low, e.g., at a ∼KHz operating frequency, the permanent
rate is 4.4× 10−18 at year 2. The fault probabilities at ∼MHz and ∼GHz are 10−3 and 10−6
smaller respectively.
5.6 SPTA Methodology
This section starts with the introduction of a cache model with an evict-on-miss random
replacement policy. Then, it proceeds to describe a state-of-the-art SPTA method for ran-
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dom instruction caches which comprises two separate approaches: a cache contention based
approach and a state space based approach. For each of these two methods, we study the
impact of faults and discuss how we augmented the SPTA methodology to account for it. A
major advantage of the joint use of the contention based approach and the state space based
approach is the ability to keep computational complexity within the tractable realm.
The SPTA method under scrutiny is directly applicable to fully associative caches and it can
be generalized to set associative caches (by separately performing the analysis of each cache
set as if it was a fully associative cache). We focus on single-path programs and assumes no
pre-emption. In addition, cache miss and cache hit latencies are assumed to be constant, to
avoid timing anomalies.
5.6.1 The Cache Model
An abstraction of a set-associative cache is shown in Figure 5.2. This type of cache is divided
into multiple sets and, for each of them, it provides a number of ways to store cache blocks.
Each memory address used by the cache is broken into three parts: tag, set and offset. The
offset locates the data within each block and the set is used to find which cache block should
be used with a given memory address. As multiple memory addresses can be stored in the
same cache block, the tag is stored within each cache block for comparison, to identify the
actual memory address it refers to.
Way 1 Way 2 Way 3 Way 4
Set 0 0x. . .
Set 1 0x. . . 0x. . .
Set 2
Set 3 0x. . .
Figure 5.2 Set-associative cache representation.
In a cache with an evict-on-miss random replacement policy, every time a cache miss happens,
a cache block in the same set is randomly selected and replaced with the new data (the term
data is used, here and in the following, to refer to the content of a memory address).
Our method can be applied to both instruction and data caches. In data caches, there are
two choices for the writing policy: a write-through or a write-back policies. A write-back
policy writes the data temporarily in the cache, and then transfers the data to the main
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memory when the cache block is evicted. However, in the presence of faults, the data in
the cache may be corrupted, resulting in data consistency issues. Hence, in this paper, we
consider data caches with a write-through policy, which is often combined with a no write
allocate policy, i.e., on a write miss, no cache line is allocated as shown in Figure 5.3.
Data read
Cache hit?
Select a
cache block
Read data
from the
main memory
Return data
Data write
Cache hit?
Write data
to the main
memory
Write data
to the cache
No
Yes
No
Yes
Figure 5.3 A write-through data cache with no write allocate.
Note that each memory address has one and only one corresponding cache set. As a result,
cache blocks belonging to separate sets cannot affect one another, and results relative to
different cache sets can be regarded as independent variables. For this reason, we can use
SPTA to calculate the pWCET of each set and then obtain the overall pWCET by convolving
the pWCETs of all cache sets [27].
5.6.2 Cache Contention Approach
To perform SPTA on instruction caches, we exploit a trace T = [e1, ...en], where each ei
represents a memory block. The reuse distance rd is defined as the number of memory
blocks accessed between two consecutive references to the same memory block, and it is
calculated as:
rd(ei, T ) =

i− j − 1 if ∃ej ∈ T : ej = ei,
∀p : j < p < i, ep 6= ei
∞ otherwise
(5.4)
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Cache contention con(ei, T ) is a metric proposed in [11] to help calculate cache hit proba-
bilities and it includes all the cache blocks that may contribute to cache hits. It is defined
as:
con(ei, T ) =
 ∞ if rd(ei, T ) =∞|conS(ei, T )| otherwise (5.5)
conS(ei, T ) = {ej ∈ T |i− rd(ei, T ) < j < i ∧ Pˆ (ehitj ) 6= 0}
∪{er ∈ T |r = i− rd(ei, T )}
(5.6)
The lower bound of the actual hit probability PˆN(ehiti ) for a cache with associativity N is
computed as:
PˆN(ehiti ) =
 0 con(ei, T ) ≥ N(N−1
N
)rd(ei,T ) otherwise (5.7)
5.6.3 Extending the Cache Contention Approach
In Figure 5.3, we can see that reading data is akin to reading instructions. For what concerns
writing data, the write-through policy always writes data directly to the main memory.
Consequently, one can regard each write operation as a cache miss. We introduce the binary
function T to express whether a memory request is a cache read or a cache write:
T (ei) =
 R instruction or data readW data write (5.8)
We first tackle the case of a cache read, i.e., T (ei) = R. To account for the impact of faults,
we need to modify PˆN(ehiti ) accordingly. If a permanent fault has been detected, the available
cache block number may be smaller than the associativity N . Consequently, we use N groups
of hit probabilities for our analysis and use k ∈ N, 0 ≤ k ≤ N to represent k available cache
blocks. We define Pˆ kF (ehiti ) as the lower bound of the hit probability for the kth group in the
presence of faults, and we calculate it as follows:
Pˆ kF (ehiti ) =
i∏
j=m
ajt ·
i∏
j=m
ajp · bik · Pˆ k(ehiti ). (5.9)
Knowing that m is the memory index such that m < i ∧ em−1 = ei ∧ ∀m < p < i : ep 6= ei.
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We use ait to calculate the transient faults effects as it denotes the probability of not observing
a transient fault when accessing memory block ei. When a transient fault occurs in the cache,
we assume that it is detected and a cache miss ensues. Let nia be the number of memory
accesses between accessing ei−1 and ei. We have nia = 1 if ei−1 and ei are in the same cache
set; otherwise it is a value > 1 because different cache sets are accessed.
Since the transient fault probability for each memory access is ft, we have that:
ait = (1− ft)n
i
a (5.10)
Let aip be the probability of not encountering a permanent fault when accessing ei. Similarly
to what we did with ait, we can calculate aip from the permanent fault probability fp as:
aip = (1− fp)n
i
a (5.11)
With ait, aip and m, we derive the terms
∏i
j=m a
i
t and
∏i
j=m a
i
p, which account for the hit
probability reductions due to transient faults and permanent faults, respectively.
We define dik as the occurrence probability of the k-th group after having accessed memory
block ei−1. This includes the accumulated effects of permanent faults and it is computed as
follows:
dik =
N∑
j=k
 j
k
 (1− aip)j−k(aip)kdi−1j (5.12)
Knowing that:
d0k =
 1 if k = N0 otherwise (5.13)
Then, bik is computed as follows:
bik =

djk if ∃ej ∈ T : ej = ei,
∀p : j < p < i, ep 6= ei
1 otherwise
(5.14)
Let PˆF (ehiti ) be the hit probability with faults for both cache read and write operations. For
a cache read, this is equal to the sum of the hit probabilities of all N groups reading the
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cache. In the case of a cache write, instead, we have a cache miss. Thus, we have that:
PˆF (ehiti ) =

∑N
j=1 Pˆ
j
F (ehiti ) if T (ei) = R
0 if T (ei) =W
(5.15)
Table 5.1 presents an example of the calculations required to compute the hit probabilities
with fault impacts when reading the memory sequence a, b, a.
Table 5.1 Calculation example when reading memory sequence a, b, a through a fully asso-
ciative cache with associativity N = 2. Transient and permanent fault rates are ft = 0.2 and
fp = 0.1, respectively, yielding ait = 0.8 and aip = 0.9.
ei a b a
rd ∞ ∞ 1
con ∞ ∞ 1
PˆN 0 0 0.5
di1 0.18 0.3078 0.3951
di2 0.81 0.6561 0.5314
bi1 1 1 0.18
bi2 1 1 0.81
Pˆ 1F 0 0 0.04666
Pˆ 2F 0 0 0.21
PˆF 0 0 0.2567
5.6.4 State Space Approach
Contention based approaches provide a way to perform fast SPTA on random caches. How-
ever, their results can be imprecise. To improve their accuracy, Altmeyer et al. [11] use a
state space based approach.
In a state space based approach, a cache state is defined as CS = (E,P,D), where E ⊆ E
is a set of memory blocks in the cache, P ⊆ R is the occurrence probability and D : N→ R
is the cache miss distribution. To keep this approach within tractable complexity, only one
memory block set R is selected for thorough analysis. The other blocks are regarded as cache
evictions and analyzed using a contention based approach, which produces a much fast result
for reasonable accuracy.
Assuming that the cache is initially empty, we use ⊥ to represent an empty cache block or
a non-selected memory block e /∈ R. Then the initial state space is defined as CSinit = ({⊥
65
, ... ⊥}, 1, D), with:
D(x) =
 1 if x = 00 otherwise (5.16)
When a memory block e is accessed, the update function u is used to model how the state
space changes. If the memory block is in the cache, the state is unaffected. Otherwise, either
a cache block will be evicted or a new cache block will be used for the incoming memory
block. The update function is defined as:
u((E,P,D), e) =
 {(E,P,D)} if e ∈ R ∧ e ∈ Emiss((E,P,D), e) otherwise (5.17)
Knowing that:
miss((E,P,D), e) = {(E \ e′) ∪ {e}, P · 1
N
,D′|e′ ∈ E} (5.18)
and
D′(x) =

D(x) if e /∈ R
0 if e ∈ R ∧ x = 0
D(x− 1) otherwise
(5.19)
To reduce the number of states, the merge operation unionmulti can be used to join two states with
the same memory blocks. This operation is defined as:
(E1, P1, D1) unionmulti (E2, P2, D2) =
{(
E1, P1 + P2,
(
P1
P1+P2D1
)
⊕
(
P2
P1+P2D2
))}
E1 = E2
{(E1, P1, D1), (E2, P2, D2)} otherwise
(5.20)
where ⊕ is the summation of the distributions—i.e., (D1 +D2)(x) = D1(x) +D2(x))—and
p ·D is the multiplication of each element in D by p.
From the initial state space and the update function, one can calculate how a distribution
varies with the incoming memory block addresses. The final distribution is then computed
as the weighted sum of all distributions.
5.6.5 Extending the State Space Approach
The state space approach that we just presented applies to read operations. We need to
extend it to the write operations of write-through caches. Every data write operation is
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regarded as a cache miss. Therefore, in the case of a data write, we have the update function
u:
u((E,P,D), e) = {(E,P,D′)} if T (e) =W (5.21)
To take transient and permanent faults into consideration, we need to modify the update
function, so that also the transient and permanent fault detection mechanisms are accounted
for. To do so, we use the method proposed in [31].
We define the transient fault impact function tf as follows:
tf((E,P,D)) = {(E \ E ′, P · (ait)|E\E
′| · (1− ait)|E
′|, D)|E ′ ⊆ E} (5.22)
When a transient fault occurs, we assumed that it can be detected. As a consequence, a
transient fault can be regarded as a cache eviction, i.e., the data in the cache block become
invalid and a cache miss occurs. Every cache block may be affected by a transient fault at
any time, and the probability for a cache block of not being interested by a transient fault
is calculated using Equation (5.10). The cache blocks are partitioned into E \ E ′ (i.e., the
blocks without transient faults) and those that are evicted E ′ (i.e., the blocks with transient
faults).
Besides transient faults, we also need to further modify our methodology to deal with per-
manent faults. Since permanent faults can reduce the number of available cache blocks for a
cache set, we use Sk to represent the cache state set with k ∈ N, 0 ≤ k ≤ N available blocks.
Thus, we have CS ∈ Sk.
We define the permanent fault impact function as pf . Suppose that the state before a
permanent fault occurs is CS = (E,P,D) ∈ Si and the state with permanent faults is
CS ′ ∈ Sj, j ≤ i, i.e., the number of available cache blocks decreases because of the occurrence
of permanent faults. Then, we compute pf as follows:
pf((E,P,D)) = (E \ E ′, P · (aip)|E\E
′| · (1− aip)|E
′|, D)
|E ′ ⊆ E,CS ′ ∈ S|E\E′|
(5.23)
The permanent fault impact function describes how a permanent fault affects states in dif-
ferent cache sets. Note that when we use a state CS ∈ Si, we consider that the cache
associativity is i (i.e., cache blocks with permanent faults are detected and disabled). For
now, we ignore the impacts of a permanent fault detection mechanism and a perfect detection
mechanism is assumed, i.e., the permanent faults are detected immediately after they occur.
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Equations (5.22) and (5.23) describe transient and permanent fault impacts, respectively.
We apply them to the cache states before the update function u in order to perform SPTA
estimates in the presence of faults. Table 5.2 details the SPTA in the presence of faults using
the same scenario of Table 5.1.
Table 5.2 Calculation example for the state space based approach when reading the memory
sequence a, b, a with the same cache configuration and fault rates of Table 5.1. At the
beginning of each memory access, the fault impacts are evaluated using the transient fault
impact function tf and the permanent fault impact function pf . Finally, the update function
u is used to update the cache states.
Initial ({⊥,⊥}, 1, [1])
States
Transient ({⊥,⊥}, 1, [1])
Faults
Permanent ({⊥,⊥}, 0.81, [1]), ({⊥}, 0.18, [1])
Faults ({}, 0.01, [1])
a ({a,⊥}, 0.81, [0, 1]), ({a}, 0.18, [0, 1])
({}, 0.01, [0, 1])
Transient ({a,⊥}, 0.648, [0, 1]), ({⊥,⊥}, 0.162, [0, 1])
Faults ({a}, 0.144, [0, 1]), ({⊥}, 0.036, [0, 1]),
({}, 0.01, [0, 1])
Permanent ({a,⊥}, 0.5249, [0, 1]), ({⊥,⊥}, 0.1312, [0, 1])
Faults ({a}, 0.1879, [0, 1]), ({⊥}, 0.1199, [0, 1]),
({}, 0.0361, [0, 1])
b ({a, b}, 0.2625, [0, 0, 1]), ({b,⊥}, 0.3937, [0, 0, 1])
({b}, 0.3078, [0, 0, 1]), ({}, 0.0361, [0, 0, 1])
Transient ({a, b}, 0.168, [0, 0, 1]), ({a,⊥}, 0.042, [0, 0, 1])
Faults ({b,⊥}, 0.357, [0, 0, 1]), ({⊥,⊥}, 0.08924, [0, 0, 1])
({b}, 0.2462, [0, 0, 1]), ({⊥}, 0.06156, [0, 0, 1])
({}, 0.0361, [0, 1])
Permanent ({a, b}, 0.1361, [0, 0, 1]), ({a,⊥}, 0.03402, [0, 0, 1])
Faults ({b,⊥}, 0.2892, [0, 0, 1]), ({⊥,⊥}, 0.07228, [0, 0, 1])
({a}, 0.0189, [0, 0, 1]), ({b}, 0.2688, [0, 0, 1])
({⊥}, 0.1074, [0, 0, 1]), ({}, 0.07344, [0, 0, 1])
a ({a, b}, 0.2807, [0, 0, 0.4849, 0.5151])
({a,⊥}, 0.2509, [0, 0, 0.1356, 0.8644])
({a}, 0.3951, [0, 0, 0.04784, 0.9522])
({}, 0.07344, [0, 0, 0, 1])
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5.7 Permanent Fault Detection Mechanisms
The SPTA method presented in Section 5.6 assumes that permanent faults are detected—
and addressed—immediately after they occur. This assumption can be regarded as one
of “perfect detection”. However, in the real world, a permanent fault is not detected per-
fectly/immediately. Depending on the applied permanent fault detection mechanism, since
the fault occurs, there might be a longer or shorter delay before a is is identified/classified
as permanent. Because disabling the faulty block depends on its detection, this delay can
affect the execution times.
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(b) The faulty block is disabled.
Figure 5.4 The impact of permanent fault detection on a 2-way random cache with a perma-
nent fault probability of 0.1 per memory access. One square represents a cache block whose
status can be: a) empty; b) containing a memory block; or c) permanently faulty. The value
at the bottom of the block indicates the probability of the status. The dotted lines denote the
behavior of the cache blocks in the presence of permanent faults and the solid lines indicate
the behavior of a memory access. When a permanent fault occurs in a cache block, it is
marked with an X.
Figure 5.4 shows how the performance of detection mechanisms affect the system’s timing
behavior for the example memory access sequence a, a. The second access of a is not always a
cache hit, because a permanent fault can make a cache block invalid. In Subfigure 5.4(a), the
permanent fault is not detected. In Subfigure 5.4(b), the permanent fault is detected and the
faulty block is disabled. We can see that when a is stored in the cache, the probabilities of
the cache block status are different, since a different number of cache blocks is used. For the
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second access of a, the hit probabilities can be computed by summing up the probabilities
of all cache blocks that contain a as follows: in Subfigure 5.4(a), 0.1539 + 0.6561 = 0.81; in
Figure 5.4(b), 0.2349+ 0.6561 = 0.891. The difference arises from the presence or absence of
prompt fault detection.
In this article, we investigate two permanent fault detection mechanisms from [30]: rule-
based and Dynamic Hidden Markov Model (D-HMM) based fault classification. We assume
that cache scrubbing happens periodically to check for the onset of errors in the data. If any
fault is detected in a cache block, the block is labelled as invalid. Using a fault classification
mechanism, we can tell apart transient and permanent faults—and detect those in the latter
category.
5.7.1 Rule-based Detection
The rule-based fault detection is a straightforward mechanism to classify a fault as permanent.
We adopt the approach presented in [99, 3]. We use a counter to record the number of faults
in a block within a reset period. Every time a fault is detected, the counter value increases
by 1.
At the beginning of each reset period, the counter value is set to 0. We can then define
a threshold value such that, when the counter value exceeds it, we classify the fault as
permanent; otherwise the fault is regarded as transient.
5.7.2 D-HMM based Detection
To more reliably classify permanent faults amid transient faults, a D-HMM based detec-
tion mechanism was proposed by Panerati et al. [86]. HMMs are defined by the following
components:
• P (S0): the initial probability distribution over the domain of the state variable.
• Tij = P (St = j|St−1 = i): a one time-step probabilistic transition function for the state
variable.
• Eij = P (Ot = j|St = i): the probabilistic sensor model revealing the probability of
every observation in any given a state.
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Table 5.3 D-HMM sensor model, “Available” means that there is no fault in the block.
Otherwise a permanent failure or transient SEU have occurred.
St
P (Ot|St)
Fault No Fault
Available 0 1
SEU 1 0
Failure 1 0
Table 5.4 D-HMM transition model, SEUs and permanent failures are treated as independent
from one another.
St−1
P (St|St−1)
Available SEU Failure
Available 1− P (SEU ∨ Failure) PSEU Pfailure(t)
SEU 1− P (SEU ∨ Failure) PSEU Pfailure(t)
Failure 0 0 1
One of the advantages of the HMM representation is the fact that we can predict the state
variable with linear time complexity:
Pt(S = j|O1:t−1) =
∑
i
Pt−1(S = i|O1:t−1)Tij (5.24)
Given a new observation, the prediction can also be refined as:
Pt(S = j|Ot = j, O1:t−1) = αPt(S = i|O1:t−1)Eij (5.25)
where α is a normalization parameter.
The sensor model and transition model used by the D-HMM classifier are displayed in Ta-
ble 5.3 and 5.4, respectively. In these models, PSEU is the probability of a SEU and Pfailure(t)
is the probability of a permanent fault to occur during the scrubbing period at time t.
We initialize a D-HMM model for each cache block. At the beginning of a scrubbing phase,
we update the system model using Equation (5.24). After the scrubbing phase, we refine
the result with Equation 5.25. Then, we re-apply Equation 5.24 for prediction. A “belief”
threshold value is chosen so that, if the predicted value (for the likelihood of the block to be
in the “failure” state) exceeds it, we classify the fault as permanent.
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5.8 Evaluation
In this section, we present the experimental setup and evaluation of the proposed SPTA
methodology in the presence of both permanent and transient faults. Furthermore, we com-
pare the different online fault detection mechanisms from the previous section to study their
impact on the overall performance.
5.8.1 Experimental Setup
For our evaluation, we choose to use the Mälardalen benchmark suite [52]. These are very
popular benchmarks for the WCET estimation problem. To generate our input, we use
the gem5 instruction set simulator [23] to produce instruction and data traces for an ARM
processor. The data traces are not used in the experiments. A statically linked library is
adopted for the compilation of the benchmark executables.
System Under Test
We consider a computing system provided with a Floating Point Unit (FPU). For all bench-
marks, single-path program memory traces are generated using the pre-defined inputs. The
system is equipped with separate L1 instruction and data caches. In the following, several
cache configurations are evaluated.
We assume that the latencies for a cache hit, a cache miss and error detection overhead
for each memory access are constant, and they are Ch, Cm, and Cd, respectively. The total
number of cache accesses, cache misses and cache hits are denoted as as Nt, nm and nh. Thus
the execution time t is calculated as
t = nm · (Cm + Cd) + (Nt − nh) · (Ch + Cd). (5.26)
We observe that t is a linear function of nm. Thus, we can use the number of misses as a
metric to denote the overall execution time.
Fault Scenarios
With regard to fault scenarios, we setup a low and a high fault scenario for our experiments.
In each scenario, each cache block has a transient fault probability and a permanent fault
probability on each cache access. With regard to transient faults, we assume that in the
low fault rate scenario, the system is protected against high-energy particles. We use a
probability value of 1e−10 which is equivalent to ∼ 1e−6 SEU bit−1s−1. This is, for example,
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the long term SEU rate for a device with a 4mm shield thickness on a highly elliptical orbit
(HEO) [108] as computed by ESA’s SPENVIS (SPace ENVironment Information System).
In the high fault rate scenario, we assume that faults happen with a probability of 1e−2
per block, per memory access. This assumption is extremely severe and, in fact, pertaining
to environmental conditions harsher than those we would find in most practical aerospace
applications. It is comparable, for example, to the SEU rates that are caused by solar events
in Mercury’s orbit [46]. However, such as “stress” test allows us to better unveil how the
performance impacts of the rule-based and the D-HMM detection mechanisms set apart
from one another in extreme conditions (despite the very short run-time of our benchmark
applications).
Using Equation (5.2), we compute the permanent fault probability with a 5-year MTTF to
be approximately 1e−20. This value is used in the low fault rate scenario. To account for
the extra wear caused by particle radiation in the high fault rate scenario, we increase the
permanent fault rate to 1e−5 and 1e−4.
5.8.2 Results
The cache of the system under test has a size of 1024 bytes with 2-way associativity and a
16-byte cache blocks. Due to space limitation, we only present a fraction of the benchmark
results in this section. Since the execution times of the Mälardalen benchmarks are extremely
short, the high fault rate scenario is the one producing the most noteworthy results. In
setting up the SPTA methodology, we select the most frequent memory blocks to be fed to
the state space based approach while the remaining blocks are treated with the contention
based approach.
Accuracy of SPTA
We first evaluate the accuracy of the proposed SPTA method when faults occur. Since there
are no other established SPTA methods for random caches affected by faults, Figure 5.5 com-
pares the experimental pWCET results with those returned by the proposed SPTA method—
using different numbers of blocks n for the state space based approach. The x-axis denotes
the number of cache misses, and y-axis indicates the associated exceedance probability, i.e.,
the probability for a program to encounter more misses than the corresponding number on
the x-axis.
The results in Figure 5.5 show that—when a sufficient number of blocks is used in the state
space based approach (n = 3, 4 for both fdct and compress)—our SPTA method produces
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accurate results. Some minor differences between the simulations and the SPTA result are
concentrated around the tails of the distributions. This deviation is due to the relative
scarcity of simulation samples, which we limited to constrain our simulations within feasible
times. As the number of blocks in the state space based approach decreases, the accuracy of
the SPTA method gets compromised and the number of cache misses over-estimated.
We can see that, even though simulations can provide accurate results, one needs ≥ 1015 sim-
ulations when looking at exceedance probabilities of 10−15. This is almost always unfeasible
in practice. The number of required simulations could be reduced using MBPTA techniques
but is beyond the scope of this research. The proposed SPTA, however, can provide results
even for extremely low exceedance probabilties. Its accuracy only depends on the number of
blocks used for the state space analysis. Conversely, the calculation time of the SPTA can
be reduced at the cost of lower accuracy.
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Figure 5.5 Accuracy of the proposed SPTA with a transient fault probability of 1e−10 and
a permanent fault probability of 1e−5 per memory access. The number of simulations is
set to 1,000. The number of blocks used in the SPTA state space based approach is set to
n = 1, 2, 3, 4.
The Impact of Faults
Having assessed the performance of the SPTA method per se, we then evaluate the pWCETs
of different fault scenarios. The transient fault probability is set to 1e−10. Since permanent
faults can accumulate, they are the ones that most significantly affect the system performance.
In our experiments, we evaluates different permanent fault probabilities.
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Figure 5.6 presents the pWCETs for different fault scenarios. Our simulations verify that the
proposed SPTA provides realistic results. As the permanent fault probability increases, the
number of misses increases accordingly, as one would expect. However, we observe that, with
time, the number of misses may become dramatically large. For example, in Figure ??—with
permanent fault probability 1e−7—between the exceedance probability of 1e−5 and 1e−7, the
number of misses increases significantly. This is due to the fact that some cache sets may
be especially sensitive to the accumulated permanent faults. Their pWCET may change
significantly and, consequently, affect the final pWCET.
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(b) The compress benchmark.
Figure 5.6 Study of the impact of faults using the SPTA method. The transient fault proba-
bility is set to 1e−10, and the permanent fault probability to 1e−20, 1e−10, and1e−5 per memory
access. The simulation is repeated 1,000 times and the number of blocks used in the SPTA
state space based approach is set to n = 4.
Sensitivity to the Cache Parameters
The cache iteself plays an import role in determining the resulting pWCET distribution. In
this section, we use different cache configurations to study their impact on performance and
results.
In Figure 5.7, we can see how the cache block size affects the pWCET distributions. As
the cache block size increases, the number of cache misses, at low exceedance probabilities,
increases. This is because in our model, we assume that, when a permanent fault occurs in
a cache block, this cache block will not be re-used in the future. As a result, a permanent
fault affects a bigger area of the cache if we are using a larger cache block. This, in turn,
entails a larger number of cache misses.
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Figure 5.7 Impact of the cache block size on the fdct benchmark. The transient and perma-
nent fault probability are 1e−10, and 1e−5, respectively. The number of blocks used in the
SPTA state space based approach is set to n = 4. The cache size is 1024 bytes with 2-way
associativity and the cache block size varies from 16-byte to 128-byte.
In Figure 5.8, instead, we increase the cache size to study its impact on the pWCET distri-
butions. Predictably, the pWCET improves as the cache size increases. This is because a
larger cache has more cache sets. Thus, the program instructions and data are distributed
over a larger number of cache sets, leading to potentially fewer cache conflicts. On the other
hand, if the cache size is already sufficiently large for a program’s execution, using a larger
cache will not necessary improve the pWCET distribution.
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Figure 5.8 Impact of the cache size on fdct benchmark. The transient and permanent fault
probability are 1e−10, and 1e−5, respectively. The number of blocks used in the SPTA state
space based approach is set to n = 4. The cache block size is 16-byte with 2-way associativity
and the cache size varies from 1024 bytes to 4096 bytes.
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5.8.3 The Impact of Fault Detection
In the previous sections, we evaluated the pWCETs produced by our SPTA method, assuming
that the cache blocks with permanent faults are disabled once they become faulty. However,
when both transient and permanent faults occur, it can takes an additional time penalty
before being able to classify a fault as permanent. In this section, we evaluate the effects on
the pWCETs estimates of different permanent fault detection mechanisms.
For these experiments, we consider the following two fault scenarios:
1. Low fault rate scenario: permanent faults have a probability of 1e−20 per memory access
and transient faults of 1e−10 per memory access.
2. High fault rate scenario: permanent faults have a probability of 1e−4 per memory access
and transient faults of 1e−2 per memory
For each scenario, we compare the simulation results obtained using the rule-based and the
D-HMM based permanent fault detection mechanisms. We run 1,000 simulations for each
one of the detection mechanisms. For the rule-based method, the threshold is set to the
empirical value of 4 and the reset period is equal to the execution time of of each benchmark.
That is, if 4 faults are detected, the corresponding cache block is considered to be affected by
permanent fault and it will be disabled. For D-HMM based detection, the threshold is set to
0.9. If the prediction value exceeds 0.9 (i.e. a 90% belief confidence), the cache block will be
disabled. Finally, the SPTA results with perfect fault detection are used as a baseline. Note
that we also experimented with other threshold value. As they produced similar results, they
are not shown here due to the space limitations.
In the low fault rate scenario, both detection mechanisms result in similar pWCETs, which
closely match the results of perfect detection. There is not much difference between pWCETs
using different permanent fault detection mechanisms, because the execution times of the
benchmarks are short, and with extremely low fault rates, permanent fault rarely occurs,
limiting the impact of the detection mechanisms.
In the high fault rate scenario, however, the strengths and weaknesses of different detection
mechanisms are no longer masked by the rarity of faults. For any given exceedance proba-
bility, the system execution time with rule-based permanent fault detection is much longer
than that with D-HMM based permanent fault detection mechanism.
The statistical results of all benchmarks in the high fault rate scenario are displayed in
Figure 5.9 as box plots. We observe that for rule-based detection, the execution times are
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Figure 5.9 Box plots of the latency ratios of “rule-based detection over perfect detection”
and “D-HMM based detection over perfect detection” at the exceedance probability of 10−3
for all benchmarks in the Mälardalen suite in the high fault rate scenario.
distinctively longer than those obtained using D-HMM detection. The median values are
1.187 and 1.049 respectively.
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Figure 5.10 The latency ratios in the high fault rate scenario for all benchmarks in the
Mälardalen suite.
To better show the effects of detection mechanisms in the high fault rate scenario, the
detection-mechanism-to-perfect-detection ratios of all the benchmarks in the Mälardalen suite
is presented in Figure 5.10. On the x-axis are the different benchmarks and the y-axis shows
the overhead (w.r.t. perfect detection) of rule-based detection execution time to D-HMM
based detection execution time for each benchmark—i.e., lower is best. The geometric mean
values are 1.256 and 1.042. On average, rule-based detection results a 21% larger overhead
than D-HMM based detection.
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5.9 Conclusion
In this article, we proposed an SPTA methodology for random caches and single-path pro-
grams executing on real-time systems in the presence of faults. The SPTA method consists
of two combined approaches: a contention based approach and a state space based approach.
With the two approaches, both transient and permanent fault impacts are taken into account,
and the lower bound of the number of cache misses is computed. In the SPTA alone, perfect
permanent fault detection is assumed. However, this is not the case in a realistic context.
Thus, we studied two online permanent fault detection mechanisms: rule-based and D-HMM
based detection. We compared the pWCET estimates using both detection mechanisms and
found that D-HMM based detection significantly improves the pWCET estimates when com-
pared to rule-based detection. In our future work, we plan to extend our SPTA method to
multi-path programs, and study the effect of additional fault tolerant techniques.
79
CHAPTER 6 ARTICLE 4: STATIC PROBABILISTIC TIMING ANALYSIS
WITH A PERMANENT FAULT DETECTION MECHANISM
6.1 Preface
In Chapter 5 [32], we have introduce an SPTA methodology with perfect permananet fault
detection. Our experimental findings suggest that, in practice, the specific implementation
of a permanent fault detection mechanism is an important factor and may affect pWCET
distributions substantially. Hence, it is crucual to take into account the detection technique
implementation in the SPTA of random caches. To this end, we propose an SPTA method
that integrates permanent error detection, by splitting the SPTA method into two modes
to account for the impact of the detection methods, respectively. We investigate one in
particular: a rule-based detection technique is added to our SPTA method and its evaluation
indicates that this approach is capable of providing safe and tight pWCET estimates.
Authors: Chao Chen, Jacopo Panerati, Imane Hafnaoui and Giovanni Beltrame
Accepted by: 2017 12th IEEE Symposium on Industrial Embedded Systems (SIES)
6.2 Abstract
In recent years, random caches have been proposed as a way to simplify the timing analysis
of real-time systems. However, technology-scaling makes caches prone to faults. Fault detec-
tion mechanisms can detect permanent faults but they affect the timing analysis of a random
cache. This paper introduces a Static Probabilistic Timing Analysis (SPTA) technique that
accounts for a permanent fault detection mechanism. The permanent fault detection mech-
anism periodically checks caches for faults and disables faulty cache blocks to prevent future
accesses. The SPTA method operates by periodically switching its run-time between the
fault-detection and the no-fault-detection states. This is the first SPTA with a realistic per-
manent fault detection mechanism. Experiments show that the proposed method always
provides safe timing estimations—even when few memory blocks are provided—and accurate
results—when sufficient memory blocks are present.
6.3 Introduction
The real-time embedded systems demanded by the aerospace and automotive industries are
safety-critical systems that place strict requirements on timing performance. The software
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tasks executed by these systems are required to meet their deadlines in all kinds of conditions,
including worst case scenarios. Traditionally, designers have used extremely conservative esti-
mations of the execution times extracted from deterministic architectural models. The major
shortcoming of this approach is the fact that it can place the Worst Case Execution Time
(WCET) extremely far away from the actual maximum time demanded by an application
[18]. A rising design trend consists of exploiting probabilistic architectures to obtain better
and tighter WCET bounds. Examples of this approaches are already available on commercial
processors, such as the ARM cache controller with a pseudo-random replacement strategy1.
In this paper, a cache with a random replacement policy is employed instead of a traditional,
deterministic one such as Least-Recently-Used (LRU). Thus, pathological cases—those that
lead to systematic cache misses—are avoided and only low probabilities are associated to ex-
treme cases [90]. These low probabilities ensure that the system execution time matches the
safety requirements (e.g. 10−9 failures per hour) with tighter WCETs. Probabilistic WCETs
(pWCETs) also provide the exceedance probability of a corresponding execution time. In
other words, they tell us the probability of encountering a task exceeding a certain execution
time to complete its computation.
The vast majority of the research work that focus on WCET estimation techniques for either
deterministic or probabilistic architectures is based on the assumption that the hardware is
immune to randomly occurring faults. However, performance enhancing techniques—such
as technology scaling—have a negative effect on a system’s reliability. Transistor shrinking
can introduce process variations that increase the components’ probability of failure. The
use of techniques for power consumption optimization, such as Dynamic Voltage Scaling
(DVS), can also increase the failure probability of SRAM cells if the voltage is excessively
reduced [117]. The study conducted in [83] paints a morbid picture of what we can expect
in the future in terms of failure probabilities due to the scaling of components. The authors
report that SRAM cells will be the most affected elements: the probability of failure they
predict is 6.1 × 10−13 at 45nm and will increase to 2.6 × 10−04 at 12nm. Another study
[58] underlined the issue by reporting that caches in particular will be a major source for
performance degradation in future designs. For all of these reasons, we can no longer afford
to ignore the effects of fault occurrence when estimating WCET bounds.
On top of permanent faults due to manufacturing processes, we consider dynamic faults
from factors such as wear-out effects, etcetera. A non-zero probability of a permanent fault
exists at each memory access. The main contribution of this paper is the development of
an SPTA method that integrates a permanent fault detection mechanism. To the best of
1http://infocenter.arm.com/help/index.jsp
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our knowledge, this is the first SPTA with a realistic permanent fault detection mechanism.
The SPTA is based on the combined methodology proposed by Altmeyer et al. [11]. We
extend their approach in our proposed SPTA method by taking faults into account. Since
the fault detection mechanism checks for faults periodically, we develop SPTA formulae for
two operating modes:
• When the fault detection is off, we develop the SPTA without fault detection, i.e.,
faulty blocks are regarded as they can still be used.
• When the fault detection is turned on, we develop the SPTA with fault detection which
considers the permanent disabling of faulty blocks.
By combining the two modes, our SPTA method can perform timing analysis that integrates
a periodic permanent fault detection mechanism.
The organization of the paper is as follows: we examine the related research work in Sec-
tion 6.4; Section 6.5 presents the assumptions and methods used to describe faults and
random caches; our SPTA method is proposed in Section 6.6; we evaluate it using a wide
range of benchmarks in Section 6.7; finally Section 7.10 draws the conclusions of the paper.
6.4 Related Work
6.4.1 SPTA
In the literature, three kinds of Probabilistic Timing Analysis (PTA) methods have been
proposed: 1. measurement-based [37]; 2. static [118, 27, 39, 11]; and 3. a hybrid of both
methods [18]. Caches with random replacement policies are used to make the system proba-
bilistically predictable [90] and PTA computes the pWCET distribution of a program as its
timing estimation. Two replacement policies have been proposed: evict-on-access [27] and
evict-on-miss replacement. Since the evict-on-miss policy can provide a better pWCET [39],
we focus on SPTA with evict-on-miss policy in this paper.
SPTA methods from the early days exploit the reuse distance. Zhou [118] provides a tractable
formula for pWCET which, however, is found unsound by Cazorla et al. [27] and Altmeyer
et al. [9]. Quinones et al. [90] and Kosmidis et al. [66] give other formulae, but these may
produce an overestimation of the number of cache hits [40]. Davis et al. [39] provide an
optimal formula when the only reuse distance is used for calculation.
Altmeyer and Davis [9] propose an SPTA method for single-path programs, which can provide
more accurate results compared to previous methods, at the expense of the calculation speed.
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Two methods—cache contention and exhaustive state enumeration—are combined to provide
a precise and accurate result. Altmeyer et al. [11] introduce alternative methods to combine
them. Griffin et al. [49] propose an SPTA with lossy compression, whose accuracy depends
on tunable parameters.
Davis et al. [39] propose an SPTA for multi-path programs using path merging. Lesage et al.
[71] introduce a more accurate SPTA, which is built upon the method in [9] and extended to
multi-path programs by calculating the upper bounds of the cache states and reducing the
path according to the worst-case execution path expansion.
6.4.2 Faults
The amount of research on PTA in faulty scenarios has recently boomed. Slijepcevic et
al. [98] use MBPTA to study fault-tolerant real-time systems with random caches. They
introduce Degraded Test Mode (DTM) for pWCET calculation, which can compute average
and worst-case cases in the presence of faults. More fault scenarios for both transient and
permanent faults are introduced in [99], and experiments and simulations show that the
impact of faults is negligible for many applications. However, there are some cases where
faults affect the system significantly—e.g., when permanent faults decrease the number of
cache blocks with severe consequences.
Hardy and Puaut [56] develop an SPTA method for instruction caches with LRU policies.
They study permanent faults caused by manufacturing variations. Given the cache miss
probability, the pWCET is computed by integrating the fault-free scenario. Hardy et al. [55]
investigate different reliability mechanisms for permanent faults, and find out that the execu-
tion time of programs can be significantly reduced when using simple reliability mechanisms.
Chen et al. [31] introduce a state space based SPTA, which can provide an accurate pWCET
in the presence of both transient and permanent faults. A perfect permanent fault detection
mechanism (which detects permanent faults immediately after their occurrences) is assumed
to be adopted. In practice, however, detection cannot be perfect. Therefore, in this paper
we develop our SPTA taking this into consideration. To study permanent fault detection
effects, Chen et al. [30] apply two different fault detection mechanisms and compare their
effects, showing that detection mechanism can improve pWCET distributions dramatically.
This result is derived from measurements rather than of static analysis.
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6.5 System Models
In this section, we present models for a random cache and permanent faults. Their respective
impacts on our SPTA methodology are then analyzed.
6.5.1 Random cache model
For our system stochastic, we adopt an N -way set-associative evict-on-miss cache. In this
paper, a single-level cache is studied. The cache behavior depends on two policies: place-
ment policy and replacement policy, for these, we adopt modulo placement and random
replacement policies, respectively.
A set-associative cache consists of different cache sets in which every cache set is regarded
as an N -way fully-associative cache. When a memory block is accessed, it is assigned to a
particular set using the modulo placement policy, i.e., several bits of the memory address
determine the set. The cache set for each memory block remains the same during a program’s
execution.
If the memory block is not in the cache, the replacement policy determines the cache behavior
for the new memory block. With random replacement, a random cache block in the cache
set is evicted to make room for the incoming memory block, thus introducing randomness
during a program execution. By doing so, the pathological cases that always evict memory
blocks necessary for future accesses on a deterministic architecture can be avoided.
6.5.2 Permanent fault model
Permanent faults are those errors that, when they occur, render a cache block unusable for
all future accesses as it will keep producing errors. To enable permanent fault detection, we
adopt a periodic scrubbing technique with period T .
In this paper, we are mainly concerned with permanent faults arising from component wear-
out effects, rather than those due to the manufacturing process. The aging of its components
makes a system more prone to permanent faults as the time goes by. Consequently, there
is a permanent fault probability for each memory access. We adopt the model proposed by
Panerati et al. [86]:
fp(t, T ) =
cdfnorm ln(t)−µσ − cdfnorm( ln(t−T )−µσ )
1− cdfnorm( ln(t−T )−µσ )
, (6.1)
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where fp(t, T ) is the probability of a permanent fault for a memory access occurring between
time t− T and t and cdfnorm is the cumulative density function of the normal distribution.
The mean (µ) and standard deviation (σ) are calculated from a component’s Mean Time To
Failure (MTTF):
µ = ln( MTTF
2
√
varMTTF +MTTF 2
)
σ =
√
ln(1 + varMTTF
MTTF 2
). (6.2)
Equation (6.1) computes the probability of a permanent fault during a specific detection
period. In this paper, we use the mechanism proposed in [3] for permanent fault detection.
This is an on-line mechanism which detects and disables faulty cache blocks. For each
cache block, there is a counter for the number of faults to distinguish permanent faults
from transient faults. When the counter value exceeds a threshold, the fault is regarded
as permanent and the hardware is reconfigured to disable the corresponding cache block so
that the permanent fault is confined. Thus, when a fault is detected, we assume that it
is permanent and disable the cache block. In this paper, we only focus on the effects of
permanent faults.
6.6 SPTA with Detection
In this section, we review the SPTA method proposed in [11], which consists of two parts:
a cache contention method and a state enumeration one. In each part, we show how we
extend this SPTA approach to take into consideration faults and their detection mechanism.
The SPTA is applied to a fully-associative cache, and it can be extended to a set-associative
cache, dealing with each cache set separately.
6.6.1 Cache contention method
Most of the existing SPTA methods use memory traces to perform their analysis. The reuse
distance is a metric used extensively in SPTAs. In [11], the reuse distance function rd is
formally defined for every access as:
rd(ei, L) =

i− j − 1 if ∃ej ∈ L : ej = ei,
∀p : j < p < i, ep 6= ei
∞ otherwise
(6.3)
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where L = [e1, e2, ...en] is a memory trace.
Having defined rd, we can use it as a helper function to perform our SPTA as outlined in
the following sections.
The cache contention con(ei, L) is used to calculate the probability of a cache hit. It depends
on previous accesses and provides more precise hit probabilities than other methods, such as
the one proposed by Davis et al. [39]. Following the methodology proposed in [11], the cache
contention is defined as:
con(ei, L) =
 ∞ if rd(ei, L) =∞|conS(ei, L)| otherwise (6.4)
conS(ei, L) = {ej ∈ L|i− rd(ei, L) < j < i ∧ PˆN(ehitj ) 6= 0}
∪{er ∈ L|r = i− rd(ei, L)}
(6.5)
We define PˆN(ehiti ) as the lower bound hit probabilities for a cache of associativity N in
the scenario in which faults do not occur. Using con(ei, L) and rd(ei, L), we can compute
PˆN(ehiti ) as follows:
PˆN(ehiti ) =
 0 con(ei, L) ≥ N(N−1
N
)rd(ei,L) otherwise
(6.6)
With the hit probabilities PˆN(ehiti ), we can construct the Probability Mass Function (PMF),
which is an essential parameter to estimate the pWCET [11]. In this section, we demon-
strate how to calculate hit probabilities using the cache contention method (refer to [11] for
additional detail on the use of PMFs). This is the starting point from which we build our
method to include faults and their detection mechanism.
6.6.2 Extension of the cache contention method
Due to permanent faults, some cache blocks may be unusable. For this reason, we analyze
N + 1 different hit probabilities, representing different numbers of faulty cache blocks. We
use Pˆ kF (ehiti ) (k ∈ N, 0 ≤ k ≤ N) to denote the k-th lower bound probability, i.e., with k
available blocks (N − k blocks are detected as permanently faulty). Note that for k = 0, no
cache blocks are available, which makes the cache miss probability to 1. For these groups,
we skip the calculation of the hit probability.
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The permanent fault detection mechanism detects faults periodically. Therefore, it has two
operating modes: the time when fault detection is actively performed and the time it spends
in an idle state. We identify them as Active Mode and Idle Mode, respectively, in the
following sections.
We use % to indicate the modulo operator. It is used to find remainder after division of two
numbers and it is defined as
i%j = i− j · bi/jc
Let Ta be the period in terms of number of memory accesses. For a memory block ei, if
i%Ta = 0, the fault detection mechanism is in the Active Mode. Otherwise, it is in Idle
Mode.
In the Active Mode, the fault detection mechanism is able to detect the permanent faults
and the following equation can be extracted for the k-th group probability:
Pˆ kF (ehiti ) =
i∏
j=m
ajp · bik · Pˆ k(ehiti ) (6.7)
where Pˆ k(ehiti ) is computed using Equation (6.6). ap is a parameter relating to permanent
faults such that aip computes the probability of not having a permanent fault in a memory
block ei. Given that nia is the number of memory accesses between the accesses of ei−1 and
ei (nia = 1 for a fully-associative cache), and fp is the probability of the occurrence of a
permanent fault for each memory access, then we have:
aip = (1− fp)n
i
a (6.8)
m is the memory index such that m < i ∧ em−1 = ei ∧ ∀m < p < i : ep 6= ei, i.e., it accounts
for all subsequent memory blocks after the previous access of the same memory block ei. As
faults are independent from one another, the product term ∏ij=m ajp denotes possible evictions
due to faults.
To take into account each group, we define dik as the occurrence probability of the k-th set
of probabilities before accessing ei. For k = N , we have dik ≥ djk, i ≤ j since, as time
progresses, the probability of a system without faulty blocks decreases. For k = 0, we have
dik ≤ djk, i ≤ j—since faulty blocks cannot be accessed any longer—thus, the probability
without the available blocks increases as time goes by. When 0 < k < N , dik may increase or
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decrease depending on the access time. We use the following equation to calculate it:
dik =
N∑
j=k
 j
k
 (1− aip)j−k(aip)kdi−1j (6.9)
where
d0k =
 1 if k = N0 otherwise (6.10)
When a memory block is accessed, we need to add it to cache. However, the occurrence
probability of each group is different. We define a parameter bik to denote the k-th group
occurrence probability for the last access of the same memory block and it represents the
probability of putting the memory block into cache. We can calculate bik as follows
bik =

djk if ∃ej ∈ L : ej = ei,
∀p : j < p < i, ep 6= ei
1 otherwise
(6.11)
With ∏ij=m ajp and bik, we can calculate PˆN(ehiti ) using Equation (6.7).
In Idle Mode, we consider the fault detection mechanism to be turned off. In this case,
Pˆ kF (ehiti ) =
i∏
j=m
ajp ·min(bik, bi−i%Tmk ) · Pˆ k(ehiti ) (6.12)
where i is the index of the current memory block, and i − i%Tm is the memory block for
which a previous fault detection occurs. bik is calculated using Equation (6.11). Because
the fault detection is not active, when another fault occurs, it cannot be detected. We use
min(bik, bi−i%Tmk )—the minimal value between bik and bi−i%Tmk —to calculate the occurrence
probability of its k-th group, since it computes a pessimistic occurrence probability and thus
provides a lower bound hit probability.
Equations (6.7) and (6.12) calculate the estimated hit probabilities with and without perma-
nent fault detection mechanism, respectively. We exploit both equations and switch between
them periodically to account for the effects of fault detection in this SPTA cache contention-
based method. The hit probability with fault detection PˆF (ehiti ) can be computed by summing
the probabilities of all groups as:
PˆF (ehiti ) =
N∑
j=1
Pˆ jF (ehiti ) (6.13)
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6.6.3 State enumeration method
In addition to the contention-based method, Altmeyer et al. [11] propose a state enumeration-
based method. This method takes into account all states to obtain more precise results. A
set of memory blocks is defined as E ⊆ E, P ∈ R denotes the probability and D : N → R
represents the cache miss distribution. Thus, a cache state is defined by CS = (E,P,D).
State enumeration provides accurate results at the expense of the computation time that
increases exponentially because of the large number of states. To avoid state explosion, a set
of memory blocks R is selected, while the remaining blocks are treated using the contention-
based method. The symbol ⊥ denotes an empty cache block or a memory block e /∈ R. The
number of selected memory blocks is denoted by n, i.e. n = |R|, and we put the n most
frequently used memory blocks into the set R. For a memory block e, if e ∈ R, we treat
it with the state enumeration method. Otherwise, we apply the cache contention method.
The state enumeration method and the cache contention method produce two independent
pWCETs, and the final pWCET result obtained by their convolution.
An initial cache state is denoted as
CSinit = ({⊥, ... ⊥}, 1, D)
with
D(x) =
 1 if x = 00 otherwise (6.14)
Every time a memory block e is accessed, the state space changes and an update function u
describes how to quantify this event:
u((E,P,D), e) =
 {(E,P,D)} if e ∈ R ∧ e ∈ Emiss((E,P,D), e) otherwise (6.15)
with
miss((E,P,D), e) = {((E \ e′) ∪ {e}, P · 1
N
,D′)|e′ ∈ E} (6.16)
and
D′(x) =

D(x) if e /∈ R
0 if e ∈ R ∧ x = 0
D(x− 1) otherwise
(6.17)
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We also define a merge operation unionmulti, that can be used to reduce the number of states that
share the same memory blocks:
(E1, P1, D1) unionmulti (E2, P2, D2) = {(E1, P1 + P2, (
P1
P1+P2D1)⊕ ( P2P1+P2D2))} E1 = E2
{(E1, P1, D1), (E2, P2, D2)} otherwise
(6.18)
where ⊕ is the summation of the distributions and p · D is the element-wise multiplication
of D by p.
Using the initial cache state CSinit and the update function u, we can calculate how the
cache state changes as well as the cache miss distribution. The final cache miss distribution
is computed as the sum of all the cache miss distributions, weighted by the corresponding
occurrence probability P .
6.6.4 Extension of the state enumeration method
To deal with permanent fault effects, we apply a state space-based method. We introduced
a modification to incorporate the state enumeration method, which causes additional state
changes at every memory access to account for the presence of faults.
Similarly to what we did for the contention-based method, we have to deal with two different
operating modes: Active Mode and Idle Mode. In either mode, we analyze both the fault
occurrence and the effects of fault detection.
Before the update function u, a permanent fault function pf is added to account for additional
state changes caused by faults. A fault detection function fd is used to represent different
detection effects. The miss function in Equation (6.16) must also be modified accordingly
when in the presence of faults.
To take into account the fault detection mechanism, we extend the 3-tuple cache state CS =
(E,P,D) to a 4-tuple cache state CS = (E,P,D,A), by introducing an additional element
A ∈ N. A stores the k-th group index k from which new states come in the pf function and
its initial value is A = −1. If A 6= −1, then a fault has occurred in the current state but this
has not been detected yet. The merge operation (7.8) can be used when both E and A are
equal for two cache states.
In Active Mode, we deal with the case in which detection is present. We define Sk as a
cache state set which contains k ∈ N, 0 ≤ k ≤ N cache blocks without permanent faults, i.e.,
it denotes the k-th group. Let CS = (E,P,D,A) ∈ Si be a cache state before permanent
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faults, and CS ′ = (E ′, P ′, D,A′) ∈ Sj(j ≤ i) be a cache state after a permanent fault occurs.
Note that faults do not change D (and j ≤ i) because a state can stay in Si without any fault,
or it moves to Sj with fewer available blocks because of the induced faults. The permanent
fault effect is calculated as
pf((E,P,D,A)) = {(E ′, P · (aip)|E
′| · (1− aip)|E\E
′|, D,A′)
|E ′ ⊆ E}
(6.19)
where aip is the probability without a permanent fault as it was calculated in Equation (6.8)
and A′ is
A′ =
 i if j < i ∧ A = −1A otherwise (6.20)
We can see that, due to permanent faults, some faults may cause permanent damage on
cache blocks, therefore changing the state from Si to Sj. Furthermore, A is used to check if
a permanent fault has been detected or not.
The fault detection function fd describes the detection mechanism. In this paper, we reset
A to its original value −1 to indicate that faults are detected, so we have
fd((E,P,D,A)) = (E,P,D,−1) (6.21)
The miss function defines how the system behaves in the case of a cache miss. For CS =
(E,P,D,A) ∈ Si, we have:
miss((E,P,D,A), e) = {((E \ e′) ∪ {e}, P · 1
i
,D′, A)|e′ ∈ E} (6.22)
This is similar to the miss function without faults. However, for a different cache set Si, we
have a different number of available cache blocks. Thus, we need to use i for the probability
calculation, instead of the cache associativity N .
In Idle Mode, the permanent fault function pf is the same as that in Active Mode and
there is no fd function. On the contrary, the miss function is different. This is due to the
fact that some cache blocks may have permanent faults and yet they may not be detected in
this case, which makes the system unaware of some faulty cache blocks and unable to disable
them. As a result, some faulty blocks may be used to store incoming memory blocks.
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With CS = (E,P,D,A) ∈ Si, the miss function is computed as
miss((E,P,D,A), e) = {((E \ e′) ∪ {e}, P · 1
i
,D′, A)|e′ ∈ E
∧A = −1} ∪ {((E \ e′) ∪ {e}, P · 1
A
,D′, A)|e′ ∈ E ∧ A 6= −1}
∪{(E,P · A− i
A
,D′, A)|A 6= −1}
(6.23)
This miss function consists of three parts. In the first part, we consider the states whose
faults have been detected. In the second part, we cope with the states whose faults have not
been detected, and the cache blocks without faults are used to store data. In the third part,
faults have not been detected, and the faulty cache blocks are selected, resulting in no new
states. The union of the three parts is the state set after a cache miss.
With periodic switches between Active Mode and Idle Mode, we are able to analyze the
system considering the effects of permanent fault detection.
6.7 Experimental Evaluation
We evaluate the accuracy of the proposed SPTA methodology in this section. With our
method, we investigate different scenarios and study the fault and detection effects on timing
analysis.
6.7.1 Experimental Setup
To evaluate the proposed approach, we select the Mälardalen benchmark suite [52]—which is
used frequently for WCET estimations, including pWCET analysis (e.g., in [11])—to perform
our experiments. We assume that the system is equipped with an L1 cache and a main
memory. We use only instruction caches for evaluations, but our approach can be applied to
data caches as well.
To obtain the memory traces for the input, we generate binary executable files for the bench-
marks and use a instruction set simulator, gem5 [23], to generate traces. We use the default
ARM processor in the gem5 for simulation, and our experiments are performed on a Linux
system. In the compilation of the executables, we choose to use statically linked libraries
and assume that a Floating Point Unit exists for floating point operations. We generate
benchmark traces using the default inputs.
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(a) fdct memory trace access pattern. (b) edn memory trace access pattern.
(c) adpcm memory trace access pattern.
Figure 6.1 Memory trace access patterns for selected benchmarks. Each memory block access
is plotted as a dot. The x-axis represents the cache set index (0-127) in which the memory
block is stored, and the y-axis shows the access time of the memory block.
6.7.2 Benchmark Selection
Due to space limitations, we have selected 3 benchmarks for evaluation: fdct, edn and adpcm.
Figure 6.1 shows the memory trace access patterns of the benchmarks, from which we observe
which cache sets are accessed with respect to time. We assume that each access consumes
the same amount of time, which is not necessarily always true. For this reason, Figure 6.1
is an approximate access pattern. We can see that the accesses for fdct are sequential, i.e.,
the system fetches memory blocks in consecutive cache set indexes continually. For edn, a
number of adjacent cache sets are accessed continuously over a period of time, and then a
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(a) fdct benchmark with different numbers of
memory blocks.
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(b) Zoomed in fdct benchmark accuracy verifica-
tion.
Figure 6.2 SPTA accuracy estimation for fdct. The number of blocks used in the SPTA state
space based approach is set to n = 1, 2, 3, 4.
different batch of cache sets is repeatedly accessed in the following period. For adpcm, we
observe that the cache sets are repeatedly accessed with a specific access pattern.
6.7.3 Accuracy Verification
Our proposed approach is based on a combined method using a cache contention method and
a state enumeration method, which results in a compromise between calculation time and
accuracy. The accuracy of the result improves as the number of memory blocks n = 1, 2, 3...
applied to state enumeration method increases.
We use a cache with a size of 1024 bytes, 2-way associativity and 16-byte cache block for
evaluation. To verify the accuracy, we use the results obtained from 1, 000 simulations as the
baseline. The permanent fault probability per memory access is set to fp = 1e−20, which is
the value for a 1MHz processor with 5-year MTTF using Equation (6.1). We set the fault
detection period to Ta = 100 memory accesses in all experiments.
Figures 6.3 – 6.4 show the results obtained for the benchmarks previously discussed. The
results are expressed as probabilistic WCET (pWCET), i.e., the exceedance probabilities
with respect to corresponding execution times. The x-axis denotes number of cache misses.
The greater the number of cache misses, the longer the execution time of the program runs.
The y-axis represents the exceedance probability for a cache miss number and the lowest
exceedance probability is set to 10−10.
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(a) edn benchmark with different numbers of
memory blocks.
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(b) Zoomed in edn benchmark accuracy verifica-
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Figure 6.3 SPTA accuracy estimation for edn. The number of blocks used in the SPTA state
space based approach is set to n = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.
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(a) adpcm benchmark with different numbers of
memory blocks.
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Figure 6.4 SPTA accuracy estimation for adpcm. The number of blocks used in the SPTA
state space based approach is set to n = 1, 3, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13.
The results from our method can be compared with the results obtained from simulations.
Let mn be the number of cache misses with n memory blocks for the state enumeration
method, andmb be the baseline cache miss number at the exceedance probability of 10−10. To
obtain mb, we use the SPTA result which matches the simulation result at higher exceedance
probabilities, i.e., mb = m4,m6,m13 for fdct, edn and adpcm, respectively. We define the
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ratio ζ as
ζ = mn
mb
× 100%
This compares the SPTA result with the memory block number n with the base simulation
result, and indicates the precision of our SPTA method.
For n = 1, the results from the SPTA are much more pessimistic than those from simulations.
For fdct, edn and adpcm, the ratios ζ are about 1100%, 3370% and 480% more pessimistic,
respectively. For n = 2, ζ’s are 520%, 1250% and 170%. We can see that when few memory
blocks are used, our method produces pessimistic and hence safe results. However, as the
number of memory blocks increases, the accuracy of the estimation improves accordingly.
As more memory blocks are applied, the results from our approach are the same as those
from simulations. However, for different benchmarks, the number of memory blocks required
to reach an acceptable accuracy may differ. For fdct (Figure 6.3), for example, we can reach
relatively accurate results with n = 3. When n is further increased, the SPTA results are very
close and might even be matching. We can see that the pWCET curve with n = 3 overlaps the
pWCET curve with n = 4 in Figure 6.2(a). On the other hand, the requirement to reach the
same level of accuracy for edn and adpcm is n = 6 (Figure 6.3(b)) and n = 13 (Figure 6.4(b))
respectively, since their code sizes are larger, and hence utilizes more memory blocks. When
the pWCETs from SPTA match those from simulations, we claim that sufficient memory
blocks are present in the state enumeration method. For fdct, edn and adpcm, the sufficient
number of memory blocks are n = 4, 6, 13, respectively.
6.7.4 Cache Performance
In this section, we change the cache configurations to study the cache impacts on system
performance and further verify the accuracy of our method.
We change the cache block size from 16 to 32 bytes, while the rest of the configuration
remains the same as described in Section 6.7.2. Figure 6.5 illustrates the pWCETs of the
same benchmarks. The figures show that when we double the cache block size, our method
pWCETs still match simulation pWCETs. In addition, when larger cache blocks are used,
cache misses are significantly reduced, i.e., mn decreases dramatically in Figure 6.5 when
compared to the results in Figures 6.3, ?? and 6.4. This is due to the fact that, when a cache
miss happens, memory blocks are fetched and stored in cache for future accesses. Compared
to a smaller cache block size which is forced to evict certain blocks, a larger cache block size
effectively increases the number of cache hits and reduces cache misses.
Next, we set the cache to a 4-way associativity cache, instead of a 2-way. The number
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(a) fdct with the number of memory blocks n = 4.
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(c) adpcm with the number of memory blocks n =
9, 10, 11, 12, 13.
Figure 6.5 SPTA accuracy estimation with 32-byte cache blocks.
of cache sets remains the same, which increases the cache size to 2048 bytes. The other
configuration parameters are kept the same as those in Section 6.7.2. Figure 6.6 displays the
pWCETs of the benchmarks and it shows that accurate results can still be computed with a
sufficient number of memory blocks. The pWCETs using 4-way caches and their variations
with different memory blocks are similar to those using 2-way caches, except that the number
of cache misses is different. It shows that for fdct and edn, the number of cache misses mn
grows when using 4-way cache with reduced a cache block size, but mn decreases for adpcm.
Therefore there is no consistent conclusion on whether 2-way caches with a larger cache block
size perform better.
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Figure 6.6 SPTA accuracy estimation with 4-way cache and the same number of cache sets.
6.7.5 Fault and Detection Effects
From Equation (6.1), we can see that fault probability varies with time. In this section, we
study fault and their detection effects in different fault scenarios. The cache configuration
is the same as in Section 6.7.2. However, we increase the fault probabilities gradually to
investigate their impacts in extreme conditions.
Figure 6.7 compares the simulation pWCETs and SPTA pWCETs, which shows that our
SPTA method can provide accurate results in different permanent fault scenarios. We apply
different permanent fault probabilities to the benchmarks to see how faults affect system
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Figure 6.7 SPTA accuracy estimation in different fault scenarios for the benchmarks.
timing behaviors. We assume that cache blocks have the same property and they degrade
in the same way. Thus, at each cache access, each block has the specified permanent fault
occurrence probability. In Figure 6.7(a), we select fault probabilities e−20, e−6 and e−5
respectively to plot pWCETs with significant differences. In Figures 6.7(b) and 6.7(c), the
fault probability is limited to up to e−8, since as the fault probability increases further to
e−5, the number of cache misses becomes much larger at the exceedance probability of 10−10,
and cannot be properly displayed in the figure.
Intuitively, as more faults occur in the system, the number of cache miss increases. For large
benchmarks (Figures 6.7(b) and 6.7(c)), the system is more affected by the faults, i.e., the
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cache miss number increases considerably at the exceedance probability of 10−10 compared
to the number of cache misses with fault probability e−20. Due to different characteristics
of the benchmarks, their timing estimations vary differently as well. In Figure 6.7(a), the
number of cache misses increases gradually. In Figures 6.7(b) and 6.7(c), we notice dramatic
increase in the number of cache misses . We observe that in Figure 6.7(b) with probability of
e−8, when the exceedance probability decreases from 10−6 to 10−7, the cache miss number
doubles from 2500 to 5000. Such a phenomenon appears in Figure 6.7(c) as well, but does
not appear in Figure 6.7(a).
6.8 Conclusion
Random caches are becoming increasingly important but they are increasingly prone to faults
because of various reasons, such technology scaling and aging effects. In this paper, we pro-
posed an SPTA methodology accounting for the presence of permanent faults and a periodic
permanent fault detection mechanism. Our methodology is based on a combined state-of-the-
art approach for random caches for single-path programs. The combined approach consists
of two methods: a cache contention method and a state enumeration method. We analyzed
the fault occurrence and the effects of fault detection for each method separately. Due to
periodic fault detection, we developed our SPTA methods for an Active Mode and an Idle
Mode (i.e. with and without fault detection) and the system switches periodically between
the two. Experimental results showed that our approach can provide safe timing estimations
using few memory blocks, and its accuracy improves as the number of used memory blocks
increases. We verified the accuracy of our proposed method using different cache configura-
tions and fault probabilities, and studied both the impact of the cache and faults on timing
behaviors. In our future work, we intend to further improve the accuracy of the approach
when using only few memory blocks, and investigate faults and their detection mechanisms
in multi-path programs.
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CHAPTER 7 ARTICLE 5: AN ADAPTIVE MARKOV MODEL FOR THE
TIMING ANALYSIS OF PROBABILISTIC CACHES
7.1 Preface
In Chapter 3 [31], we have proposed a Markov chain based SPTA method. In this article,
we extend that work as follows: we formally present a general Markov chain framework; we
use examples to show in detail how the proposed method works for time-randomized caches;
we demonstrate the safety of the pWCET adaptively obtained from the Markov model using
limited number of memory blocks; we extende the Markov chain approach to write-back
caches with a write-allocate policy; we implement a state-of-the-art SPTA methodology and
compare this method and our proposed method; we compare the timing behaviors of real-time
systems with time-randomized caches and Least Recently Used (LRU) caches, respectively.
The results allow us to support the claims of previous studies.
Authors: Chao Chen and Giovanni Beltrame
Accepted by: ACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems (TODAES)
[33].
7.2 Abstract
Accurate timing prediction for real-time embedded software execution is becoming a prob-
lem due to the increasing complexity of computer architecture, and the presence of mixed-
criticality workloads. Probabilistic caches were proposed to set bounds to Worst Case Ex-
ecution Time (WCET) estimates and help designers improve real-time embedded system
resource use. Static Probabilistic Timing Analysis (SPTA) for probabilistic caches is nev-
ertheless difficult to perform, because cache accesses depend on execution history, and the
computational complexity of SPTA makes it intractable for calculation as the number of ac-
cesses increases. In this paper, we explore and improve SPTA for caches with evict-on-miss
random replacement policy using a state space modeling technique. A non-homogeneous
Markov model is employed for single-path programs in discrete-time finite state space repre-
sentation. To make this Markov model tractable, we limit the number of states and use an
adaptive method for state modification. Experiments show that compared to the state-of-
the-art methodology, the proposed adaptive Markov chain approach provides better results
at the occurrence probability of 10−15: in terms of accuracy, the state-of-the-art SPTA results
are more conservative, by 11% more on average. In terms of computation time, our approach
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is not significantly different from the state-of-the-art SPTA.
7.3 Introduction
A time-critical embedded computing system, such as a satellite on-board computer, requires
accurate timing prediction of software execution. If events are not managed within a cer-
tain timeframe, the result may be catastrophic. Historically, these systems were kept at a
minimum of complexity to minimize the occurrence of failures and to maintain high timing
predictability. However, to address the increasing complexity of applications and their cor-
responding need for performance, more advanced architectures using multi-stage pipelines,
several memory hierarchy levels and even Multi-Processor System-on-Chip (MPSoC) de-
signs [77] are proposed.
These traditional deterministic computer architectures make software timing behavior al-
most impossible to accurately predict. Normally, the execution time of an application on a
deterministic architecture follows a distribution that might have some corner cases which are
beyond normal operation. A conservative estimation will place the Worst Case Execution
Time (WCET) far away from the actual maximum time used by the application [18], espe-
cially when considering possible interactions with other tasks. This would lead to a large
overestimation of the computing resources needed for the task [27].
To help predict timing behavior, probabilistic real-time systems were introduced. Such sys-
tems have very low pathological occurrence probabilities, which are hard to test and predict.
Quinones et al. [90] study an instruction cache with randomized replacement (random re-
placement pre-existed their work), showing that it provides tighter bounds for pathological
cases in which systematic cache misses happen and their probabilistic WCET (pWCET) can
be empirically derived by experiments. Moreover, some commercial real-time systems have
adopted time-randomized caches as well, such as the ARM processor with a pseudo-random
cache replacement policy1.
Two timing analysis techniques are proposed in literature [116]: measurement based timing
analysis and static timing analysis, which have their probabilistic counterparts in Measure-
ment Based Probabilistic Timing Analysis (MBPTA) and Static Probabilistic Timing Anal-
ysis (SPTA) respectively. The result of SPTA and MBPTA is expressed in terms of pWCET,
i.e. an exceedance function that shows the probability of an application to exceed a given
execution time.
MBPTA is an empirical method: it is based on repeated testing of an application to estimate
1http://infocenter.arm.com/help/index.jsp/
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its timing probability distribution. Generally, MBPTA requires a large amount of data from
simulations or testing on real systems to get accurate results. Cucu-Grosjean et al. [37]
propose an MBPTA methodology based on Extreme Value Theory (EVT) [41, 13], which
needs only a few hundred runs for MBPTA.
SPTA uses a different approach: it is based on detailed knowledge of software and hardware.
Together with simulation models and theoretical analysis, a precise timing analysis or a timing
bound can be obtained. For caches, several variables are used for the bound calculation,
e.g. reuse distance and cache associativity. Reuse distance defines the degree of separation
between two accesses to the same memory address. pWCET estimates can be computed with
the help of reuse distance and cache associativity.
In this paper, we present a methodology for SPTA for set-associative instruction and data
caches with random replacement policy, which is based on the Markov chain model in [31].
It takes single-path programs as inputs and computes exceedance probabilities with respect
to execution time (the number of processor cycles in our simulations). The calculation is
performed using state space techniques, and it is based on a non-homogeneous Markov chain
model [97]. At every step, the current status of the system can be represented as a state vector
with a corresponding probability vector, and the transition matrix for next step is calculated
accordingly. To perform timing analysis, timing distribution vectors–which are used for
timing representation and analysis–are assigned for each state. We implement another precise
SPTA methodology [11] that can also be used for accurate timing analysis, and find out that
it provides WCET bounds that are 11% looser on average in terms of geometric mean than
the results from the proposed method, while having a similar computational cost. With the
proposed Markov chain based method, we can evaluate cache impacts on system performance,
which helps the design of real-time embedded systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: related work is discussed in Section 7.4; sys-
tem modeling is explained in Section 7.5; timing analysis for the system is demonstrated in
Section 7.6; an adaptive method is introduced in Section 7.7 to limit the computational com-
plexity of the Markov chain based model; real-world benchmarks are evaluated in Section 7.9;
and finally Section 7.10 draws come concluding remarks.
7.4 Related Work
There have been few research efforts on timing analysis for probabilistic systems. Bernat
et al. [18] develop a WCET analysis method for probabilistic hard real-time systems, in
which the concept of a probabilistic system–whose execution deadline must be met by given
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probabilities–is introduced. They use the notion of execution profiles for timing represen-
tation and analysis. To help determine the WCET of programs, Bernat et al. [21] propose
an approach based on copulas. It uses the dependence structure description of programs for
computing the WCET, and when unavailable, it provides a lower bound.
Traditional computing systems are deterministic, and their timing analysis depend on exe-
cution history, whose computational complexity increases exponentially as the program exe-
cutes. To reduce the dependency on execution history, probabilistic systems are introduced,
implemented in hardware and software.
By using hardware techniques, programmers do not need to modify software and the system
WCET can be improved by hardware modifications at architectural level. The method to
realize this is to modify the behavior of the cache–which is a bridge between processor and
main memory–and make it random. Mezzetti et al. [78] show that time-randomized caches
bring several benefits to hard RT system: it reduces user’s efforts for timing analysis and
provides tight WCET.
The behavior of a cache is determined by two policies: replacement policy and placement
policy, and they are made random respectively for pWCET analysis.
For cache replacement, every time a new memory request comes into the cache set from the
main memory, one cache block in this set will be selected and evicted. The new address is put
into the position of the evicted block. There are several replacement policies for conventional
caches, such as First-In-First-Out (FIFO), Least Recently Used (LRU), Most Recently Used
(MRU) [8], etc. To make the cache behavior random for a new memory address, one can
adopt random replacement policy . When using a random replacement policy, every time
the cache eviction happens, a cache block is selected randomly to be replaced by the new
memory request. Quinones et al. [90] study a random replacement policy for standard
and skew-associate caches and they compare simulation results with caches using the LRU
replacement policy, because it performs best in terms of predictability [93]. The authors show
that caches with random replacement policy reduce performance anomalies. For example, in
one case study, the hit ratio of a cache using the LRU is from 0.41 to 0.93; while for a cache
with random replacement policy, it varies from 0.64 to 0.94.
The cache placement policy has an impact on cache behavior as well. For cache placement,
when choosing the cache set, a conventional cache uses several bits of the memory address.
Schlansker et al. [96] propose a random placement policy and investigate its impact by
matrix operations. This policy distributes cache entries more uniformly, and cache miss ratio
is lower than that from conventional caches. Topham and Gonzalez [107] use a random
placement policy and the results show that it can reduce cache conflicts and improves system
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performance. However, the random placement policy in [96, 107] adopts a pseudo-random
hash function that depends on memory addresses. Hence for a given memory layout, it
always produces the same placement distribution. Kosmidis et al. [66] propose a cache with
a random replacement policy and a parametric random placement policy, which requires little
overhead in terms of complexity and energy consumption. The introduction of the parameter
into the hash function ensures that the placement distribution is randomized for the same
memory layout, so that it is feasible to apply probabilistic timing analysis.
In addition to aforementioned hardware techniques, software techniques (e.g. compiler and
runtime techniques) can also be applied to make a system behavior random. Berger and
Zorn [16] present DieHard, a runtime system, to allocate memory randomly. The probabilistic
memory safety is achieved by using a large heap space. The DieHard manager deals with
objects in the heap and reduces memory error probabilities. Kosmidis et al. [67] propose a
software approach to randomize the behavior of conventional caches for use with probabilistic
timing analysis. This work modifies code and data memory objects oﬄine using compiler and
linker. When the program starts or objects are allocated, the memory objects are placed in
random locations by dynamic randomization code in the executable. Dynamic randomization
challenges safety requirements (e.g. ISO26262) in the automotive domain. To solve this issue,
Kosmidis et al. [64] present a static software randomization method. Several binary files are
produced for the same program, in which memory objects are created with offsets to achieve
random effects. Kosmidis et al. [65] develop a software tool to modify source code of the
program, which realizes randomization without modifying existing toolchains.
In pWCET analysis, the result is expressed in terms of a density function or an exceedance
function: it shows the probability of an application for given execution or the probabil-
ity to exceed a given execution time. This can further be classified into three categories:
Measurement-Based Probabilistic Timing Analysis (MBPTA), Static Probabilistic Timing
Analysis (SPTA) and the combination of both methods.
In MBPTA, execution time measurements are collected and predictions are made using Ex-
treme Value Theory (EVT). EVT [41, 13] is a statistical methodology that studies extremely
rare events (i.e. events at the tails of the distribution) that may have severe consequences,
when little experimental evidence is available. Usually two methods can applied to EVT:
Block Maxima (BM) [37] and Peaks Over Threshold (POT) [17].
In [26, 44], Burns and Edgar demonstrate how to predict execution time with measurements
by an EVT method. Raw data are fit to the Gumbel distribution [51] and results are repre-
sented as a density function with respect to execution time. Hansen et al. [53] explain why
raw data fitting in [44] is incorrect. A BM method using EVT for WCET distribution esti-
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mation is thus presented. Griffin et al. [48] investigate assumptions required by the Gumbel
distribution, and study precision sacrificed due to this statistical method. Additional restric-
tions on the EVT method are proposed for safe applications. Lu et al. [75] propose a new
way of sampling mechanism to estimate program execution time on a single processor and
EVT is combined with this sampling technique. A more recent work using EVT is from [37].
A BM method is applied to fit the Gumbel distribution using a quantile plot, needing only
a few hundred simulation runs. This significantly reduces the number of required measure-
ments. Kosmidis et al. [63] study how processor architectures should be modified to meet
MBPTA requirements. Wartel et al. [111] apply MBPTA to real avionics applications and
results show tight pWCET estimates. Abella et al. [5] investigate when MBPTA fails due
to pathological cases and propose Heart of Gold techniques to detect these cases. Lesage et
al. [72] introduce a framework for MBPTA result evaluation. Synthetic tasks are used to
provide realistic data and actual WCET can be computed using proposed framework.
Apart from statistical analysis of measurements, another way of PTA is Static PTA (SPTA).
This requires detailed knowledge of software and hardware. A timing bound can be obtained
by theoretical analysis: with the given assumptions, the SPTA method analyzes instruction
or data caches and obtains a probabilistic distribution of the program’s execution time.
Several works on SPTA have been proposed for caches with random replacement policy. Zhou
[118] proposes a cache hit formula using reuse distance–the number of memory addresses
accessed between two consecutive references to the same memory address–which simplifies
computational complexity significantly. The probabilities for each cache access are made
independent, and the final result is the convolution of all cache accesses. However, Cazorla
et al. and Altmeyer et al. [27, 9] have found his methodology unsound. Quinones et al.
and Kosmidis et al. [90, 66] give other formulea for evict-on-miss caches, and Cucu-Grosjean
et al., Cazorla et al. [37, 27] perform evict-on-access timing analysis using these formulea.
However, Kosmidis et al. [66] may overestimate the cache hit ratio [40]. Thus, the result of
probabilities for timing may be too optimistic and incorrect in this case.
Davis et al. [39] develop a formula using reuse distance only for evict-on-miss caches, and
Altmeyer et al. [9] prove it to be optimal when only reuse distance is known. Multi-path pro-
grams are also analyzed by assuming that they are bounded. Besides, pre-emption impacts
are taken into account for timing analysis. Altmeyer et al. [9] have proposed an exhaustive
analysis approach for SPTA. To reduce the computational complexity, the exhaustive ap-
proach can be combined with simplified formulae. This approach is improved in [11], with
an improved algorithm for SPTA. Griffin et al. [49] propose a methodology from the field
of Lossy Compression and they use a fully-associative cache for timing analysis throughout
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their work. By using May and Must Analysis, the result is more accurate with appropriate
parameters. To demonstrate the impact of time-randomized caches, Reineke, Abella et al.
and Altmeyer et al. [92, 4, 11] have done comparisons between caches using LRU and ran-
dom replacement policy. Lesage et al. [71] develop an SPTA for multi-path programs. A
worst-case execution path is obtained using a joint function by exploring cache states and
path inclusions. Based on SPTA from [9], the pWCET can be calculated.
Hybrid analysis combines both MBPTA and SPTA for timing behavior prediction. So far,
very little research has been done for hybrid timing analysis. Bernat et al. [18, 20] introduce
a hybrid timing analysis for probabilistic hard RT systems: an RT program is analyzed and
its structure is represented as a syntax tree. Instrumentation and trace are generated, so that
distributions of all blocks can be produced locally using SPTA or MBPTA. A traversal of the
syntax tree is used to calculate the WCET of the program. Due to dependencies between
different blocks, copulas is proposed by [21] to obtain a lower bound.
In this paper, we propose an adaptive Markov chain based SPTA methodology for time-
randomized caches. Rather than using reuse distance only, this method adopts more infor-
mation and produces more accurate results. By limiting number of states used in the Markov
chain model, the computational complexity has been restrained to make the calculation fea-
sible.
7.5 System Model
In this section, we present a methodology to model the timing of a system with a probabilistic
cache using state space model. The next state of the system with random replacement caches
solely depends on current state, which satisfies the Markov property and can be represented
as a Markov chain. A set-associative cache is used as an example, but note that a direct
mapped cache can be seen as a special case of set-associative cache, in which the associativity
equals 1; a fully-associative cache is another special case, in which the associativity equals
the number of available cache blocks.
7.5.1 Cache Architecture
A set-associative cache is shown in Figure 7.1. This cache has several sets, and for each of
those it provides a number of ways to store cache blocks. Each memory address used by the
cache is divided in three parts: tag bits, set bits and offset bits. offset bits locate the data
within each cache block, set bits are used to find which cache block should be selected for a
given memory address. As multiple memory addresses can be stored in the same cache block,
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Figure 7.1 Set-associative cache representation
tag bits are stored within each cache block for comparison to identify the correct memory
address it refers to. There exist several cache policies that describe how addresses are placed
and replaced in the cache. In this paper, we consider a cache with modulo placement policy
and evict-on-miss random replacement policy.
For the modulo placement policy, the set bits are used to select the cache set in which the
data will be stored using the modulo operation. With an evict-on-miss random replacement
policy, every time a cache miss happens, a way is selected randomly, and the cache block
data are replaced by the new memory content.
To calculate the timing distribution of a probabilistic system, we first obtain the timing
distribution of each cache set and the timing associated with the whole cache can be obtained
by performing a convolution across all sets. Since modulo placement policy is adopted,
memory addresses in different cache sets are stored separately and do not affect each other,
i.e. the memory address in one cache set does not change the hit or miss probabilities in
another cache set. Hence they are independent of each other statistically. As a result, the
final timing distribution can be obtained using convolutions.
7.5.2 State Space Exploration
Let us assume there are distinct memory addresses M = {a, b, c, · · · } that are allocated to
one cache set. The state space S can be constructed in a way such that the combinations
of the distinct memory addresses are elements of the state space. The element si ∈ S is the
state of the system, and it represents a unique cache configuration, i.e. the memory address
layout of the system. The state space S is formally defined as:
∀A ⊆M,A ∈ S
Let Nw be the number of ways (i.e. associativity) of the cache set. Then we have |si| ≤
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min(Nw, |M |), i.e. the number of distinct memory addresses in a state is less than or equal to
the minimal value between cache associativity and the number of distinct memory addresses
for this set.
Figure 7.2 is used as an illustration of state space construction, in which we define states
S = {s0, s1, s2, s3, · · · } that correspond to the following configurations:
s0 = ∅: empty cache
s1 = {a}: address a in cache
s2 = {b}: address b in cache
s3 = {a, b}: address a, b in cache
...
A cache memory is generally organized in blocks of more than one byte. In the following
analysis the term address refers to the block identifier, i.e. the tag address.
Given this state representation, one set of a time-randomized cache can be modeled with the
following Markov chain:
Sn = Sn−1 · Pn−1 (7.1)
where S represents state occurrence probability vector for the cache and P represents the
transition matrix which determines how the current state probability S is transformed into
a new state S. Sn and Pn represent the state probability vector and transition matrix at
step n. We assume that initially there are no memory addresses in the cache, i.e. the system
starts executing with an empty cache. Let us suppose that there are N states, i.e. |S| = N ,
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then the state probability vector is
S = [Pr(s0), P r(s1), · · · , P r(sN−1)] (7.2)
where Pr(si) is the probability of state si.
The number of states N in Sn is
N =
l∑
k=0
 |M |
k
 (7.3)
with |M | the number of addresses associated with the set, and l = min(Nw, |M |) i.e. the
minimal value between cache associativity and |M |.
From Equation (7.3), we can see that the number of states N is a function of cache associa-
tivity Nw and the number of addresses |M | for one set. For a specific cache, as the number
of memory addresses |M | increases, the computational complexity increases polynomially
with a large exponent |M |, which becomes eventually intractable for computation. However,
the cache organization in blocks helps reducing the total number of memory addresses. Be-
sides, as cache size increases, the probability for all code and data to reside in one cache set
decreases, which effectively lowers the value of variable |M |.
7.5.3 Transition Matrix Calculation
Every time a new memory address is accessed, the cache state may change, and the transition
matrix for next step varies accordingly. Therefore, we need a non-homogeneous Markov chain
model, i.e. a Markov chain model whose transition matrix varies over time. The way to
compute the transition matrix at each step is demonstrated in this section.
The transition matrix is represented as
P =

p0→0, p0→1, · · · , p0→N−1
p1→0, p1→1, · · · , p1→N−1
... ... . . . ...
pN−1→0, pN−1→1, · · · , pN−1→N−1

(7.4)
where pi→j is the probability for the system to go from state si to state sj. In our model,
the probability pi→j varies constantly depending on current system state and the transition
matrix thus needs to be computed at each time step.
Algorithm 2 shows how to compute the transition matrix. It takes two inputs (state si and
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ALGORITHM 2: Transition matrix calculation
Data: State si, memory address a
Result: Transition matrix element pi→j
1 Nw ← cache associativity;
2 if a ∈ si then
3 pi→i ←1; //cache hit
4 end
5 if a 6∈ si then
6 //cache miss
7 for b ∈ si and sj=si \ {b} ∪ {a} do
8 pi→j ←1/Nw; //one address is replaced
9 end
10 if |si| < Nw then
11 for sj=si ∪ {a} do
12 pi→j ←(Nw − |si|)/Nw; //one address is added
13 end
14 end
15 end
the incoming memory address a) and produces one output (transition matrix element pi→j).
The algorithm checks state si and generates the transition matrix elements accordingly as
follows:
Line 2: If the requested memory address is in the state (a ∈ si), there is a cache hit. In this
case, the cache will not change its state and it thus has a probability of 1, i.e. pi→i = 1.
Line 5: If the requested memory address is not in the state (a 6∈ si), there is a cache
miss and the transition matrix is computed. This is the most complex case: the new
memory address may replace an existing cache block, or it may be put into a new
cache block and probabilities have to be computed accordingly. In our target cache,
the probability of replacing an existing cache block is 1/Nw (see Line 8), where Nw is
the cache associativity. This is because we consider an evict-on-miss time-randomized
cache, and a cache block is randomly selected for replacement with probability 1/Nw.
The probability for a memory address to be placed in an empty cache block is (Nw −
|si|)/Nw (see Line 12), where |si| is the number of blocks in use for the current state si.
This is due to the fact that if the new memory address does not cause a replacement,
it can only be put into an empty cache block. The number of empty cache blocks is
Nw−|si|, and they are chosen fromNw ways. Therefore the probability is (Nw−|si|)/Nw.
Example 7.5.1 is given for illustration.
Example 7.5.1 Suppose we have a cache set with associativity of 4. The first and second
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cache blocks have been used, and the third and fourth cache blocks are empty. When a new
memory address is cached, the probability of going into the first cache block is 1/Nw, i.e. 1/4.
Similarly, for the second cache block, the probability is 1/4. They are computed separately,
because they have different addresses, which represent different states si. The probability of
loading a block into an empty cache blocks is (Nw − |si|)/Nw, i.e. 1/2. Since the third and
fourth cache blocks are both empty, loading into one or the other has the same effect, and
therefore it represents a single state considering the probability of both.
Using Algorithm 2, Equation (7.1) can be used to describe state transitions of the system,
provided the initial distribution S0 is known. However, the cumulative timing information,
which shows timing with respect to probability, is still unknown. To solve this issue, Sec-
tion 7.6 introduces the vector that stores timing information for each state.
7.6 Timing Analysis
To describe the timing behavior of a system, we employ a vector containing timing informa-
tion. This vector–together with the state space model described in Section 7.5–can describe
the system timing behavior, where the state space model specifies occurrence probabilities
of all states, and the timing vector specifies how the execution time is distributed for each
state.
7.6.1 Timing Representation
A vector Ci can be used to denote the timing distribution in terms of number of cycles for
a state si, and a vector CPi can represent the probability of occurrence for Ci. Note that
the number of cycles is different from the time step used in the Markov chain. At each time
step, one memory address is accessed and different number of cycles may be applied to the
timing analysis according to the system status (e.g. 1 cycle for a cache hit and 100 cycles for
a cache miss). Then we have
Ci = [ci0, ci1, · · · ]
CPi = [Pr(ci0), P r(ci1), · · · ]
where cij represents the program duration in cycles in ascending order for state si and Pr(cij)
the occurrence probability for cij. As an example, Figure 7.3(a) shows the timing distribution
in Ci and CPi for state si. One can see that the probabilities for a duration of 3, 102, 201
and 300 are 0.40, 0.25, 0.15 and 0.20 respectively.
112
c0 =3 c1 =102 c2 =201 c3 =300
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
Pr
ob
.
Ci
(a) Timing distribution
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
Number of cycles
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
(b) Cumulative timing
Figure 7.3 Timing analysis example
7.6.2 SPTA Convolution
For set-associative caches, we use convolutions to get the timing of different cache sets. In
probability theory and statistics, if two random variables are independent, then the sum of
them follows a distribution which is the convolution of both distributions. By using modulo
placement policy, we make sure that memory addresses in one cache set do not affect hit
or miss probabilities of memory addresses in another cache set. Therefore independence is
guaranteed. We show the convolution in detail by using Execution Time Profile (ETP).
The Execution Time Profile (ETP) is used to represent timing information and its associated
probability. The ETP for state si is defined as
ETPi = {Ci, CPi} = {[ci0, ci1, · · · ], [Pr(ci0), P r(ci1), · · · ]}
where Ci is the timing distribution vector, and CPi is its corresponding occurrence probability
vector.
Suppose there are two ETPs: ETPi and ETPj, and their convolutions is ETPk. Then the
convolution is performed as follows (the symbol ∗ is used as the convolution operator)
ETPk = ETPi ∗ ETPj = {Ci, CPi} ∗ {Cj, CPj}
= {[ci0, ci1, · · · ], [Pr(ci0), P r(ci1), · · · ]} ∗ {[cj0, cj1, · · · ], [Pr(cj0), P r(cj1), · · · ]}
= {Ck, CPk} = {[ck0, ck1, · · · ], [Pr(ck0), P r(ck1), · · · ]}
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where
ckl = cim + cjn (7.5)
Pr(ckl ) =
∑
ck
l
=cim+c
j
n
Pr(cim)Pr(cjn) (7.6)
The convolution of two ETPs is demonstrated in Example 7.6.1. Two ETPs–ETP1 and
ETP2–are provided. ETP1 has three possible timing values: [1, 2, 3] and their probabili-
ties are [0.1, 0.3, 0.6]; the timing distribution and corresponding probabilities for ETP2 are
[1, 3] and [0.2, 0.8] respectively. From Equation (7.5), we can see the element in the new
timing distribution is the sum of timing distributions of elements in ETP1 and ETP2, i.e.
[2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. The new probability vector is calculated using Equation (7.6). Its element is
the sum of product of two elements in probability vectors of ETP1 and ETP2, provided the
sum of corresponding timing distributions are the same. For example, for the cycle 4, its
corresponding probability is 0.2, which consists two parts: the first part is the sum of cycle
1 in ETP1 and cycle 3 in ETP2. The second part is the sum of cycle 3 in ETP1 and cycle 1
in ETP2. So the corresponding probability is 0.1× 0.8 + 0.6× 0.2 = 0.2.
Example 7.6.1
ETP1 = {[1, 2, 3], [0.1, 0.3, 0.6]}, ETP2 = {[1, 3], [0.2, 0.8]}
ETP1 ∗ ETP2 = {[1, 2, 3], [0.1, 0.3, 0.6]} ∗ {[1, 3], [0.2, 0.8]}
= {[2, 3, 4, 5, 6], [0.02, 0.06, 0.2, 0.24, 0.48]}
7.6.3 Cumulative Timing
Having the timing information for each cache set, we can compute a cumulative timing plot.
This gives us an exceedance function, showing the probability of exceeding a certain program
duration in cycles. The timing distribution is the same as from the timing vector, i.e. Ci.
The cumulative probability is denoted as CPCi, and its jth element is calculated as follows
CPCi[j] =
∑
CPi[k]>CPi[j]
CPi[k] =
∑
Pr(ci
k
)>Pr(cj
k
)
Pr(cik) (7.7)
where n is the number of elements in CPi.
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As an example, the cumulative probabilities to exceed a program duration of 3, 102, 201 and
300 are 0.6, 0.35, 0.2 and 0 respectively. The result is plotted in Figure 7.3(b).
7.6.4 Timing Integration
From previous sections, it can be seen that timing vectors can be used to express the timing
behavior of a system. In this section, we discuss how to integrate timing vectors into our
state space model based on a non-homogeneous Markov chain model.
Since we use a Markov chain model for our system, at every step the system can be de-
scribed by the states in the state space. To calculate timing information, timing vectors are
integrated into the Markov chain model. Each state si is assigned a vector Ci to keep its
timing. The timing vector may expand as time goes on, since more duration may appear as
the system state evolves. In addition, a corresponding vector CPi–that represents the occur-
rence probabilities of each possible timing–is generated at the same time. The algorithm to
calculate timing is illustrated in Algorithm 3.
ALGORITHM 3: Calculate timing distribution
Data: Transition matrix P , timing distribution C, corresponding prob. CP
Result: New timing distribution C2, prob. CP2
1 Nh ← cycle number for cache hit;
2 Nm ← cycle number for cache miss;
3 C ← ∅;
4 CP2← ∅;
5 for cik ∈ Ci and cjk ∈ Cj do
6 if pj→i 6= 0 then
7 if i=j then
8 //cache hit
9 cik = cik +Nh;
10 else
11 //cache miss
12 cik = c
j
k +Nm;
13 Pr(cik) = Pr(c
j
k) · pj→i;
14 end
15 end
16 end
17 C2 = C2 + C;
18 CP2 = CP2 + CP ;
19 //merge timings with the same cycle number
20 Merge C and CP ;
Algorithm 3 takes three inputs (transition matrix P , timing distribution vector C and its
corresponding probability vector CP ) and produces two outputs (new timing distribution
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vector C2 and its corresponding probability vector CP2). We can see that timing information
is associated with the Markov chain model transition matrix P . All values of elements in
P are examined: if not 0, this means that the system will change its state, and the timing
vectors will be used to compute the timing associated with the transition. There are 2 cases
for timing calculation, as seen below
Line 7: If the element of transition matrix P to be examined is on the diagonal, then it is
pj→i, where j = i, i.e. the state does not change and the access is a cache hit. In this
case, timing vectors will be expanded: the duration for a cache hit (e.g. 1 cycle) is
added to all elements to timing vector Cj which keeps the timing of state sj and the
result is integrated into timing vector Ci for si. The corresponding probability vector
CPj is directly integrated for CPi, since a cache hit forces the transition probability
pi→i = 1.
Line 10: If the transition matrix element is not on the diagonal, then it is pj→i, where j 6= i.
It means the state has changed from state sj to si and therefore it is a cache miss. In
this case, the timing vectors will be expanded the same way as in the previous case:
the duration for a cache miss (e.g. 100 cycles) is added to Cj and integrated into Ci.
However, its corresponding probability CPj is multiplied by the transition probability
pj→i. The probability result considering each transition is integrated into CPi.
With the Algorithm 3, new timing vectors are generated based on old ones. However, in the
new timing vectors there may be duplicate duration. Such mutually exclusive cases should
be merged: timings with the same duration are merged by adding their probabilities. For
example, there is a pair of timing and probability vectors
Ci = [100, 100, 201], CPi = [0.2, 0.7, 0.1]
can be merged as
Ci = [100, 201], CPi = [0.9, 0.1].
7.6.5 Analysis Framework
By computing timing vectors together with the state space model, we can obtain the required
timing information. The framework of our computation is displayed in Figure 7.4.
In this framework, a transition matrix Pn−1 is computed at every step. With the transition
matrix Pn−1, the new state Sn is obtained using a Markov chain matrix model, which will
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Figure 7.4 Markov chain framework
be used for the transition matrix calculation for the next step. Meanwhile, timing vectors
Ci, CPi are generated using the transition matrix. These are fed back to the next step.
Finally, timing vectors are accumulated to form the timing exceedance function.
7.7 Adaptive Method
In previous sections, we have demonstrated how to use a Markov chain based model to
do timing analysis. The result of this method is accurate, but since the number of states
increases polynomially with a large exponent, this method is intractable. As a result, we
introduce an adaptive method to limit the number of states and to produce a result with
reasonable accuracy.
7.7.1 State Modification
There are different ways to select some memory addresses for Markov chain states. Here we
propose an adaptive method and it replaces states in the markov chain continuously.
We have shown that state si is used to represent a unique memory layout of the system.
Suppose there are |M | memory addresses, to reduce computational complexity, we would
like to use only n (n < |M |) memory addresses to represent states. This is realized using
state modification in two steps:
• State construction: for the first n addresses, we construct the state space using the
Markov chain method as {s0, s1, ...}. This way, the number of states does not increase
polynomially any more- it is limited to the value given by Equation (7.3). When another
new memory address comes, we modify the memory addresses in state si in next step,
instead of increasing the number of states.
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• State modification: when memory address a is accessed, we first check if it is already
in state si. If a ∈ si, it means this memory address is already in our state space. In
this case, we do not need to modify the state. If a 6∈ si, it means this is a new address,
and we would like to modify our state such that this address a is included in the state
space. Meanwhile, one memory address in the state space will be discarded to have the
same number of address. To modify the state, we first find the memory address b that
is not used in future, or whose next access takes the most time steps in all memory
addresses consisting the state space when it is used. This method tries to keep all
memory addresses that will be used shortly and discard those memory addresses that
will be used after a long time. The state si containing b is then removed. The new
memory address a is applied to the Markov chain model and new state sj is constructed,
i.e. sj = si \{b}∪{a}. This way, the number of states remains the same, but the states
represent different memory addresses: those states si containing address a have been
replaced by states sj containing address b.
We can see that we select a fixed number of addresses, which results in a fixed number of
states. Besides, by looking into the future memory requests, we can find which addresses
will be used shortly. Hence we are able to discard those addresses that will be used at a
later time, while pessimistically merging their timing information into the existing states as
described in Section 7.7.2.
7.7.2 Timing Analysis
When states are changed, we need to take timing analysis into account as well, because each
state is assigned different timing distributions. To obtain the safety bound of pWCET, we
use a conservative method. We need to deal with the following variables for timing analysis:
state occurrence vector S, timing distribution vector C and its occurrence probability vector
CP .
Suppose si is the state containing the memory address md to be discarded, and sk is the
state containing all other memory addresses in si except the address b, i.e. sk = si \ {md}.
In previous section, we see that when a new address is accessed, we may remove the state
si. Therefore the state vector which represents its occurrence probability must be modified
accordingly. In the new state vector S, we use this formula to modify it:
Pr(sk) = Pr(si) + Pr(sk) (7.8)
Let mi be the incoming address. For the new state sj = si\{md}∪{mi}, we have Pr(sj) = 0.
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Apart from the state vector modification, we need to modify the timing distribution vector
C and its occurrence probability vector CP . This is performed in a similar way to the
modification of the state occurrence vector S. Suppose Ci and CPi are vectors for si, and
Ck and CPk are vectors for sk. Then the modification is performed using formulae
Ck = Ck + Ci, CPk = CPi + CPk (7.9)
The elements with the same number of cycles are then merged, as shown in Line 20 of
Algorithm 3.
After the modifications of the state occurrence vector S, timing distribution vector C and its
occurrence probability vector CP , we have transformed our Markov chain model into a new
one. The next address to be accessed is applied to this new Markov chain model by using
Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3 and timing analysis can thus be performed.
7.7.3 Safety of the Adaptive Method
We adaptively modify states using Equation (7.8) and (7.9), which can provide pessimistic
and safe results. Hereby we explain why results are safe. Let sn be a state without state
modifications from the adaptive method, i.e. a state that contains all memory addresses. Let
sa be a state with adaptive method. Note that some memory addresses may be discarded
by state modifications. Thus we have sa ⊆ sn. To study if the adaptive method using sa
produces safe results compared to the method using sn, we need to compare Ca and CPa with
Cn and CPn. Let mi be the incoming address and we know that Ca = Cn and CPa = CPn
before accessing mi. We need to consider following cases:
• mi ∈ sa: it implies that mi ∈ sn. Consequently there is a cache hit for both sa and
sn. From Algorithm 3, we can compute that ∀p, Ca[p] = Ca[p] + Nh, where Ca[p] in
the right-hand side is the element in Ca before accessing mi, Ca[p] in the left-hand side
is the element in Ca after accessing mi and Nh is the number of cycles for a cache
hit. This is the same for Cn. Therefore after accessing mi, we still have Ca = Cn and
CPa = CPn.
• mi /∈ sa and mi ∈ sn: for sa, it is a cache miss; for sn, it is a cache hit. In the case
of a cache miss, a state sa may become a state si, with associated Ci and CPi. Using
Algorithm 3, we have ∀p, Ci[p] = Ca[p] + Nm, where Nm is the number of cycles for a
cache miss.
When a cache miss happens, we need to take into account of all new states and all
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states use the same Ci. We sum up the probability vector elements of all states.
CPa[p] =
∑
iCPa[p] · pa→i = CPa[p]
∑
i pa→i = CPa[p]. We can see that for a cache
miss, the sum of probability vectors of new states is CPa = CPn. However, the element
in Ca is larger than the element in Cn, because Nm > Nh. Therefore the result using
sa is safe and more pessimistic compared to the result using sn.
• mi /∈ sa and mi /∈ sn: we still have Ca = Cn and CPa = CPn, but the element in Ca is
added by Nm instead of Nh.
From previous discussion, we conclude that our method can provide a safe and pessimistic
result. In our method, we have selected a memory address and have replaced it with incom-
ing memory address.This address is selected to keep as much information as possible for the
system: for future memory accesses, only the cache hits which are related to discarded mem-
ory addresses are ignored. Using this method, we take account of temporal characteristics
of applications and make our model adaptive better to their dynamic changes, such as the
case that cache locality changes during execution in terms of both cache contents and the
active line number. In Section 7.9, we can see that this method increases result accuracy and
reduces computational cost. Example 7.7.1 presents how to adaptively modify state space
S, state occurrence vector S, timing distribution vector C and the corresponding probability
vector CP .
Example 7.7.1 Suppose that the memory accesses are a, b, c, a, c, and they are accessed from
step 1 to step 5. We limit the distinct memory address number n = 2. Besides, we assume
that the cache associativity Nw = 4, the cache hit cycle Nh = 1, and the cache miss cycle
Nm = 100.
At step 1, before we access a, we construct the state space as S = {s0 = ∅, s1 = {a}, s2 =
{b}, s3 = {a, b}}. The state occurrence vector S = [1, 0, 0, 0], timing distribution vector
C = [∅, ∅, ∅, ∅], and the corresponding probability vector CP = [∅, ∅, ∅, ∅].
At step 3, we need to modify S, S, C and CP . Before the modification, we have S = {s0 =
∅, s1 = {a}, s2 = {b}, s3 = {a, b}}, with S = [0, 0, 0.25, 0.75], C = [∅, ∅, [200], [200]] and
CP = [∅, ∅, [0.25], [0.75]].
Then we change the state space to S = {s0 = ∅, s1 = {a}, s2 = {c}, s3 = {a, c}}. b is
replaced by c, because it is not used in following accesses. The associated vectors are changed
accordingly: S = [0.25, 0.75, 0, 0], C = [[200], [200], ∅, ∅] and CP = [0.25, 0.75, ∅, ∅]. We can
see that after state modification, we have Pr(s1 = {a}) = 0.75, which is a pessimistic case
of Pr(s1 = {a, b}) = 0.75. In the same way, we change the state from Pr{b} = 0.25 to
Pr{∅} = 0.25. The corresponding C and CP are modified accordingly.
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7.8 Extension to Data Caches
We have demonstrated our Markov chain approach that can be applied to instruction caches
directly. However, writing policies make data caches behave differently from instruction
caches. In this section, we explain how to extend our approach to data caches.
7.8.1 Data Cache Writing Policies
There exist two writing policies for data caches: write-through and write-back policies. A
write-through policy writes data to both the cache and the main memory at the same time.
This can be modeled very easily and our Markov chain method can be applied in a straight-
forward fashion.
However, a write-back data cache behaves differently and it is often combined with a write-
allocate policy, as illustrated in Figure 7.5. When reading or writing data from a write-back
cache, we need to check if the selected cache block is set as ‘dirty’. If so, the data in the cache
block must be sent to the main memory first, because it has been modified, which results in
an additional latency.
To extend our approach to data caches, we assume that when reading or writing, a cache
access latency is Nh, and a main memory access latency is Nm. This is the same as what we
used for instruction caches. From Figure 7.5, we can calculate latency L for the following
scenarios:
• Cache hit: L = Nh.
• Cache miss and ‘not dirty’: L = Nm.
• Cache miss and ‘dirty’: L = 2Nm.
7.8.2 Method Modification
Compared to instruction caches, there is an additional latency Nm for cache misses in the
presence of ‘dirty’ cache blocks. Thus we need to modify Algorithm 2 and 3. We introduce
binary variables Bad , Bat ∈ {true, false} to represent if the cache block with address a is dirty
and the type of the data access to a, respectively. When the block with address a is dirty,
Bad = true; otherwise Bad = false. If it is a data write, Bat = true; otherwise Bat = false.
First, we add additional operations to Algorithm 2 as follows:
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(a) Read data from a data cache.
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(b) Write data to a data cache.
Figure 7.5 Read and write for a write-back data cache with a write-allocate.
Line 5: In the case of a cache miss, we set the block as ‘not dirty’ if it is a data read, i.e. if
Bat = false, Bad = false.
Line 15: We set the block as ‘dirty’ if it is a data write, i.e. if Bat = true, Bad = true.
Next we modify Algorithm 3 to account for additional latencies due to dirty blocks as follows:
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Line 7: We modify the case of a cache hit, such that if a block is not dirty, the latency is Nh;
otherwise it is Nm. Then we remove Line 9 and add the following: if Bad = false, cik =
ck +Nh; otherwise cik = cik +Nm.
Line 10: We modify the case of a cache miss in a similar way. If a block is not dirty, the
latency is Nm; otherwise it is 2Nm. Note that when using the adaptive method, some
addresses may be discarded, which results in empty cache blocks. We useBadiscard = true
to indicate the address a has been discarded before, and Badiscard = false otherwise.
When we access discarded addresses in future, we assume pessimistically that the blocks
with such addresses are dirty. Consequently, we remove Line 12 and add the following:
if Bad = false ∧Badiscard = false, cik = cjk +Nm; otherwise cik = cjk + 2Nm.
By adding operations related to dirty blocks to Algorithm 2, we are able to tell if each cache
block is dirty or not. We modify Algorithm 3 to account for additional latencies caused by
dirty blocks, and use pessimistic assumptions while applying the adaptive method.
7.9 Benchmarks Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate our methodology using real-world benchmark applications. We
chose the Mälardalen benchmarks [52], a popular benchmark suite used for WCET evaluation
and analysis. We perform SPTA using our adaptive Markov chain model, and compare its
results with results from another state-of-the-art SPTA methodology. All benchmarks are
performed with a dual-core Intel Duo CPU running at 3.0 GHz with 4GB memory.
Our experiments use the SoCLib open platform2 to simulate our design under test. SoCLib
supports several processor architectures: we adopt the MIPS 32-bit processor architecture.
The Mälardalen benchmark suite was compiled into MIPS ISA with the Sourcery CodeBench
tool from Mentor Graphics3. The platform is equipped with a single MIPS processor with
an L1 instruction cache, which has been modified to use evict-on-miss random replacement
policy. Our experiments are performed for an instruction cache and a write-back, write-
allocate cache.
For industrial and avionic embedded systems, cache associativity is usually fairly small. For
example, the LEON34 processor has a configurable cache between 1 and 4 ways. Thus we set
the cache size as 512 bytes, with 4-way associativity and 4-byte cache block. For each cache
miss, we assume a duration of 100 cycles and thus a dirty data cache block causes another
2http://www.soclib.fr/
3http://www.mentor.com/embedded-software/sourcery-tools/
4http://www.gaisler.com/index.php/products/processors/leon3
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100 cycles; for each cache hit, the delay is 1 cycle. Memory address traces are generated
by the platform, which are used for SPTA and adaptive Markov chain model analysis. We
considered modulo placement only.
Benchmarks5 used for analysis are listed in Table 7.1. We select the benchmarks that do not
require hard floating point unit that is absent in our SoCLib platform.
Benchmark Description
expint Series expansion for computing an exponential integral function
bs Binary search
duff Unstructured loop with known bound
statemate Automatically generated code
fdct Fast discrete cosine transform
jfdctint Discrete cosine transformation
ndes Bit manipulation, shifts, array and matrix calculations
compress Data compression
edn Vector multiplication and array handling
adpcm Adaptive pulse code modulation
bsort100 Bubble sort
matmult Matrix multiplication
fir Finite impulse response filter
Table 7.1 Benchmarks
7.9.1 Model Accuracy
In this section, results from the adaptive Markov chain model are compared with simulations
to verify its accuracy. For each cache set, different number of memory addresses are selected
to see their impact on timing analysis. We select 10−15 as the exceedance probability of
interest, since the maximum allowed failure rate is 10−9 per hour for commercial airborne
systems, which is equivalent to an exceedance probability of around 10−13 [37]. Thus we
estimate the time at 10−15 as a conservative result.
For the sake of space limitations, Figure 7.6 shows comparisons between simulations and a
subset of the benchmarks using instruction caches and Figure 7.7 shows comparisons using
data caches. Figure 7.6(a) and Figure 7.7(a) display the comparison between simulations and
FDCT benchmark; Figure 7.6(b) and Figure 7.7(b) show the comparison for EDN bench-
mark. We ran 10,000 simulations to sample the timing behavior of the benchmark and
performed cache analyses with the memory traces using our proposed approach. Simulated
5http://www.mrtc.mdh.se/projects/wcet/benchmarks.html
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(a) Benchmark fdct. Total memory access: 1632.
Distinct memory access: 267.
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Figure 7.6 Adaptive Markov chain model accuracy using instruction caches. A varying num-
ber of memory addresses are used in adaptive Markov chain model for comparison with
simulations.
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Figure 7.7 Adaptive Markov chain model accuracy using write-back data caches with write-
allocate. Different number of memory addresses are used in adaptive Markov chain model
for comparison with simulations.
time is obtained for each simulation. On each figure, the x-axis shows the number of cycles
and y-axis represents the exceedance probability for corresponding cycles. This is called
probabilistic WCET (pWCET), because for each WCET estimate, there is an associated
exceedance probability. When we compare different results, we can see the WCET estimate
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for a specific exceedance probability.
We can see as we increase the number of memory addresses n, the result from the adaptive
Markov chain comes closer to that from simulations. Take Figure 7.6(a) for example, for
n = 3 the number of cycles is 62,000 at the exceedance probability of 10−15; for n = 4 it
becomes 53,000, reducing the estimate pessimism by using more memory addresses. They will
eventually produce the same result if all memory addresses are applied to the Markov chain
method, and increasing the number n does not change the result anymore, as illustrated
for n = 4 in Figure 7.6(a) and n = 2, 3 in Figure 7.7(a). In general, both the Markov
chain methodology and simulations match well. Since simulations are performed randomly,
there is a variance for each simulation, but the difference is not significant. However, as the
probability goes down, fewer simulation samples are available, to the point where the results
are not reliable: at the tail of the simulation plot, there is an obvious deviation between
simulations and Markov chain methodology. This deviation is due to the lack of simulation
samples, which were limited to constrain the simulation to feasible times. As the number
of simulation samples increases, the simulation result converges to the result of our method.
We thus conclude that our method can perform timing analysis accurately.
7.9.2 Comparison with Altmeyer SPTA
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Figure 7.8 Comparison with state-of-the-art SPTA. Accuracy and calculation time are com-
pared respectively using different number of memory addresses.
In this section, we use instruction caches and compare the results from our methodology with
that from the state-of-the-art SPTA proposed by [11], which is referred as “Altmeyer SPTA“.
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In “Altmeyer SPTA“, memory addresses are divided into two independent parts: the state
enumeration part and cache contention part. The addresses in the state enumeration part
are used for a detailed analysis. A cache state is represented as a triple CS = (E,P,D),
where E contains memory addresses for the state, P is the probability of the state and D
is the miss distribution. Every time an address is accessed, the update function is applied
to update cache state. If the memory is not in the state enumeration part, update function
evicts memory address in E; otherwise, the memory address is put into E. The probability
P and miss distribution D are modified accordingly by the update function. By detailed
analysis, a timing distribution can be generated.
To perform timing analysis for cache contention part, the notion of cache contention is intro-
duced. All memory accesses are regarded as independent, and the lower bound probability
of each memory access is calculated. Cache contention is used to see how memory addresses
content for cache blocks. A simulation S is used to represent potentially conflicting addresses.
If the accessed memory is not in S, the hit probability is 0. Otherwise, it is calculated us-
ing reuse distance, stack distance and cache associativity. This way, hit probabilities for all
memory accesses are calculated and the timing distribution can be obtained by convolution.
Since this part is independent of detailed analysis of state enumeration part, the convolution
of timing distributions is the final distribution of the program.
The Altmeyer SPTA consists of two parts and the enumeration part uses the most-used
memory addresses. This is different from our method, in which we use only one part, and
we change the memory addresses in the state space adaptively.
In Figure 7.8, we compare the calculation accuracy and time of two different methods. The
number of memory addresses for each cache set n ranges from n = 3 to n = 6. We start by
using a small number of different memory addresses for each cache set n = 3. With such a
number, some benchmarks show similar results to simulations, while others exhibit conser-
vative timing predictions. As we increase memory addresses up to n = 6, most benchmarks
have reached a point where further memory address increment improves the result accuracy
slowly. The memory trace file sizes of the benchmarks are in ascending order from left to
right in Figure 7.8.
Figure 7.8(a) shows the cycle number ratio between Altmeyer SPTA and the adaptive Markov
chain based method. At the exceedance probability of 10−15, we obtain estimated number of
cycles using Altmeyer SPTA and the adaptive Markov chain model and they are represented
as Na and Nm, respectively. We calculate the cycle number ratio Rc as
Rc =
Na
Nm
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We can see that when Rc > 1, the Altmeyer SPTA is more pessimistic; when Rc < 1, the
adaptive Markov chain model is more pessimistic. Otherwise both methods produce the same
result. On average, the geometric mean of Altmeyer SPTA estimates 11% more cycles than
our adaptive Markov chain based method.
Figure 7.8(b) represents the time ratio between the Altmeyer SPTA and adaptive Markov
chain based method. We use Ta to denote the calculation time for Altmeyer SPTA and Tm
for the adaptive Markov chain model. The time ratio Rt is computed as
Rt =
Ta
Tm
Figure 7.8(b) illustrates that the Altmeyer SPTA takes the approximately the same amount of
time as our Markov model, with Altmeyer SPTA being 1% slower on average. The calculation
time ratio varies within a limited range for all benchmarks (from 0.2 to 2.9), and overall the
time difference between two methods is not statistically significant according to t-test at 95%
confidence (p=0.22).
7.9.3 Comparison with LRU
In this section, we study impacts of cache on LRU replacement policy and random replace-
ment policy. In Figure 7.9, we use fdct and apply different cache sizes and associativities.
For a single-path program, the number of cycles is constant for caches with LRU policy. We
use a simulation to obtain the number of cycles using LRU policy and plot it as a vertical
line.
We can see that in Figure 7.9(a) and Figure 7.9(b), LRU performs worse than random
replacement, i.e. the number of cycles from LRU policy is larger than that using random
replacement policy. This is because for a smaller cache size, there are fewer cache sets. As
a result, there are more memory accesses for each cache set. When the number of accesses
becomes larger, the LRU performance becomes worse, since there are more opportunities
to replace a cache block before its future use. Random replacement policy, however, is not
affected so significantly. Each cache block is replaced randomly, which makes it possible to
keep any cache block for future use. In the worst case, pathological case may occur for LRU
caches, i.e. there are always cache misses for memory accesses in a cache set, since too many
distinct memory addresses are used in such a pattern that they are evicted before their next
accesses. A time-randomized cache can avoid such pathological cases since it evicts memory
blocks randomly.
Figure 7.9(c) and Figure 7.9(d) illustrate that as the cache size increases, the number of cycles
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decreases significantly, especially for LRU caches. On average, a larger cache size indicates
fewer memory blocks for each cache set, which may avoid pathological cases effectively for
LRU caches, which reduces number of cycles dramatically.
In addition, there are no associativity constraints on the use of our approach. In Figure 7.9(e)
and Figure 7.9(f), we can see as cache associativity increases, our method can still be applied.
The accuracy may be compromised, because more memory addresses are accessed when
associativity increases. Some information is lost due to limited number of used blocks n,
which compromises timing analysis result. The general rule is that n should be as large as
possible, given the available computational resources.
Several previous studies have done comparisons between random and LRU replacement poli-
cies [100, 101, 90, 66]. Our experiments show that when the code size is larger than cache
size, random policy helps reduce cache misses, which confirms the conclusion from previous
studies that random policy can avoid pathological cases effectively. However, note that our
results depend on the code layout of benchmarks and we analyze the cache impact using
a particular code layout, i.e. the trace from the platform. This is only one of the entire
code layout space. If the code layout changes, different results may be produced, because
we have adopted set-associative caches with modulo placement policy in the experiments.
The execution times for LRU and time-randomized caches may be different, i.e. they may
be shorter or longer compared to the presented results, depending on changes of the code
layout. In this section, we do not compare average performance of random and LRU policies,
since we do not have memory traces of all code layouts.
7.10 Conclusions
In this paper, we have demonstrated an adaptive Markov chain based Static Probabilistic
Timing Analysis (SPTA) methodology. Our methodology is based on a non-homogeneous
Markov chain model, which explores state space modeling for one cache set, and convolves
different sets to generate final timing information. To reduce computational complexity, the
state space can be limited to the specified level. The state space is modified adaptively, such
that selected addresses can be replaced by new incoming addresses in the state space with
good accuracy, while maintaining the same number of states. By reducing the number of
addresses used for state modification, we can find a compromise between calculation accuracy
and time.
Benchmark applications are used to verify accuracy of this methodology by using simulations
based on SoCLib platform with MIPS processor architecture. Its results are compared to
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state-of-the-art SPTA methodology. It shows that with the adaptive state modification, our
methodology has improved accuracy of results using less amount of calculation time. We also
demonstrate how to evaluate cache impacts on system timing behaviors using the proposed
method, which can help designers to select cache parameters of real-time embedded systems.
As future work, we can address several aspects: Simultaneous running of multiple programs
and hybrid SPTA/MBPTA are two examples. In addition, we only explored single-path
programs in this paper. However, it can be extended to multi-path programs by identifying
the worst-case path. Fully extending the approach to multi-path programs is also part of our
future work.
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(a) Cache size: 256 bytes. Associativity: 2.
110000 120000 130000 140000 150000 160000
Number of cycles
10-15
10-14
10-13
10-12
10-11
10-10
10-9
10-8
10-7
10-6
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
E
x
ce
e
d
a
n
ce
 P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
fdct sim
lru
altmeyer
markov
(b) Cache size: 256 bytes. Associativity: 4.
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(c) Cache size: 512 bytes. Associativity: 2.
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(d) Cache size: 512 bytes. Associativity: 4.
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(e) Cache size: 512 bytes. Associativity: 8.
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(f) Cache size: 512 bytes. Associativity: 16.
Figure 7.9 Benchmark fdct. Comparison with LRU replacement with different cache sizes
and associativities. Number of used blocks n=6.
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CHAPTER 8 GENERAL DISCUSSION
In previous chapters, we have presented the details of our research work. In this chapter,
we discuss their contributions and potential impact in three aspects: timing analysis and
complexity, impact of faults and the integration of fault detection. At the end of the chapter,
we summarize the contributions and the impact in Table 8.1.
8.1 On Timing Analysis Accuracy and Complexity
The use of random caches has become increasingly popular for embedded systems, which
makes it necessary to develop corresponding timing analysis techniques. As a result, prob-
abilistic timing analysis methods have been proposed to compute timing distributions with
respect to exceedance probabilities. In Chapters 3 and 7, we have proposed a Markov chain
based SPTA to calculate timing estimates accurately.
In Chapter 3, we aimed at developing an SPTA method in the presence of faults. Using
a Markov chain model, we are able to describe all states of the system at each cache ac-
cess. Thus, the timing information could be precisely obtained. Nevertheless, there exists a
challenge in using the Markov chain model: the number of states increases so dramatically
with the number of distinct memory addresses that it becomes intractable. Consequently,
we limited the number of states to make the SPTA tractable.
In Chapter 7, we saw that the state number of Markov chain based SPTA increases polyno-
mially with a large exponent. Besides, the prior research work focused only on instruction
caches. We extended the work in Chapter 3 from instruction caches to write-back data
caches with a write-allocate policy, which is a commonly used policy to reduce data access
latencies (the SPTA can be extended to write-through data caches as well with trivial mod-
ifications). The adaptive state modification method, which obtains timing information with
limited number of states, is explained in detail to demonstrate its safety and tightness.
Experiments in Chapter 3 illustrate that the Markov chain based SPTA can always pro-
duce safe pWCET estimates, and accurate pWCET estimates can be calculated with enough
number of memory addresses. Although we observed some differences at low exceedance prob-
abilities between the simulations and the pWCET distributions obtained using the proposed
SPTA, this can be explained by the insufficient number of data-points retrieved from the sim-
ulations. Experiments in Chapter 7 show that, with extension to data caches, the Markov
chain based SPTA can still provide accurate results. Statistically, our proposed method
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compute more accurate pWCET estimates compared to the state-of-the-art combined SPTA
method.
Using our proposed SPTA method, we can obtain pWCET estimates of random instruction
and data caches, which allows further analysis of the timing behavior of the system. For
example, we can compare pWCET estimates of random caches with timing estimates from
LRU caches, as performed in Chapter 7. We discover that although in many cases LRU
caches perform better, they also perform very poorly in some other cases, i.e. the execution
times using LRU caches are much longer than those using random caches. This is due
to the occurrence of systematic cache misses in LRU caches, especially in loops where the
number of accessed memory blocks is larger than the cache associativity. Random caches
avoid this phenomenon by evicting cache blocks randomly, which helps improve the WCET
of a system. This confirms conclusions from previous studies [90, 27]. In terms of average
performance, it is hard to extract absolute conclusions on the best choice between random and
LRU caches. Smith and Goodman [100, 101] argue that random replacement outperforms
LRU replacement. However, Quinones et al. [90] suggest that random replacement can
degrade average performance. Since we could not obtain all possible memory traces of the
benchmarks, we did not evaluate the average performance of random replacement.
Although our SPTA method is proposed for random caches, it can also be applied to deter-
ministic caches (e.g. LRU caches), in which each memory access can be regarded as a special
case of random caches with a deterministic probability. However, in terms of performance, it
may not be comparable to state-of-the-art timing analysis method for deterministic caches,
since it was initially proposed for random caches.
8.2 On the Impact of Transient and Permanent Faults
As feature sizes of semiconductor devices scale down, reliability issues have arisen: the fault
probabilities of caches–the components that adopt smallest features allowed and occupy large
area of processors–increases steadily. This lead us to the development of SPTA method in
the presence of faults in Chapters 3 and 5.
In this dissertation, we focus on faults in storage elements of caches. Faults in the combina-
tional logic are different from those in the storage elements. For example, transient faults in
the combinational logic do not affect future operations, while those in the storage elements
will not be removed until they are detected. To prevent errors in the combinational logic,
corresponding fault detection and correction techniques can be adopted, which may increase
time to access the cache. This is however out of the scope of the dissertation.
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We have modelled both transient and permanent faults for random caches in Chapter 3. For
transient faults, we focus on SEUs (a change of state by high-energy particles, especially in
space environments) which produce errors temporarily. Cache blocks with transient faults
provide erroneous data. Upon detecting transient faults, the system sets the data in the
corresponding block as invalid and may fill the cache blocks with new memory data. Therefore
faults are removed and the cache blocks can work without affecting future operations.
There are different types of permanent faults due to process variations in manufacturing
process, aging effects of components, etc. We study dynamic permanent faults induced by
aging effects. By establishing a formula to calculate the permanent fault probability, we
observe that the permanent fault probability increases with time. Once a permanent fault
occurs, it remains in the cache block. To avoid following errors, this cache block can be
disabled for further use.
With fault models, we successfully analyze fault impact on pWCET estimates. Chapter 3
presents our first attempt to statically analyze random caches in presence of faults. When
transient fault rate increases, the pWCET estimate increases gradually as what we would
have expected. We note that, however, as the number of permanent fault exceeds some
threshold, there may be a dramatic increase in execution time for some benchmarks. This is
in reason of the fact that, after a permanent fault occurs in a cache set, the program may
frequently access that same set, which significantly increases the execution times due to cache
misses caused by permanent faults.
Chapter 5 extends the SPTA from instruction caches to write-through data caches with
no write-allocate policy, which avoid data inconsistency issues that happen in write-back
data caches because of faults. Evaluations reveal that as the cache block size increases,
the pWCET may be improved at low exceedance probabilities, but it becomes worse at high
exceedance probabilities. This is because every time a cache miss occurs, more memory blocks
are fetched and stored in the cache, which effectively reduces the probability of cache misses
for the following memory accesses, which improves pWCET at low exceedance probabilities.
Nevertheless, a permanent fault in a cache block of a large size affects more area, which
degrades the pWCET at high exceedance probabilities.
From Chapters 3 and 5, we conclude that the final pWCET depends on the characteristics
of the selected benchmark. To predict fault impact, we need to use our proposed SPTA and
pay attention to sudden changes of pWCET estimates, in which the presence of permanent
faults may vary the pWCET significantly.
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8.3 On the Integration of Fault Detection into Timing Analysis
In our previous discussion, we have investigated SPTA methods that includes both transient
and permanent fault impact. For simplicity reasons, a perfect fault detection technique that
detects transient and permanent faults immediately after they occur is assumed to be in
place.
In practice, however, a perfect detection technique is infeasible and may take some time to
detect and classify a permanent fault. To improve system performance, we apply D-HMM
based permanent fault detection to random caches. Through the comparison between rule-
based and D-HMM based permanent fault detection in Chapter 4, we observe that fault
detection plays an important role in the pWCET distributions, especially under extreme
conditions when fault rates are particularly high. D-HMM predicts the occurrence of a
permanent fault more accurately, which can further help disable the corresponding cache
block to avoid future cache misses caused by this block. By comparing the measured execution
times using rule-based and D-HMM based detection to those using a perfect detection, we
discover that D-HMM detection performs very well with similar execution times to those
with a perfect detection.
Having recognized the importance of permanent fault detection techniques, we integrated the
implementation a practical permanent fault detection technique into the proposed SPTA in
Chapter 6. Experimental evaluations show that it is possible to obtain accurate pWCETs on
a system with a realistic permanent fault detection technique. Besides, we observe that when
we increase the size of the cache block, the number of cache misses decreases drastically and
the pWCETs are improved. We find that when we increase the cache associativity and use the
same number of cache sets, the pWCETs are improved as well. In some cases, the pWCET
improvements are greater when increasing the cache block size rather than increasing the
cache associativity. In other cases, the pWCET improvements are smaller. This degree of
improvement depends on the program features.
The integration of the rule-based detection into SPTA is the starting point of a realistic
permanent detection technique analysis. More advanced detection techniques (e.g. D-HMM
based detection) can be studied in a similar manner using different detection models. With
fault models and detection techniques, the method can be used for aerospace application
analysis, where faults occur due to high space radiation. The developed technology can be
used for software validation and certification to reduce the cost significantly.
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Table 8.1 Summary of the contributions and impact of the dissertation.
Ch. Ref. Contribution Impact
3 [31] Fault models for transient faults
(i.e. SEUs) and dynamic permanent
faults due to aging effects.
Providing researchers with fault
models for caches.
Transient and permanent fault de-
tection techniques.
Allowing researchers to study sys-
tem timing behavior with fault de-
tection techniques.
A Markov chain model for SPTA of
random caches.
Enabling accurate timing distribu-
tions for systems in presence of
faults, taking fault detection effects
into consideration.
4 [30] Proposal of D-HMM based detec-
tion for permanent faults in random
caches.
Demonstrating how to implement a
practical permanent fault detection
technique.
Comparison using measurements be-
tween two practical permanent fault
detection techniques.
Discovery on the significance of a
permanent fault detection technique
on the system performance.
5 [32] In addition to instruction caches,
write-through data caches are taken
into account for SPTA with faults.
Allowing researchers to study both
instruction and data cache effects.
Introduction of a cache contention
based SPTA method.
Making it faster to perform SPTA at
the expense of calculation speed.
Practical fault detection comparison
to perfect detection with instruction
and write-through data caches.
Evaluating practical detection per-
formance with respect to the perfect
one.
6 [34] Development of SPTA for a practi-
cal permanent fault detection tech-
nique.
Insight into integration of periodic
fault detection in practice.
Experiments with different cache
configurations.
Unveiling cache configuration im-
pact on timing distributions using
the SPTA.
7 [33] Extension of the Markov chain based
SPTA to commonly used write-back
data caches.
Enabling full performance analysis
on both instruction and data caches.
Performance comparison between
random caches and LRU caches.
Indicating advantages and disadvan-
tages of random caches.
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CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
9.1 Contributions
In this dissertation, we have developed a Markov chain based SPTA. The state is used to
represent the memory layout of the cache. For each memory access, the state update is
computed using a transition matrix, which depends on the current state and the incom-
ing memory block. The timing information for each state is calculated separately, and the
pWCET distribution can be derived using the timing information of all states after accessing
all memory blocks. We limit the number of memory blocks in the Markov chain model and
use an adaptive method to change the memory blocks in the state and to retain as much
information as possible. By comparing the proposed SPTA method to state-of-the-art SPTA
method with a combination of a state enumeration method and a cache contention method,
we discover that on average, the Markov chain based SPTA generates a more precise pWCET
estimate.
To deal with the impact of faults, we have defined a transient fault model and a permanent
fault model. The transient fault model considers SEUs as transient faults, and we assume
that an online detection technique can detect all transient faults. The permanent fault
model assumes that for every memory access, there is a probability of a permanent error in
the program execution caused by the system’s components wear-out, the aging effects, etc.
This probability is not constant and it increases as time goes by. We suppose that there
is a permanent fault detection mechanism to detect and classify permanent faults. Once
a permanent fault is detected, we disable the cache block where it occurred so that only
fault-free blocks are used for future memory accesses.
With the fault and detection techniques in place, we have integrated the fault impacts into
our Markov chain based SPTA and verified its accuracy through a series of experiments.
Since our SPTA is based on states, we manage to incorporate the fault impact into the state
enumeration method of the state-of-the-art SPTA. We develop the formulae to account for
the impact of faults on cache contention method separately. The experimental results prove
the effectiveness of the modified state-of-the-art SPTA that takes faults into consideration.
There are many ways to implement a permanent fault detection in real systems. In this
dissertation, we deploy two permanent fault detection techniques—rule-based and D-HMM
based detection—and study the impact of the implementation of permanent fault detection
using measurements. We conclude that, on average, permanent fault detection provides
137
execution times that are shorter compared to those using rule-based detection.
We then integrate the rule-based permanent fault detection into a state-of-the-art SPTA
method to obtain pWCET statically. Since the permanent fault detection technique is peri-
odic, we use two modes to represent the case in which the fault detection is active and the
case in which the fault detection is idle. For each mode, we develop corresponding formulae
to provide safe and tight pWCETs. In the experiment section, we evaluate the accuracy
and impact of faults on pWCET distributions. The role of the cache block size and cache
associativity are investigated as well.
9.2 Limitations
We have proposed a number of SPTA methodologies able to cope with the presence of faults.
However, there are some constraints to their application. As a baseline for the study of
the implementation impacts on pWCET distributions (from SPTA) we use a rule-based
permanent fault detection. This is a very simple fault detection mechanism, and there
are other advanced mechanisms, such as D-HMM based detection, which produce improved
pWCET estimates. Our SPTA only applies only to rule-based detection and, to integrate
other detection mechanisms, additional formulae should be developed, a non-trivial task.
Furthermore, when permanent fault detection is implemented, transient faults are absent.
However, their occurrences may affect the effectiveness of the rule-based detection, which
requires modifications of our proposed SPTA methodology.
A second limitation is the applicability of our SPTA in the presence of faults. We have
developed our SPTA for single-path programs, and added fault impacts in the SPTA for
cases in the presence of faults. However, our SPTA does not apply to multi-path programs.
Note that, when we verify its accuracy, we compare the pWCET distributions with those
derived from simulations rather than using industrial measurements.
9.3 Future Work
For our future work, we will extend our single-path SPTA with faults to multi-path SPTA.
Furthermore, we used the Mälardalen benchmark suit in our experiments, a common suit for
PTA evaluations. However, there are other available benchmarks and we plan on evaluating
our methods using them as well. Since there are not many commercial products with random
caches, we have only verified pWCET distributions using simulations. It would be interesting
for us to perform SPTA on real commercial embedded-systems in future.
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